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PREFACE
This study considers approximately one century (1529- 
1633) in the life of a 195 mile-long strip of land in 
western Honduras. My original intent was to explore the 
construction, and use, of a Spanish colonial road within 
this corridor and to tell the story of how that camino real 
changed the geography of this strip of land. Having 
conducted an exhaustive review of historical route 
geographies, I was convinced that Honduras' earliest 
trunkline was fertile ground for tracking the region's early 
settlement geography. Much to my disappointment, however, 
insufficient archival material preluded my telling the story 
as intended.
Therefore, my investigation has veered from the 
specific to the more general. To describe the route 
geography of the Honduran corridor, I have described aspects 
of route geography and colonial transport for routes 
throughout all of Central America. From this information I 
have interpolated by analogy an understanding of the 
constellation of factors, spatial and temporal, that 
influenced the life of the Honduran depression. Hence, my 
original subject's lack of fine details forced me to broaden 
my focus. The result is a model of early colonial 
roadbuilding and transport in Central America and a partial 
explanation of Honduras' sputtering colonial development.
v
Because I take pleasure in reading first-hand accounts 
of colonial activities, be they overly ambitious 
descriptions of plans for colonial development, or vivid 
accounts of the difficulty of mule travel, I have included 
numerous lengthy passages within the text in the original 
Spanish. In consideration of readers unfamiliar with the 
language, I have provided translations. I also have 
littered the text with Spanish terms that appeared 
frequently in my reading. Spanish words that have not been 
adopted into common English are italicized and defined in 
brackets the first time they are used. Ensuing useages of 
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ABSTRACT
Historical route geographers consider the factors that 
influenced past roadbuilding, and the changes that result 
from roadbuilding. The earliest Spanish colonial officials 
in Central America initiated roadbuilding projects that were 
sensitive to physical and cultural factors. Officials had 
to consider the region's aboriginal routes, Spain's trade 
flows, the isthmus' topography, and the region's population 
distribution. The roads the Spaniards opened four centuries 
ago guided early settlement. In some cases, these early 
roads persist in the region's route network.
During the 16th-century Spaniards sought to establish 
transisthmian roadways that would link Spain's Atlantic and 
Pacific maritime networks. Partial fluvial routes across 
the Isthmus of Tehuantepec, Isthmus of Panama, and 
Nicaragua's Desaguadero received early attention. So, too, 
did the 195-mile long geologic depression that runs across 
western Honduras.
Colonial officials, among them Francisco Montejo, 
repeatedly attempted to persuade the Crown to direct Spain's 
inter-oceanic traffic across the Honduran corridor. This 
prospect figured significantly in Montejo's plans to 
transform the province from a colonial backwater into a 
center of commerce.
Honduras failed to attract transisthmian traffic to its 
corridor. An examination of roadbuilding and overland
xiii
transport in Latin America in the 16th-century, demonstrates 
the corridor's transport liabilities. Honduras suffered 
from a depleted indigenous population, a small agricultural 
base and a long, uneconomical crossing.
Indians initially served as cargo bearers in lieu of 
mules and carts and later constructed roads and bridges. 
Mules and oxen, were needed to draw wagons and carry loads. 
Grain surpluses were needed to feed beasts of burden, 
Indians and travelers. With regard to these demands, 
surveys from 1590 confirmed what previous letters to the 
Crown had suggested: Honduras could not support
transisthmian traffic neither did its corridor provide a 
rapid crossing.
A description of a recent crossing of the corridor and 
a glance at current traffic flows in Honduras demonstrate 
that despite the region's failure to capture Spain's 
interoceanic commerce, traces of its past promise persist. 
A few segments of the route possess Honduras' cores of 
industrial growth and agricultural production. Conversely, 






...the highway itself, by its construction, by its 
winding, by its slopes, by the material of which it is 
.made, and even by its color, is a fact teeming with 
geographic interest." (Brunhes 1947: 112)
Introduction
Where the foot, hoof, or wheel strikes the ground, 
marks the intersection between human mobility and the 
barrier to mobility that is the physical environment. If 
experience favors the way, an artifact emerges, one that 
transforms and, in its inception, acutely responds to 
nature. This artifact is the route, the road, the trackway, 
the trace, the trail, the chausee, the chan-tau, the 
camino real. It proffers humans a mastery over space; a 
mastery that however, ultimately, is at the mercy of the 
terrain the route traverses and the locomotion of the 
conveyance. Hence, routes are human etchings in the 
landscape that are particularly reflective of the 
relationship between humans, their economies, technologies 
and settlements, and the physical environment over which 
they travel.
Beyond these compelling characteristics, the route is 
ubiquitous in the cultural landscape. For just as humans 
colonize space by constructing scattered places, they, 
likewise, seal the endeavor by blazing trails to connect 
these places. Thus, where there is settlement, there are 
routes.
In addition to the ubiquity of the route and its
responsiveness to the physical environment, there remains 
yet another absorbing route feature. A route is an artery 
on the land into which human activity has been channeled
throughout the route's existence. Consider the
concentration, through time, of human endeavor along the 
paths that led through Europe's Alpine passes or across Asia 
to the Orient. The route corridor is a sensitive landscape 
record of history and a fertile focus of landscape history.
The approximately 195-mile corridor that connects 
Puerto Cortes on the north coast of Honduras to the Gulf of 
Fonseca on the Pacific Coast is the focus of this route 
study (Map 1). This research identifies and analyzes the 
interrelationships among a constellation of human and
physical factors that influenced the life of this corridor 
during the early colonial period. These factors include: 
aboriginal communication networks, Spanish exploration, 
population distribution, topography, agricultural potential. 
The knowledge gained will demonstrate early colonial route 
planning and construction in Central America, and explain 
much of Spanish settlement activity in western Honduras 
during the 16th century. In addition, the role of early 
colonial routes in the present route network will be 
discussed. The remainder of this chapter contains the most 
comprehensive review of historical route geography to date 
and places this study within the context of the discipline
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Map 1. The Honduran Corridor
of Geography. The chapter's final section provides a 
preview of this study.
Route Geography
During the past century geographers have recognized the 
congruity of route study with the broader fields of 
settlement geography and cultural-historical geography. 
Likewise, they have attended to the route features 
identified above, among others. A fine early example of 
geographers' preoccupation with routes is Karl Sapper's 
brief description of indigenous trails in highland Guatemala 
and his call for greater attention to the secrets they held 
(Sapper 1936). Much of Sapper's twelve-year stay in Central 
America was spent rambling far and wide on footpaths 
[FuBpfade]. His time on the trail demonstrated to him a 
profusion of route subtleties that ranged from the 
comparative seasonal tractions of mud to route variations 
related to vegetation types and, finally, the factors that 
influenced natives' choices of footwear (1936: 11-16). The 
late publication date belies the fact that the article was 
based on fieldwork Sapper conducted in between 1888-1900. 
Whether or not in response to Sapper's counsel, routes have 
captured the interest of many 20th century scholars.
Milton Newton (1970) called geographers' study of the 
paths of human movement "Route Geography." According to 
Newton,
study of the route as a basic repeating element in the
landscape can provide insight into man's occupance of
the land. These routes can serve as a sensitive summary 
of physical, cultural, historical, political and 
economic factors that have produced the present 
landscape (1970: 152).
Newton can be counted among those geographers who produced
comprehensive route studies. However, consideration of
Newton's work at this stage would be out of turn, for he
followed several pioneers of modern route geography.
Friedrich Ratzel (1844-1904), Paul Vidal de la Blache 
(1845-1918) and Jean Brunhes (1869-1930) included extensive 
passages concerned with routes in their respective 
systematic studies of human geography: Anthropogeographie 
(Ratzel 1912), Principes de geographie humaine (Vidal de la 
Blache 1922) and La geographie humaine (Brunhes 1910). 
Rather than detailed treatments of specific routes, these 
sections abound with explanatory generalizations and 
speculations about the nature of routes and arguments for 
the importance of route study. The accumulation of route 
studies with the passage of time has confirmed the accuracy 
of some of their early deliberations. A review of pertinent 
literature also reveals that the questions outlined by Vidal 
de la Blache, Ratzel and Brunhes have persisted and continue 
to guide route study. Therefore, a review of these well- 
known European pioneers' ideas concerning route geography is 
here appropriate. The ultimate aim is to identify briefly 
the primary methodologies they contributed to route 
geography. These, and other themes, then will be considered 
individually in greater detail in the second half of this
chapter when subsequent geographers7 applications of these
general themes to the study of specific routes are reviewed.
Friedrich Ratzel
Among Friedrich Ratzel7 s observations concerning routes
was the interdependence of human settlement and routes.
[I]t is difficult to say if the settlement or the road 
came first, they are so very dependent on each other. 
They belong close together and grow together (Ratzel 
1912: 342).
Because of this relationship to settlement, the focal point 
of the cultural landscape, Ratzel maintained that route 
study was essential to Landschaftskunde. The question he 
asked in this passage, What came first, settlement or the 
road?, has captured the attention of many geographers 
because it is fundamental to understanding the genesis of 
the built environment. Beyond this question of causality, 
Ratzel suggested that routes, themselves, might define whole 
regions. "When connected, the network of trade roads in a 
region essentially determine the nature of that region" 
(1912: 342). Ratzel expanded the regional aspect of routes 
beyond trade when he suggested that "[r]oads represent, by 
their nature, one of the best measures of culture" (1912:
344). This quote predates the practice common among atlas 
publishers in which they include in their section of 
thematic maps a map that shows world-wide route mileage. 
Authors of world regional geography textbooks also offer 
route density as a criterion to distinguish between the 
developed and underdeveloped world (De Blij 1994: 34).
However, according to Ratzel, routes served not only as 
"measures of culture," they also acted as agents of culture 
change. "Roads are one of the most powerful means of 
cultural development," (1912: 345) to say nothing of
diffusion. With these generalizations Ratzel established 
the route as a landscape signature charged with cultural 
significance.
Ratzel developed the cultural importance of routes by 
applying an early notion of core-periphery spatial relations 
to route distribution. In an admittedly simplistic example, 
he compared the route network of a coastal region to that of 
its hinterland. The greatest concentration of roads were 
found in, and define, the coastal core, while the hinterland 
periphery was road poor. From this situation he projected 
the development of "the ethnographically significant 
contrast between trade-rich and trade-poor, richer and 
poorer, progressive and stagnant peoples" (1912: 345).
Ratzel pursued the relationship between culture and the 
route further. Much as a culture ecologist views the 
relationship between humans and the physical environment as 
a reciprocal relationship, at once considering the influence 
of the physical environment on cultural development and the 
impact of human activities on the physical environment, 
Ratzel saw a reciprocal relationship between humans and the 
route. In addition to its capacity for altering culture, 
the route also reflected the fortunes of the sequence of
cultures that used it. "They [roads] are constantly
rejuvenated by successive groups of peoples, especially by
colonizing cultures in new lands" (1912: 345). The language
conjures up Ratzel's conception of the state as a living
organism with the route, which Ratzel called "Life's
Artery", an integral living constituent. Ratzel provided an
example of this process of rejuvenation.
The significance of river roads is greatest during the 
earliest stages of a country's development. Trade is 
particularly dependent on river and valley roads. In 
their plains primary settlement is concentrated. They 
provide simple, immovable boundary lines. Later, 
development disperses. The population leaves the plains 
and valleys ... roads find the rivers' winding too long 
and truncate. The border lines migrate away from the 
rivers (1912: 347).
A key factor missing from this model is the change in
transport technology that allowed the truncation, or
"rejuvenation," of the route. It is reasonable to assume
that in the many instances Ratzel mentioned "cultural
development," he implied technological change. Clearer
articulations of the relationship between the route and
transport technology by subsequent geographers will be
discussed later in this chapter.
Beyond the aforementioned themes, Ratzel also found 
value in a possibly more prosaic, or profound, feature of 
the route. According to Ratzel, "[w]hat races, tribes and 
peoples have helped to make is of world-historical 
significance" (1912: 344). In another passage he wrote that 
"[t]here is an attraction to efforts like these [road-
10
building]; people are proud of these important promoters of 
their progress, these testimonies of their blood" (1912:
345). Hence, the road, like the plowed field or built 
house, is of geographical value because it is a human 
creation.
Thus, at an early date, Ratzel identified several 
themes to guide the study of routes. They include: the 
relationship between routes and settlement; the 
chronological sequence of rcute-building and settlement; the 
unity of route and region; the route as a measure of culture 
and instrument of cultural change; the relationship between 
the route and transport technology; and the route as human 
artifact.
Paul Vidal de la Blache
Ratzel's contemporary Paul Vidal de la Blache also 
acknowledged the importance of route study. Not
surprisingly, Vidal de la Blache's treatment of routes 
occasionally coincided with Ratzel's. However, Vidal de la 
Blache did identify additional route questions and in the 
case of those concerns common to Ratzel, the Frenchman 
offered more detailed expositions of his ideas.
Vidal de la Blache also recognized the interdependence 
of the route and settlement (1926: 370-389). However, where 
Ratzel was uncertain about which came first, Vidal de la 
Blache confidently argued for the precedence of the route. 
"The road is branded on the soil. It sows seeds of life, -
houses, hamlets, villages and towns" (Vidal de la Blache 
1926: 370). In another passage he wrote that a road
"creates" life. He bolstered this argument with the mention 
of French settlements, such as Taverny and Saverne, which he 
believed named according to their origins and early route 
functions. Route travelers and beasts of burden required 
food, water and lodging at fairly regular intervals. 
Consequently, settlements emerged along routes at regular 
intervals. This relationship between route settlement and 
itinerant human sustenance is universal. Therefore, a 
ubiquitous feature of the pedestrian landscape is the 
roadhouse settlement, the Incan tambo, the Spanish posada, 
or venta, the French taverne ... The nature of these 
settlements is discussed later in this chapter in a section 
that focusses on the works of geographers who concentrated 
on this aspect of the route-settlement relationship.
Vidal de la Blache further developed the dependence of 
settlements on routes when he noted the "permanent imprint" 
that early roads made on urban morphology (1926: 381). He 
observed that the road or crossroads that gave birth to 
settlement, also guided the settlement's growth, providing 
lines of reference for the arrangement of streets. Vidal de 
la Blache believed the influence of these early surface 
etchings extended beyond urban centers. They established 
the foundations for later patterns of commerce.
Great importance must be attached to what had previously
been accomplished by road building. The consequences of
12
road construction can be felt in present economic 
conditions. For example, modern industry has often been 
founded on relations which roads brought into 
being...For industrial centers are not created by the 
presence of fuel and minerals and raw materials alone 
(1926: 388-389).
This quote suggests that current transport networks result
from the spatial inertia established by routes of an earlier
time and economy. Vidal de la Blache believed that the lack
of a long entrenched pattern of transport in America was an
essential difference between Europe and America. As will be
demonstrated throughout the remainder of this chapter,
subsequent geographers have considered this notion of
"cultural continuity" both in the Old World and the New
World.
Vidal de la Blache identified another route feature 
that has since become a standard element of route geography 
(1926: 378). This is the aforementioned relationship
between the route and the terrain it traverses. Not only is 
the "road branded on the soil," but "primitive modes of 
travel are branded with the physical environment". Despite 
the brevity of his treatment of this vital connection, Vidal 
de la Blache offered a few explanatory generalizations. For 
example, he related a method of transportation, its 
preferred route to the appropriate physical environment. 
Hence, cart traffic on cart roads favored regions where 
deposition exceeded erosion: open, slightly dissected
surfaces that experience infrequent rains, thereby ensuring 
firm soil. Beyond considerations of soil and hydrology,
13
Vidal de la Blache observed the relationship between routes 
and the physical environment in the convergence of trans­
mountain trails on passes or gates like Brenner and 
Cumberland. These physical features influenced not only 
route but also settlement location, military outposts often 
being established on either side of the pass.
Vidal de la Blache, like Ratzel, recognized the power
of roads to create human landscapes and he offered important
generalizations about these roadscapes.
These narrow ribbons, whose surfaces are constantly 
brushed by human footsteps, can already lay some claim 
to permanence, with an individuality all their own" 
(1926: 370).
What is the basis of this "individuality? How does this 
distinctive "ribbon" of land fit into a regional framework? 
Ratzel's assertion that a route could determine a region 
inspired similar questions. Vidal de la Blache noted 
several route characteristics related to these questions. 
Chief among these characteristics was the manner in which a 
route attracted a variety of human activities to itself. 
Activities ranged from commercial and religious to 
political, the actors hailing from throughout the diverse 
regions the route linked. Hence, a diverse mix of activity 
and people was concentrated in the strip of land that was 
route corridor, thereby distinguishing it from other areas 
of the Earth's surface (1926: 379).
Another distinguishing feature was the unique manner in 
which this strip responded in concert to changes in the
14
nature of activity along the route. Vidal de la Blache 
noted that a route corridor could be a "zone of attraction” 
or a "zone of repulsion11 depending upon the degree to which 
it was policed (1926: 381-382). During periods of security 
towns were established close to the road. In contrast, 
during lawless periods the route was a "warpath" and 
settlement, understandably, moved or was established a safe 
distance from the road. Hence, the route corridor could be 
thought of as a fluid area of the Earth's surface that ebbed 
and flowed in response to human activity.
In the following passage Vidal de la Blache alluded to 
these distinguishing route characteristics and introduced 
others.
The Roman Road is primarily an imperialistic 
achievement, an instrument of power holding in its 
clutches a whole sheaf of different, widely separated 
regions. In many places it is still associated with 
intimate and living history, because along with 
commodities, pilgrims or armies, all news of the outside 
world, all thoughts and legends, have travelled over it 
as well. Moreover the populace has given it a name; it 
has been personified (1926: 380).
Vidal de la Blache aptly chose the masters of road-building
and the permanence of their creation to convey the
exceptional character of the route. However, these
observations are not limited to the Roman via. Vidal de la
Blache viewed the route as more than a system of economic
circulation. Its essence lay beyond its trade flows. The
route was a spine of history, a channel of communication, of
15
culture. In this capacity it warranted naming and 
personification much as a region does.
Similar to Ratzel, Vidal de la Blache's treatment of 
routes did not overtly conclude that the route corridor 
constituted a region. However, he emphasized the 
distinctiveness of the corridor on the basis of its 
associated activities. In addition, his inquiries and 
observations about the route's essential character suggest 
that the corridor displays some degree of coherence. This 
distinctiveness and coherence are certainly essential 
characteristics of regions.
Therefore, we find a general correspondence between 
Friedrich Ratzel and Paul Vidal de la Blache's conceptions 
of the function and character of routes. Vidal de la Blache 
considered the relationship between the route and settlement 
and assigned causal power to the road. He identified the 
connection between route settlement and itinerant 
sustenance. In addition, he emphasized the permanent 
influence early routes exerted on subsequent spatial 
relations. Vidal de la Blache also introduced the physical 
environment as a essential concern of route study. And, 
finally, he sought the essential character of the route, its 
history, its name, its personality.
Jean Brunhes
Vidal de la Blache's student Jean Brunhes (1978) also 
emphasized the importance of route study to human geography
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and contributed valuable insights. However, it may appear 
that his ideas are given short shrift in this chapter. This 
primarily results from his place in the order of 
presentation. It also reflects the congruence of his 
observations and generalizations with those of Ratzel, a 
geographer with whose work he was familiar, and Vidal de la 
Blache, his mentor.
Brunhes divided the human landscape into three 
categories. One of these he called "sterile occupation of 
the soil" (1978: 65). This included human dwellings and 
agglomerations and circulation networks (James and Martin 
1981: 193). Hence, it included the route. The grouping of 
route and settlement reflects the interdependence that 
Brunhes concluded existed between the two. Similar to Vidal 
de la Blache, Brunhes believed that "inhabited centers 
(were) created by the road" (1978: 175). Similar to Ratzel, 
he emphasized that the settlement-route relationship existed 
and warranted attention at various scales: from the roads of 
great empires to "small trodden spaces or beaten paths" 
leading to small Alpine huts (1978: 110).
Brunhes also agreed with Ratzel when he suggested that 
routes were measures of cultural development (1978: 114- 
116). When Brunhes echoed his mentor and directed his 
attention to a culture, the Romans, known for their road- 
building prowess he identified another fertile aspect of the 
route. The route is an artifact that reflects the decisions
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of people who can be considered working field geographers.
[T]he Romans, desirous above everything else of 
quickness of communications and military transportation, 
took no account, in the construction of roads, of the 
natural features of the land. Their roads are as far 
possible straight lines. Artificial work is therefore 
very frequent...The Romans did not content themselves 
merely with smoothing the ground. In order to assure 
the solidity of the road, instead of opening it they 
built it (1978: 114).
As a colonizing force the Romans were faced with momentous
spatial problems. What were the most efficient means to
establish political control? At what locations would
military outposts prove to be most effective? Over which
routes should roads be built to link these outposts? How
might current trade flows be re-oriented toward Rome?
Successful solutions to these problems depended on practical
knowledge of the physical and human geography of the areas
to be colonized. The routes, and maps of routes, that
remain reveal the solutions to these problems.
Similar to Vidal de la Blache, Brunhes also found in
the route a sensitive expression of the relationship between
humans and the physical environment. However, consistent
with his understanding of human geography, Brunhes
emphasized the influence water availability exercised on the
location of routes and route settlements.
The historic routes of travel of the desert nomads, the 
buffalo trails of the Great Plains, are almost as 
rigorously subject to the distribution of water holes as 
our trains are subject to stops at fixed stations ... to 
supply the boilers with water (1978: 55).
In this passage Brunhes highlighted the physical environment
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as an integral factor in route geography. He also referred 
to another factor, transport technology. As we saw earlier, 
Ratzel briefly dealt with this topic when he wrote of route 
"rejuvenation" and "cultural development." Brunhes, 
however, devoted greater attention to this crucial subject. 
Despite his assertion that improvements in transport 
technology failed to free routes from the grip of the 
physical environment, Brunhes did acknowledge that routes 
responded to technological change. With each innovation we 
"find an echo in geography" (1978: 113).
Therefore, beyond confirming many of the observations 
of Friedrich Ratzel and Paul Vidal de la Blache, a reading 
of Jean Brunhes broadens our perspective to include an 
appreciation of variations in route scale, a recognition of 
the geography that early route planners practiced and a 
regard for the relationship between transport technology and 
the route.
Themes Recurrent
Inquiry into the writings of Ratzel, Vidal de la Blache 
and Brunhes resulted in the identification of a host of 
themes that by virtue of their acuity have guided route 
geography since early in the 20th century. Presently this 
chapter will consider the subsequent application of these 
themes to route study. This endeavor skirts redundancy 
because the scope of inquiry moves from the general to the 
specific. The resulting increase in resolution allows more
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detailed analysis. In addition, our survey of route 
literature will identify other factors that have come to 
light in the decades since Ratzel, Vidal de la Blache and 
Brunhes considered the route. Among the results of place- 
and culture-specific route study is a refinement of previous 
generalizations, the identification of route-related 
universals and intensified appreciation for the route as a 
sensitive marker of culture history.
Discussion of the body of route literature will be
organized according to the following themes: Traces of
History; Route Origin, Persistence and Pioneer Settlement; 
and Cultural Geomorphology, Transport Technology and 
Trailblazing Geographers; and the Road as Region. Despite 
organizing route geography into these discrete thematic 
divisions, on numerous occasions subject matter spills over 
from one section into one or two others. This is
unavoidable and reflects the interdependence of the themes. 
Traces of History
Yi-Fu Tuan (1980) identified the attraction that the 
route held for geographers when he explained the 
•'significance of the artifact." According to Tuan, the 
artifact, a "humanly constructed object, material or
mental", has "the power to stabilize life" (1980: 462-463). 
A constellation of artifacts establishes in nature "the sort 
of order that satisfies (humans) material and spiritual 
needs" (1980: 465). Prominent among these artifacts is the
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route, for it promotes human mobility and communication. 
Considered through time, it is a recurring record of the 
efforts of past cultures. It is an artifact that orients 
history.
Numerous geographers have contented themselves with the 
study of routes as historical markers, as landscape remnants 
of significant human endeavors. The guiding research 
principle for many of these geographers simply was that 
ground knowledge of important historic routes was necessary 
for understanding these routes. Securing ground knowledge 
often involved traveling the length of the route, observing 
the terrain it traversed and noting the route's present 
function. The studies that resulted commonly steered a 
descriptive course. Scholars established the route's 
historical context. They described the physical nature of 
the route and its course. Where appropriate, they 
identified what they thought were significant route features 
that might apply beyond their specific studies. Rarely did 
these studies pose, much less solve, geographical problems. 
Instead, the spirit of these inquiries was that history 
dwelt in the miles that these routes traversed. In his 
study of trans-Appalachian roads Albert Perry Brigham evoked 
this Romantic spirit when he sounded an early call for 
geographers to get out and walk some of the old route traces 
and "seize the experience of the past" (Brigham 1905: 327).
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The pertinence of Brigham's exhortation is evidenced in 
the subsequent profusion of similar studies infused with his 
spirit. Admittedly, a brief review of these studies offers 
little insight into the general geography of routes. It 
does, however, reveal insights into the development of the 
practice of geography.
The two-decade period between 1930 and 1950 appears to 
have been a time when geography, as a discipline, valued 
studies of historic routes by virtue of the empirical facts 
of history that they provided. During this period prominent 
English language journals, including the Geographical 
Review, the Geographical Journal and the Annals of the 
Association of American Geographers, published several such 
route geographies. However, this trend possibly was 
initiated by a study published in a journal not among these. 
Ibero-Americana published Carl Sauer's The Road to Cibola in 
1932. In this study Sauer traced the early development by 
the Spaniards of a trunk road that led to the northwestern 
frontier of New Spain and thereby, facilitated the extension 
of Spanish control, in the form of religious and 
administrative institutions that followed the trailblazers. 
Sauer acquired ground knowledge of this route from his 
repeated travel along it en route to field study areas in 
Mexico. At the outset he identified a primary value of this 
familiarity that informed this sort of study. He was 
writing history with the "advantage of knowing the country"
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(1932: 2), an advantage that he felt historians often
lacked. This "advantage" recurs in most of the route 
geographies from this period. Sauer's study is rich in 
physical description of the route and explanation of route 
strategies. Moreover, he gleaned from archival documents 
some of the particulars of the geographical information that 
guided the Spaniards opening of the road.
The next historical route study to appear was Robert 
Hall's (1937) treatment of the Tokugawa government's 16th 
century road that connected Kyoto and Yedo [Tokyo]. Beyond 
providing the standard elements mentioned above, Hall 
introduced the notion, mentioned earlier, that a route 
corridor could be considered a region (1937: 357). He
viewed the road as a factor that had always coordinated 
human activity. The road, therefore, was an especially 
appropriate feature on which to base the study of history.
Harold Peake (1939) considered the "keekwilee holes" 
(ancient routeways) he found entrenched in the chalky 
English Downs. He tracked the history of landforms along 
several of these routes and with the information from 10th 
and 11th land charters and analysis of toponyms 
reconstructed the courses they followed. His ultimate 
purpose was to untangle conflicting versions of the history 
of these route remnants (1939: 436).
Despite an adequate description of the route's 
historical significance, Hanson-Lowe's (1940) study of an
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ancient tribute path that led from Lhasa to Peiping was 
essentially a travelogue of his journey along the route. 
One can imagine that his chief purpose was exploration 
rather than explanation. This brings up another aspect of 
this sort of route study. Old routes led researchers on 
excursions of after-the-fact exploration. This prospect of 
discovery persisted especially in those cases in which 
routes led geographers to remote areas that largely had been 
passed over by modernization.
The Geographical Journal published one such study in 
the same volume as Hanson-Lowe's previously-mentioned 
article. Patrick Fitzgerald traveled the old caravan trail 
that linked Bhamo on the Irawaddy to Kunming near the 
headwaters of the Yangtze (1940). At the time of the study, 
the trail traversed the frontier between the British Empire 
and China. Fitzgerald noted present trade flows along the 
corridor and the possibility of opening the corridor for 
automobile transport. Considering the locations of the 
routes, the time of the studies and the political situation, 
it seems that, beyond history and exploration, Hanson-Lowe's 
and Fitzgerald's studies could also have been undertaken for 
strategic purposes. Both studies, published by a British 
journal, examined routes that led from the British sphere of 
influence to China's interior. It seems reasonable that a 
possible outcome was Britain's development of penetration 
corridors along these old routes. Ratzel might have called
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this potential example of continuous use an illustration of 
"route rejuvenation". Another study from this year that was 
guided by similar concerns was Felix Howland's (1940) 
research on caravan routes that crossed the Hindu Kush.
Two years after publication of these three studies the 
Geographical Journal resumed its interest in strategic route 
geography with the publication of Sir Henry Craw's (1942) 
study of the Burma Road and J. V. Harrison's treatment of 
tribal routes that led from southern Iran to southern 
Russia. William Rudolph (1943) revisited this purpose in 
his study of "Strategic Roads of the World." Rudolph cited 
old trails in Africa, Asia and Latin America that could 
serve as possible routes of "development" (1943: 124).
A winter jaunt by a pair of footloose geography 
graduate students, Robert West and James Parsons (1941), 
culminated in an exemplary route study. They trekked the 
Topia Road, a prominent trans-Sierran trail in New Spain. 
Their study steered a descriptive course in explaining the 
historical significance of this route that connected the 
"Road to Cibola" to Culiacan. West and Parsons depicted 
colonial traffic flows and found their remnants in the 
present landscape, mostly in the form of sunken roads. 
Photographs record these remnants and convey the nature of 
the land the route traversed. Moreover, a photograph of 
West's de-soled hiking boot, published in West's Festschrift 
(Davidson and Parsons 1980: 6), is a testament to the
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physical understanding of pedestrian travel along colonial 
routes that these two geographers gained.
One final study closed out the discipline's two decade- 
long appreciation for descriptive-historical route study. 
Because of its thorough treatment of an eminently 
significant subject, Herold Wiens' (1949) study of the Shu 
Tao that led from China's Wei Ho valley over the Tsinling 
Shan and Tapa Shan mountain ranges and on to the Szechwan 
Basin can be considered as an appropriate bookend for this 
period that began with Sauer's "Road to Cibola." Wiens 
conceived of this route as a recurring "spillway" of culture 
in China's history. Among the significant innovations that 
flowed along this path to the interior were Buddhism, the 
Han civilization, the first wheelbarrow and, more recently, 
Communist efforts to unify and integrate greater China. 
Wiens posed the reverse flow from Szechwan to the Wei Ho 
valley as the first segment of the Great Silk Road, for 
Szechwan was a primary source of silk (1949: 591). The 
nature of Wien's field research is unclear. However, his 
observation that one can "meet the symbols of the past" 
(1949: 602) along the route suggests that he acquired at 
least some ground knowledge of the Shu Tao. The phrase also 
provides a profound reiteration of that quality of the route 
that attracted the geographers discussed above. A route 
corridor is a funnel for human activity. Hence, routes that
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are repeatedly revisited through time hold within their 
confines a rarified record of human endeavor.
At this juncture we will shift our attention to route 
studies by geographers who sought to explain routes, who 
viewed routes as geographical problems to be solved, as 
artifacts that obeyed spatial and temporal laws.
Route Origin and Inertia
Ratzel, Vidal de la Blache and Brunhes all suggested 
that the routes established by the earliest occupants of an 
area instituted a spatial inertia within that area. 
Spatial inertia refers to the power of a region's earliest 
route network to guide the arrangement of subsequent 
peoples7 activities and relations despite economic shifts 
and transport improvements. According to this view, a route 
corridor is much like a geologic column, with each stratum 
corresponding to a period and means of travel. The concept 
predates and concurs with Zelinsky's "Doctrine of First 
Effective Settlement" (1973: 13). And just as Zelinsky 
argued that explanations of the fundamental character of 
extant cultural landscapes lay in the culture of the 
landscape's earliest occupants, route geographers have 
searched for route explanations from the route's earliest 
travelers. Hence, considerable emphasis has been placed on 
route origins. Moreover, geographers have tracked the 
process of pioneer settlement to discover whether early 
routes did, indeed, establish a spatial inertia.
27
The instinct of the animal and the shrewdness of the 
savage, only a little higher in intelligence than the 
animal, have planned roughly the survey which 
engineering skill examines and frequently approves 
(Rogers 1889: 490).
This quote effectively captures early notions about 
route origins and persistence, especially for the New World. 
The search for origins is limited largely to the study of 
routes in the Americas. Geographies of European routes 
seldom trace origins beyond the network of Roman roads.
Andrew Burghardt (1969: 418) termed the image promoted 
in the passage above the "primitive life" explanation of 
route origin. According to this explanation European 
colonists in the New World simply followed Indian trails 
that, in turn, were but "an adaptation of animal trails," 
that led to "salt licks, grazing grounds and water holes" 
(1969: 418). The early date of Rogers' statement should not 
suggest that such an explanation was without somewhat 
contemporary dissent. Roe (1929) considered the 'Wild 
Animal Path' thesis as early as 1929. He identified the 
buffalo as the primary supposed trailblazer. His analysis 
of historical accounts supporting the Wild Animal Path 
thesis rooted out gross exaggerations and faulty analyses of 
the relationship between animal paths and ancient roads. 
Aside from these problems, Roe believed a crucial defect of 
the explanation was the absence of a common incentive. He 
argued that human routes always "had a definite objective in 
view" (1929: 307). The primary objective was trade. Roe
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disallowed the suggestion that trade and the natural 
migrations of buffalo coincided. Accordingly, there was no 
basis for explaining human routes by animal routes. A 
possible defect in Roe's argument is that he considered it 
absolute and thereby denied out and out the possibility that 
buffalo migrations were, indeed, an important factor in 
early trade.
Beyond animal origins, route geographers have studied 
the relationship between European road-building in the 
Americas and pre-existing route networks. In the 
aforementioned The Road to Cibola, Carl Sauer argued for 
route continuity when he presented the opening of the road 
to the northwestern frontier as a process by which European 
explorers largely appropriated pre-existing Indian roads 
(1932: 1).
In Alfred Meyer's (1954) study of pioneer settlement 
and circulation in the Calumet region of northwest Indiana 
and northeast Illinois he, likewise, maintained that 
"unquestionably the Indian trail ... constituted the 
predominant aboriginal influence on the basic pattern of 
pioneer settlement" (1954: 267). Similar to Sauer, he found 
evidence of this influence in the adoption of the pre­
existing route network by European settlers. The original 
government surveyors of this region were instructed to 
record the extant trade network so that they might "serve as 
guides to men who desired to buy land without seeing it"
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(1954: 259). Both Sauer and Meyer attributed European
adoption of aboriginal route networks to what they believed 
was the essential character of these routes: a surpassing 
sensitivity to the terrain they traversed. Sauer called 
these trails the "best compromise between distance and 
terrain" (1932: 2). Meyer claimed that the Indians lived 
"in the closest adjustment to their environment" (1954: 
259). Hence, the result was "a trail mapped out by nature 
itself" (1954: 254).
These two route geographies present evidence that some 
routeways experience what James Vance (1961: 357) called 
"continuous use." As such, a chronological sequence of 
cultures recognizes the merits of a particular route and, 
therefore, continue to exploit it. Certainly, there are 
numerous routes that fit that description. However, the 
"continuous use" explanation is simplistic. The consensus 
it enjoys is unfortunate. Acceptance of the "continuous 
use" explanation disregards the influence of other crucial 
route factors. Nevertheless, the general acceptance of this 
explanation warrants further inquiry.
James Vance, Andrew Burghardt and Peter Rees can be 
counted among a small group of geographers who have 
concentrated on the origins of routes or route networks. 
Each member of this trio dealt extensively with notion of 
"continuous use." A review of their findings sheds light on 
the question of route origins.
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In his comparative study of the Oregon Trail and the 
Union Pacific Railroad Vance (1961: 357) argued that the 
"continuous use" explanation incorrectly presumed that "all 
movement has similar causes and, thereby coincident 
locational requirements." The basis of his argument was the 
lack of coincidence between the aforementioned routes. 
Vance compared both routes' northern passages across the 
Rocky Mountains and the paths they followed to Ogden, Utah.
The Oregon Trail's peak of utility occurred in the 
1840s and 1850s. It largely was abandoned after the Union 
Pacific Railroad was constructed in the five years following 
the Civil War. Vance argued that abandonment and the 
interruption of "continuous use" resulted from a change in 
the purpose of travel and a sharp decline in the dependence 
of travelers on local resources since the time of peak 
travel on the Oregon Trail (1961: 357).
Both of these reasons are related to route responses to 
technological change, a topic which merited a separate 
subheading in this chapter. Nevertheless, an intentionally 
incomplete discussion of these reasons is appropriate at 
this juncture. Vance grouped travel, such as was executed 
by means of the Oregon Trail and the Union Pacific Railroad, 
into two categories: "Non-economic Transportation" followed 
by "Economic Transportation." Non-economic generally 
preceded economic travel. Vance described non-economic 
transportation as those movements that measured success in
terms other than profits (1961: 357). The most common form 
of non-economic travel was pioneer migration beyond the 
frontier where travelers had to "depend on nature to provide 
support for the journey" rather than capital (1961: 364). 
Travelers were considered successful if they reached their 
destination. Consequently, non-economic routes were 
influenced more by physical geography, the impediments to 
and the sustenance for travel, than economic geography 
(1961: 357-358). Diaries of Oregon Trail travelers, non­
economic travelers, revealed that they "had to be concerned 
with feed for their animals more than with any other aspect 
of the natural environment" (1961: 367). Therefore, Vance 
concluded that study of non-economic travel should focus on 
the natural endowments of the route such as grass, water, 
wood. In the case of the Oregon Trail, he found that these 
concerns were more important considerations than mountains 
or Indians. In essence, the Oregon Trail followed an 
"almost unbroken line of grassland" rather pursue a path 
"where effort was the least" (1961: 363-378).
In contrast, the purpose of economic transportation was 
to carry goods or people in the hope of profit from the 
activity. Any barrier could be surmounted if the net result 
of the travel was profitable. This type of travel included 
the railroad. Because of the pursuit of profit, economic 
travel was conducted year-round. In contrast to the 
relatively static "natural routes" of non-economic travel,
economic routes were "constantly subject to improvement" to 
increase profits (1961: 378). Hence, repeated calculations 
of distance, directness and grade characterized economic 
travel. As a result, Vance claimed that in contrast to the 
vegetation-dominated Oregon Trail, the Union Pacific 
Railroad demonstrated "terrain denomination" (1961: 378). 
Because of the drastic differences between the two purposes, 
non-economic vs. economic, of travel the two routes depended 
on significantly different locational criteria. Therefore, 
the Oregon Trail route was abandoned rather than 
appropriated by the Union Pacific Railroad (1961: 379).
Andrew Burghardt considered route origins in both the 
Old World and New World. In both worlds Burghardt
concentrated on the relationship between aboriginal routes
and pioneer settlement. In the introduction of his study of 
route origin in the Niagara peninsula, Burghardt (1969) 
summarized the assumptions that had dominated route
geography. First among these was that "the road is the
creator, the city the creation" (1969: 417), an assumption 
previously traced to Vidal de la Blache and Brunhes. 
Burghardt attributed it to 18th and 19th century Romanticism 
when the road signified mystery and adventure rather than 
simply a channel for trade flows. Another assumption was 
the belief that topography determined road courses. 
Burghardt called this "physical determinism" (1969: 418). 
Accordingly, natural fords or bridging points drew trails to
them; roads followed high land and avoided flood-prone low 
areas; and routes followed river valleys. And, as noted 
above, these trails were considered adaptations of animal 
trails, headed "to salt licks, grazing grounds and water 
holes" (1969: 418). Burghardt argued that the prevailing 
assumptions about route origins maintained that "topography 
or primitive life forms dictated the alignment of early 
roads, and that the location of these roads in turn dictated 
the location of urban centers" (1969: 418).
Burghardt tested these assumptions in the Niagara 
peninsula during the period of initial white settlement, 
1770-1851. He chose this area because there had been no 
major Indian settlement for more than 100 years before 
British settlement. There were, however, traces of an 
Indian route network. Burghardt found that the "most 
striking" characteristic of this route network was "the 
juxtaposition of the trail and stream network" (1969: 422). 
This was compatible with the assumptions Burghardt had 
identified earlier. Such an arrangement provided for "rapid 
communications in both directions" (1969: 422), afoot up
river and on the water down river. Other characteristics of 
the Indian route network included: the regular occurrence of 
parallel routes; lack of evidence to support animal route 
origin; and convergence of routes in areas that offered only 
narrow passage (1969: 424-425).
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The only evidence Burghardt found to support continuous 
route use was the fact that initial penetration by British 
settlers largely followed pre-existing Indian routes. These 
roads served as temporary settlement axes. However, as 
settlement progressed, a system of survey was superimposed 
on the land. This system provided a new orientation for the 
settlers' route network and a re-orientation of transport 
patterns on the peninsula. Although some Indian routes were 
incorporated into the new network, most faded from use 
(Burghardt 1969: 435).
Burghardt found little proof of the presumed capacity 
of the route to create urban centers, or even permanent 
settlement. Settlements emerged at port or mill sites 
rather than at crossroads. Edwards and Hindle recently 
reported similar findings in medieval England where port 
locations were found to be site advantages that rivalled the 
town-building benefits of routes (Edwards and Hindle 1991: 
133). In the Niagara peninsula, port settlements stimulated 
the construction of roads to link the surrounding areas to 
them. Thus, towns created roads. The pre-existing route 
network, indeed, provided a "potentiality" for significant 
settlement; however, a "catalytic action" was necessary for 
focussing urban activity in the area (Burghardt 1969: 435- 
436).
Burghardt's use of the word "catalytic" calls to mind 
a passage from Carl Sauer's "The Morphology of Landscape"
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(1925: 47-48) which emphasized the importance of "the 
catalytic relation of civilized man to area and the effects 
of the replacement of cultures." Sauer described the 
essence of the situation Burghardt studied. According to 
Burghardt, the influx of a significant number of settlers 
with "their advanced technologies and their systems of land 
use" served as the catalyst in the Niagara peninsula (1969: 
435). Burghardt neglected to note that despite the British 
settlers' advanced technologies, their early settlements and 
roads hugged the major waterways much as had the Indian 
routes.
Burghardt (1979) revisited the question of route 
origins and pioneer settlement when he turned his attention 
to the origins of an Old World route and settlement network. 
In this study of the Romans' conquest and early 
administration of Pannonia (presently the western half of 
Hungary and eastern Austria) Burghardt once again dealt with 
a situation reminiscent of the Sauer quote cited above. 
However, the study does not simply recount identical 
processes in a different location. Instead, Burghardt 
sharpened his conception of the replacement of one cultural 
landscape with another more advanced. The resulting 
insights justify a review of this study.
At the outset Burghardt suggested that the search for 
route origins should also involve the identification of the 
point in time at which a route network established a
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permanence in the cultural landscape. According to 
Burghardt:
In any one macro-region there is usually one brief, but 
large-scale period of city foundation. This fundamental 
pattern is set down when an urban-oriented society 
assumes control over areas lightly populated by non­
urbanized peoples (1979: 1).
Once again Burghardt evokes Sauer. In "The Personality of
Mexico" (1941a: 354), Sauer called for historical
geographers to focus their attention on the period, "the
first generation or two," when the New World/s cultural
landscape was re-oriented to suit the needs of the
colonizing European cultures. This is the crucial period in
which to study the establishment of route networks, for it
allows for the comparative study of two models of route
networks in a compressed period of time.
Burghardt briefly characterized the pre-Roman route 
network as a "dense web of strictly local linkages with a 
few long-range routes" (1979: 3). The only trunk trail was 
the Amber Road, which led from the mouth of the Vistula to 
the Adriatic. However, it was only of peripheral importance 
in pre-Roman Pannonia. Burghardt explained that such a 
network reflected the character of the region's trade. 
There were few products of sufficient compactness and 
lightness to be transported long distances economically 
(1979: 6). Hence, trade was regional and traffic
predominantly was restricted to a network of relatively 
short, narrow paths.
In contrast to the brevity devoted to describing the 
route network the Romans found, Burghardt provided a 
thorough depiction of the network the Romans built. It 
echoed the previously cited passage from Brunhes. Because 
of differing purposes the Romans incorporated little of the 
extant network (1979: 3). The Romans built roads to
entrench military control and administration of the region. 
These purposes required the introduction of two alien 
transport elements into the region: soldiers marching in 
formation and wheeled conveyances. Accordingly, the Romans 
built roads wide enough to accommodate foot soldiers. The 
wheel dictated that the roads be smooth, well-drained and of 
sufficient width (1979: 17). Hence, the roads were surfaced 
with basalt pavement stones. Despite a desire for level 
roads, roads followed the most direct route often at the 
expense of levelness. Directness provided for rapid troop 
deployment and a minimum of road mileage. Efficient route- 
planning required construction of fewer miles of road and 
fewer halting places. The primary demand for engineering 
involved river and marsh crossings. These spots also marked 
the only places roads veered from their direct path. These 
route-building guidelines made for swift movement of foot 
traffic but not for freight, for "freight roads tend to be 
level rather than straight" (1979: 3). Hence, comparison of 
the contrasting purposes of the two route networks 
demonstrates the lack of route continuity.
Burghardt also found little evidence to suggest that 
the pre-existing web of routes guided Roman administration 
and settlement of Pannonia. In the few cases when the two 
coincided, "the routeway is so completely realigned and 
changed in character that any implied causality is more 
apparent than real" (1979: 17). Burghardt also considered 
the "causal interrelationship between routes and cities" 
(1979: 19). In the case of Pannonia, the Romans first chose 
sites for settlement on the basis of administrative and 
military objectives. Sites that maximized "areal control" 
and facilitated rapid troop movement were favored (1979: 
19). Upon selection of sites, the Romans then built roads 
to link these sites. This supports the argument for a 
route's town-building capacity. However, Burghardt did 
allow that, in some cases, the Romans did focus their site 
selection along the cleared path that the Amber Road 
provided. Nevertheless, he claimed that "the total network 
was determined by the locations of a few specific sites" 
(1979: 19).
Burghardt pointed out another important feature of the 
route-settlement question. The Roman roads established a 
secondary system of settlement directly on the roads. These 
were the "stages," or halting places, that were spaced at 
periodic intervals along each road. Unfortunately, 
Burghardt did not provide much information on these 
settlements.
Another study of route origins tested the notion of 
continuous use or route inertia in Latin America. Peter 
Rees (1975) looked at the assumption that Spanish colonial 
routes in Latin America could be traced to pre-Hispanic 
origins. Rees focused his inquiry on the camino real 
between Veracruz and Mexico City. The Spanish built this 
route between 1525 and 1527. To determine the extent that 
the Spanish appropriated pre-existing Aztec routes, Rees 
delineated the geography of Aztec routes and established the 
extent of Spanish knowledge of New Spain from Cortes' 
itinerary. With this information he mapped Aztec routes. 
He compared this map with a map of the camino real. Rees 
found that in spite of considerable knowledge of the Aztec 
network, the Spanish constructed their camino real 
independent of Aztec routes. The camino real ran to the 
north of the Aztecs7 routeway to Veracruz. Similar to 
Burghardt, Rees explained this discontinuity to a divergence 
of transport purposes (1975: 334). Aztec routes reflected 
Aztec trade relationships. They were "internally oriented" 
(1975: 334). Pochteca [Aztec word for a class of travelling 
merchants] conducted long-distance trade in cotton, cacao, 
feathers, gold and precious stones (1975: 325). In
addition, tribute flowed along the Aztec route network. 
Rees found that Aztec trade flows were additionally 
influenced by locations of specialized markets, politics and 
the laws that governed use of tamemes [human carriers]
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(1975: 328-329). Hence, there were numerous regional
centers that drew Aztec routes to them. In contrast, the 
initial caminos reales followed the model of what Rees 
called "typical colonial route(s)" (1975: 334). They were 
"externally oriented" routes that linked Spain as directly 
as possible to Mexico City (1975: 334).
Similar to Vidal de la Blache and Burghardt, Rees found 
that the Spaniards also established a system of regularly 
spaced settlements, called ventas, that served as roadside 
inns supplying sustenance for travelers on the camino real 
(1975: 330). Along the camino real that linked Buenos Aires 
to Mendoza and opened up interior settlement in southern 
South America, David Robinson (1970: 29) found a similar 
network of settlements. At these postas travellers could 
rest and refuel. The Spaniards established 28 postas along 
this approximately 700 mile stretch. Robinson suggested 
that at least some of these postas were located on sites of 
former tambo sites. Tambos were the stages along the Inka 
road network. Cobb (1949: 25) found that these tambos were 
regularly spaced 4-8 leguas, 10-20 miles, apart. Comparison 
of the camino real's length and the tambos' spacing reveals 
that all of the postas could not have originated from old 
tambo sites. Nor could the Spaniards reproduce this 
spacing. Robinson noted that "one of the most difficult 
tasks facing surveyors or travellers was the measurement of
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distance between the various towns, villages and refuges" 
(1970: 34).
Rees also discussed the period during which spatial 
inertia is achieved by route networks. Burghardt suggested 
this occurred when an urban culture imposed itself on an 
area that previously been sparsely populated by non-urban 
peoples. This was not the case in New Spain. The Aztecs 
had developed a hierarchy of settlement that included urban 
centers prior to the arrival of the Spanish. Therefore, 
Rees suggested that route inertia in New Spain occurred at 
a critical moment of "transportation innovation" (1975: 
323). In the case of New Spain, the transportation 
innovation was the "external orientation" of transport that 
the Spanish introduced. Rees noted the permanence that this 
character of route network experienced in colonial Latin 
America. Indeed, he pointed out that throughout Latin 
America development efforts often emphasize the 
redevelopment of "internally oriented" route networks and 
interregional markets (1975: 334).
In another route study Taaffe, Morrill and Gould (1963) 
considered the question of route origin and persistence in 
Africa. They focussed on the development of the 
transportation network in Ghana and Nigeria. In contrast to 
the studies reviewed above, this study provided little 
historical detail. This is because the authors attempted to 
construct a "descriptive generalization of an ideal-typical
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sequence of transportation development” (1963: 503).
Despite the lack of particulars, these geographers proposed
a sequence of development that agrees with some of the
findings of the aforementioned studies. They claimed that
the most important single phase in the transportation 
history of an underdeveloped country is the emergence of 
the first major penetration from the sea coast to the 
interior (1963: 506).
This initial route of penetration later served as the focus
for more advanced means of transport. Moreover, the
dominance of the initial route's port persisted throughout
each wave of transport innovation. These generalizations
are consistent with, and predate, conclusions made by
Burghardt and Rees. As mentioned earlier, they both
identified the route inertia that accompanied the arrival of
a particular culture group or the introduction of some
profound transport innovation or economic shift.
Review of these studies that considered route origins 
and persistence has brought to light several concepts that 
are critical for understanding routes. The notion of 
"continuous use" of route networks appeared in some form in 
every study. A common extension of this idea is that 
settlement locations were determined by pre-existing route 
networks. In other words, roads created towns. This is the 
view that Vidal de la Blache and Brunhes took. In two 
relatively early studies, Meyer and Sauer presented evidence 
that supported the "continuous use" explanation of route 
origins. They found that native route networks, the
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circulatory systems of "primitive life", were incorporated 
by initial European settlers who recognized the efficient 
compromise between distance and terrain that they 
demonstrated.
Burghardt and Rees, among others, presented evidence 
from Old World and New World studies that suggested 
otherwise. They explained the discontinuity of route use by 
a significant shift in the purpose of transport. They also 
found that the shift in purpose of transport was accompanied 
by settlement independent of extant routes. Indeed, they 
argued that new settlements created routes. However they 
also found that these new routes also created settlements 
like the posta, venta, stage or tambo.
Vance developed a useful framework for studying the 
shift in purpose of transport. Vance attributed
interruptions in route continuity to the switch from "non­
economic" travel to "economic travel". The difference 
between these two is the difference between a hopeful 
pioneer migration along a pastured, watered trace and the 
calculated procession of a freight train along the gentle 
grade of the Union Pacific Railroad. Burghardt
characterized this shift as a "catalytic action". 
Regardless of the characterization, Sauer, Burghardt, Rees 
and others emphasized that critical moment in time when for 
some reason whole route networks were re-oriented and 
entrenched, establishing the spatial inertia that earlier
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had been attributed to animal and native route networks. 
Burghardt suggested that moment occurred when an urban 
culture occupied a region previously only sparsely settled 
by non-urban peoples. Rees identified that moment as the 
juncture that marked the introduction of some transport 
innovation. In the case of New Spain, the innovation was 
the external orientation of colonial transport.
The value of these studies lies beyond the
generalizations they support or dispute. Their significance
rests in the questions and strategies with which they framed
the problem of route origins. With their respective studies
Vance, Burghardt and Rees established much of the
methodological core of historical route geography.
Cultural Geomorphology, Transport Technology and Trailblazing Geographers
Milton Newton's (1970: 134) conception of the route as 
a "cultural landform" was particularly insightful not 
because it established the route as a member on the roster 
of cultural landscape elements, but because it acknowledged 
the route's "special responsiveness ... to physical and 
cultural facts." Newton further developed the connection 
between the physical environment and the route when he 
claimed that route geographers should study routes like 
geomorpholgists study physical landforms. "(I)ndeed, it 
(route geography) becomes a sort of cultural geomorphology" 
(1970: 134).
Newton balanced his treatment of routes with his
observation that the physical dependence of the route was
influenced by the transport technology of the cultures that
traveled the route (1970: 140). Numerous geographers,
before and after Newton, noted the sensitive relationship
between the route, the physical environment and transport
technology. A review of their observations identifies
several points of agreement on strategies by which routes
and conveyances managed space and terrain. Several route
geographers considered these route-planning strategies to
identify the geographical knowledge that guided the
decision-making process. In essence, these geographers
viewed past route planners as early working field
geographers. In his study of the development of two
railroads, Donald Meinig (1962: 413) asserted that
understanding the decision-making process
is not only a necessary task but can be an exhilarating 
one, for these ... (railroad) strategists ... were 
practicing geographers consciously thinking in spatial 
terms and conscientiously grappling with regional 
qualities, variations, and potentialities.
He argued further that route study must take a genetic 
approach. The "geographical context" of each decision that 
contributed to the establishment of the route must be re­
constructed (1962: 413). This sentiment recalls the stated 
aim of Josephine Keller's (1936) research on the early roads 
in south Louisiana. Keller claimed her simple but profound
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purpose was to "recover the facts" of the development of the 
early road network (1936: 32).
This section reviews geographers7 observations of the 
connection between routes and the physical environment. 
Inseparable from these route strategies, are their planners, 
the decisions they made, and the changes wrought by early 
improvements in transport technology.
Information about strategies to overcome the realities 
of terrain originated from inquiry into early indigenous 
routes that served what Burghardt called "primitive life". 
Beyond the simplistic stereotype of the native road planner 
as a shrewd student of terrain, only a small step removed 
from the instinctual master of geomorphology, the beast, 
there are the recurring approaches to covering distance.
In his study of the relationship between topography and 
transport in Pennsylvania, Walter Tower (1905) presented 
evidence that challenged the commonly assumed shrewdness of 
the Indians7 in blazing their route networks. He found that 
many Indian trails "took little heed of surface form" and 
ran "directly across steep mountain ridges and through deep 
valleys, with no apparent attempt to seek out the easiest 
routes" (1905: 145). This presented a stark contrast to the 
notion of the Indian "trails mapped out by nature" that only 
gradually crossed contour lines (Meyer 1954: 254). Tower
observed that the routes that served more technologically-
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advanced inodes of travel, such as trains and automobiles, 
had more respect for contour lines.
G. W. Harley (1939) observed a similar apparent 
oblivion of "primitive" routes to relief in Liberia. In the 
hilly interior he mapped the hill tribes7 trails and found 
that they also crossed hills and streams at right angles 
(1939: 450-451). He reasoned that this pattern served
hunting purposes. Ridge crests were the most effective 
vantage points from which to see game watering at the stream 
side below. The most direct line of pursuit led downslope, 
perpendicular to the contour lines. Harley observed that 
trail patterns varied according to topography. In Liberia7s 
coastal plains, trails ran parallel to watercourses. This 
is consistent with the previously mentioned juxtaposition of 
streams and Indian trails that Burghardt discovered in the 
Niagara peninsula. Burghardt explained that this
arrangement provided for rapid communication both up and 
down river. Although Harley did not mention it, an obvious 
explanation for the variation in route patterns he found in 
Liberia, his hunting solution notwithstanding, is that in 
the interior, stream courses were easily forded while 
downstream they were not.
J. V. Harrison (1942) added a humorous touch to 
understanding the relation between routes and topography. 
Harrison studied tribal routes in southern Iran. These 
routes also ignored contours. Harrison found them to be
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"far and away the most entertaining tracks in Iran" (1942:
129). According to Harrison,
if a trail follows what seems to be the hard way and 
leaves what looks to be an easy one aside there is 
usually some good reason for it, and superior 
intelligence in these matters often does not pay (1942: 
129) .
To his credit, Harrison acknowledged, albeit in a backhanded 
manner, the presence of some method to the maddening course 
of the tribal routes. Unfortunately, he did not identify 
the essence of this method.
Field researchers in the frontier regions of Latin 
America beyond where the buses stop have, no doubt, found 
that there still exists a network of trails that disregard 
relief in favor of directness. During several trips in 
which this geographer sought remnants of Honduras' camino 
real or accompanied colleagues on their respective projects 
evidence of these trails, and the hard lessons they impart, 
could not be avoided. Discovery of these trail networks 
usually occurs when travelers disembark the final means of 
automobile transport, often a pick-up truck outfitted with 
simple plank seats and a tarp cover. In Honduras, these 
vehicles, known as baronesas, carry supplies and people back 
and forth from a regional market settlement to the frontier. 
Upon disembarking travelers continue their journey on foot. 
Strangers to the area often follow the gentle grade of a 
remnant lumber road to their final destination, some 
isolated pioneer settlement. Now and then, the strangers
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will notice that some of the locals who had been walking 
with them, and who had been heavily burdened with their 
purchases from the market or with an infant on their hip, 
had disappeared along the way. Little thought is given to 
this observation. For it is certainly reasonable that the 
steep little trails that the strangers had seen diverge from 
the road might lead to these people's homes.
After a taxing walk in tropical temperatures the 
strangers arrive at their destination and look for a place 
to secure refreshments. It is at this juncture that our 
travelers learn of the network of trails that do not obey 
contour lines on maps. For without fail, the disappeared 
reappear. And after some questioning it becomes apparent 
that they appeared at the destination long before the 
strangers.
The strangers secure a breathlessly thorough 
understanding of these routes when they recklessly decide to 
exploit one of these shortcuts on their own or with a guide. 
Their excursion on the ground traces the shadow of the path 
flown by a crow in the sky, for it leads directly over an 
endless succession of steep slopes and down a equal number 
of precipitous pitches. With packs on their backs and 
blisters on their heels, our travelers dash all the 
advantage gained by directness because of their infirmity in 
the face of relief.
50
The strategy of taking terrain head on is not confined 
to aboriginal or tribal groups nor to regions beyond the 
frontier. Consider earlier passages cited from Brunhes' and 
Burghardt's descriptions of Roman roads. Both geographers 
found that the Romans valued a direct route over a gentle 
grade. Romanov (1973) and Hauck (1975) found a similar 
route strategy in the network of sacbeob ("white roads") 
constructed by the lowland Maya on the Yucatan peninsula. 
Sacbeob ran in straight line segments regardless of the 
topography. Romanov cited an anonymous quote to describe 
the nature of these roads: "Where Maya planning and Nature 
come into conflict, Nature usually loses out" (1973: 2).
In his study of the aboriginal cultural geography of 
the Llanos de Mojos in northeastern Bolivia (1966), William 
Denevan found a system of straight, elevated causeways 
similar to those found in Yucatan. Because of their 
shortness, Denevan concluded that the roads were used for 
local movement. They were constructed to provide dry 
passage over wet low-lying areas.
Hyslop (1984: 245-253) discussed the environmental
factors that influenced Inka road placement. The roads of 
the Inka empire avoided long arid stretches and rarely led 
over particularly rugged obstacles like deep abysses or 
steep slopes. Movement was generally confined to level 
valley floors or plateaus and only departed from such 
environs when there was no other choice. The Inka
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occasionally favored topographical ease over population 
centers when planning roads. Hyslop found cases in which 
the political needs of rapid transport and communication 
caused the Inka to bypass major population centers in the 
pursuit of the most direct path of travel.
Road as Region
Geographers create regions to simplify and interpret 
the complexity of physical and cultural patterns on the 
Earth's surface. Earlier in this chapter the notion that a 
road constituted a region was introduced. Ratzel and Vidal 
de la Blache concurred that a road represented a portion of 
the landscape that was distinguished by the activities it 
attracted to it and the power it had to transform and define 
the greater region that surrounded it. Beyond these 
qualities, roads often display degrees of coherence that one 
would expect within a region's boundaries.
This study of Honduras' transisthmian corridor will 
support the appropriateness of designating particular roads 
as regions in themselves. Each chapter will demonstrate the 
corridor's distinctiveness and its internal coherence. 
Chapter Two examines the historical circumstances that 
focussed the attention of the Spanish on the corridor during 
their first fifty years of activity on the American 
mainland. Chapter Three tracks the halting development of 
the corridor that ensued. Following this chapter, a short 
interlude introduces the Spanish transport tool, the camino
real. Chapter Four casts a glance backward at the region's 
pre-Columbian route template and the Honduran corridor's 
place in it. Chapter Five summarizes Spanish colonial road 
planning and describes road and bridge construction and 
funding in the New World. Within this chapter attention is 
then focussed on early surveys of, and prescribed solutions 
for, building a camino real through the Honduran corridor. 
Chapter Six discusses the Spaniards' policies regarding 
labor for road construction and for bearing, and 
demonstrates Honduras' disadvantages in these respects. 
Chapter Seven charts the Honduran corridor's supply of the 
natural and human resources necessary for road-building and 
supporting transisthmian transport. The system of road 
settlements, ventas, that provided travelers sustenance is 
also described in this chapter. Chapter Eight traces the 
development of the region's route network by taking a 
chronological inventory of the region's predominant economic 
activities. Chapter Nine recreates the experience of travel 
along the transisthmian camino real by drawing from the 
notes of a diverse assortment of trekkers, including the 
author. Chapter Ten concludes the investigation and 
considers the prudence of colonial plans in view of the 





We have heard of a good, though costly, passage; which 
would be not only advantageous, but a source of glory to 
its creator, should it be made. This passage would have 
to be constructed through the solid land ... there are 
mountains, but there are also hands. Give me the man 
who has the will to do it, and it can be done; if 
courage is lacking, there will be no lack of money, for 
the Indies ... will furnish it. For the spice trade, 
for the wealth of the Indies, and for a king of Castile, 
few things are impossible (Lopez de Gomara 1552, 
reproduced 1925: 222)
For all purposes of rapid communication, nevertheless, 
the monarchs of Spain depended upon those roads across 
the continent which their inability to convert into 
canals had compelled them to accept (Squier 1858: 667).
Site and Situation
Common to every route are the points of origin and 
destination. Between these termini course the pulses of 
human endeavor. Understanding the nature of the flow 
requires knowledge of each route's site and situation. Site 
and situation are fundamental geographical concepts. Site 
refers to the physical characteristics of a place: its
absolute location, topography, hydrology, geology, climate 
and vegetation. Situation refers to a place's relative 
location and the aggregate of cultural factors that exert 
influence on it. In the case of a route, matters of site 
and situation extend beyond the places the route connects to 
include the actual corridor that connects and surrounds 
them. Therefore, study of a route inquires after the 
character of the land traversed and the factors that 
inspire, direct and support travel between the route's 
termini.
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Since 1502, when Columbus' fourth voyage brought him to
the north coast of Honduras and then south almost to the
Gulf of Uraba, the American isthmus has presented the
European world a singular site and situation on which to
construct routes. With the exception of the one-hundred
mile stretch of desert that separates the eastern
Mediterranean Sea from the Gulf of Suez, there was in no
other corner of the globe the opportunity to blaze a
relatively short trail that would connect two of the world's
oceans. In this chapter we will consider the site and
situation of several transisthmian passages.
Situation at a Small Scale
Clarence Haring (1910: 3) noted that within two
generations of Columbus' discovery of the New World,
all of the West Indies, North America to California and 
the Carolinas, all of South America except Brazil ... 
and in the east the Philippine Islands and New Guinea 
passed under the sway of the Crown of Castile.
The trade flows that initially advanced and later linked
this expansive empire dominated the situation of each
colonial route that crossed the Central American isthmus,
for each route was initially proposed to provide a venue for
the flow of this trade across this land bridge.
The term land bridge has been used most often in
reference to a stretch of land that joins two large land
masses. A common example is the Bering Strait land bridge
that periodically joined North America with Eurasia and
allowed the peopling of America. The Central American
isthmus is also referred to as a "land bridge" that connects 
North and South America. The term assumes greater utility 
when one considers the problem that the Central American 
isthmus posed to Spain's empire during the 16th and 17th 
centuries. To the Spanish, the isthmus was a burdensome 
interruption in their maritime realm. One scholar aptly 
characterized it as the "American Nuisance" (McAlister 1954: 
259). This nuisance sorely lacked a passage that could 
connect the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. Initially, the 
Spanish sought a water passage for this purpose. This 
desire spurred on Spanish maritime exploration of the 
isthmian littoral during the first decades of the 16th 
century (Mack 1974: 1).
Columbus commenced the search with his, previously 
mentioned, fourth voyage in 1502. Eleven years hence, in 
1513, Vasco Nunez de Balboa crossed of the Isthmus of Panama 
and discovered of the "South Sea" (Ldpez de Gomara 1925: 
193) This discovery heightened hopes of the strait's 
discovery. However, more importantly, it demonstrated that 
at some points the isthmus was only fifty or so miles wide. 
Such a short distance suggested that should the strait fail 
to materialize, a road or canal were possible alternatives. 
Meanwhile, the search continued. In 1523, Charles V (366- 
367) ordered Cortez to redouble his efforts in search of "el 
secreto del estrecho" [the secret of the strait]. 
Nevertheless, just 10 months later Pedro Arias de Avila,
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henceforth referred as Pedrarias, the governor of Castilla 
del Oro, signalled the futility of the enterprise when he 
wrote to Charles and referred to the water passage as "el 
estrecho dudoso" [the doubtful strait] (Peralta 1883: 33).
However, even before hopes of discovering the 
transisthmian strait had ebbed, the Spanish had bridged the 
barrier by opening transisthmian routes, or land bridges, 
across the land bridge. Because the importance of these 
routes originally depended on the maritime trade they 
served, it is appropriate to review briefly the patterns of 
this trade.
Treatments of Spain's 16th and 17th century maritime 
commercial network abound (e.g. Haring 1910 and 1918; Schurz 
1939; Borah 1954; Mack 1974; Edwards 1980; Lyon 1990 and 
Galvin 1991). However, scholars commonly rely on Haring's 
description of the trade flows that emerged between Spain 
and the Atlantic coast of the New World. Galvin is among 
these. In his historical geography of piracy in the 
Caribbean, Galvin elaborated on Haring1s work with the use 
of effective maps. In a National Geographic article, Lyon 
provides the same for the Pacific side. These two works 
will guide the following synopsis.
Exchanges between Spain and her colonies were conducted 
through three "maritime lifelines" (Galvin 1991: 38, Map 2 
p. 58). The 18,000 mile Manila galleon route joined 
Acapulco to Manila, the eastern tip of the Orient's
Spanish Maritime Trade Routes 





Map 2. Spanish Maritime Trade Routes in the New World
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cornucopia of treasures. On the other side of the American 
isthmus Spain and the Americas were linked by a forked 
passage that led from a sole port in Spain, Seville and 
later Cadiz, to three primary ports of call on the Atlantic 
coast, Cartagena, Porto Bello and Veracruz.
During its 250-year life (1565-1815), the route that 
led from Manila to Acapulco was "the most significant 
pathway for commerce and cultural interchange between Europe 
and Asia" (Lyon 1990: 8). Spaniards called the Manila
galleon nao de la China; the name reflected the most 
important source region of the galleons1 cargo. However, 
goods from India, Ceylon, Japan and the Spice Islands also 
funneled into Manila. Oriental goods included: silk, ivory, 
spices and porcelain. The galleons, ideally, departed from 
Manila in July for a tedious eastward journey that could 
take up to a year to complete. Upon arrival in Acapulco, 
merchandise from the Orient was traded, primarily, for 
Mexican silver. Recuas [mule teams] transported the cargo 
to Mexico City and eastward on to the port at Veracruz. 
Meanwhile, westbound ships, laden with silver, departed from 
Acapulco in January. In contrast to the difficult passage 
east, the return to Manila commonly took three months, the 
galleons whisked west by the Northeast Trades and carried by 
the Equatorial Current (Lyon 1990: 11-32).
The tracks of the galleons linked Spain and Tierra 
Firme, or the Spanish Main, departing from Seville and later
Cadiz and calling at its ports at Cartagena and Porto Bello 
on the Isthmus of Panama. This pattern first emerged in 
1537 and became institutionalized seven years later when the 
casa de contratacion [House of Trade] issued a set of rules 
that organized a regular schedule for departures and routes 
of the convoys (Mack 1974: 56). The Spanish established the 
casa in 1503 to regulate and encourage trade between Spain 
and the New World (Haring 1964: 3-7). Departure of the
galleons from Spain occurred between January and March. The 
Northeast Trades and the Equatorial Current guided their 
progress on what was ordinarily a two month passage to 
Cartagena. Upon the galeones' arrival at Cartagena, a 30-60 
day stay commenced during which the products and treasure of 
Tierra Firme and New Spain were brought to Cartagena. 
Messengers were dispatched south to Lima to notify the 
Viceroyalty at Lima that the Armada of the South Sea should 
begin preparations for its trip north to Panama. Prominent 
among the Armada's cargo was the silver from the mines at 
Potosi. Along its journey the Armada was joined at Paita by 
the Navio del Oro carrying gold from Quito and its 
hinterlands. Upon arrival at Panama, the cargo from these 
two fleets was transferred to recuas and carried across the 
isthmus to Porto Bello, whereupon they met the galleons and 
the great Porto Bello fair commenced. The commerce 
transacted at the Porto Bello fair overshadowed the other 
Atlantic coast ports because it attracted goods from
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throughout Spanish America (Loosely 1933: 317). The fair 
lasted up to 40 days. From Porto Bello the galleons sailed 
back to Cartagena and then north to Havana, their final port 
of call, before returning to Spain. Arrival back in Spain 
ordinarily occurred in late October or early November, the 
galleons' circuit requiring 8-10 months (Galvin 1991: 40- 
42).
The final lifeline in Spain's maritime trade network 
was the Mexican fleet. Its primary function was to collect 
silver from New Spain and the Oriental goods that had been 
carried overland from Acapulco and transport it back to 
Spain. The fleet ordinarily departed from Spain in July and 
arrived at Veracruz during the first half of September. Its 
route coincided with that of the galleons until it entered 
the Caribbean near Guadeloupe or Dominica. At that point 
paths diverged as the Mexican fleet steered northwest for 
the Yucat&n Channel. Along the way, merchants fanned out to 
call at secondary ports like San Juan, Santo Domingo, 
Santiago de Cuba, Trujillo and Puerto Caballos. These 
traders rejoined the main fleet in Havana after it had 
called at Veracruz. Havana marked the point of departure 
for the return to Spain (Galvin 1991: 42).
The pattern of Spain's maritime trade reflected a 
number of factors. Prominent among these was Spain's 
"principle of colonial exclusivism" and its devotion to 
mercantilism (Haring 1910: 7). The principle of colonial
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exclusivism limited all colonial trade in Spain's colonies 
to Spain. Accordingly, the colonies were to fix their 
efforts on the extraction and production of raw materials to 
be shipped to Spain. Moreover, they were discouraged from 
manufacture. As a result, the mother country served as the 
colonies' sole supplier of essential manufactured goods. 
Commitment to mercantilism required that Spain extract, 
transport and then hoard the precious metals from its 
colonial treasure chest. These policies demanded the 
establishment of a pathway for regular exchange between 
Spain and her colonies. This exchange defined the situation 
of the land routes that crossed the isthmus.
Site
Spain's colonial trade network was also a product of 
the physical geography on which and by which it was 
conducted. Because maritime travel dominated trade flows, 
circulation of air and water were the physical factors of 
chief consequence and therefore, largely determined the 
general routes of flow. Two additional physical concerns of 
the Spaniards were the locations of passages through the 
Greater and Lesser Antilles and the distribution of deep 
water ports.
These watery physical features, especially matters of 
port suitability, also influenced transisthmian routes. 
However, presently, consideration of the site
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characteristics of routes will move onshore to drier 
footing, away from the medium of lubricated circulation.
The qualities the Spaniards desired for isthmian 
crossings were clear. They looked for narrow spans of the 
isthmus that coincided with low, passable gaps in Central 
America's mountainous spine. Despite this clarity of 
purpose, crossing the isthmus puzzled the Spanish for 
centuries. Evidence of this problem's persistence is found 
in the second chapter of Alexander von Humboldt's 1811 work, 
Political Essay on the Kingdom of New Spain (1966: 16-45) 
which is devoted to the question of linking the Atlantic to 
the Pacific Ocean. Humboldt considered nine interoceanic 
possibilities which ranged from the fanciful, as in the case 
of the proposed wagon road through the San Juan Mountains to 
link the headwaters of the Rio Grande and Colorado River, to 
the prudent, as in the case of a canal across the isthmus of 
Panama (1966: 22-39). Humboldt's questionable suggestions 
should be considered in a forgiving light considering the 
dearth of geographical knowledge at his disposal. The great 
scholar, himself, bemoaned the lack of basic information 
(1966: 24-25).
Some of Humboldt's proposals for isthmian crossings 
paralleled the land routes that had emerged during the 
colonial period. With the exception of the road that linked 
Veracruz with Mexico City and Acapulco, these routes 
possessed relative degrees of the desired narrowness and
levelness. Moreover, these routes echoed the Spaniards' 
unrequited desire for a water passage. Four of the five 
primary transisthmian routes allowed for partial penetration 
on rivers that drained the interior highlands and flowed to 
the Atlantic. The Acapulco-Veracruz crossing was the 
exception. A combination of several factors explains this 
phenomenon. Concentration by the Spaniards on fluvial 
corridors was reasonable considering that much of the early 
exploration of the isthmus was aquatic, with vessels 
regularly drawn to estuaries and up rivers in the hope that 
they might discover el secreto del estrecho. There is also 
the possibility that in some cases the presence of a 
waterway was merely incidental to transport. Instead, the 
presence of a river attracted route planners because it 
posed the possibility that the river's headward erosion had 
cut a low pass in the cordillera. The coincidence of route 
and river also related to the need of deepwater ports. 
Despite the influence of the above factors, the preference 
for at least some degree of aquatic penetration to the 
interior overwhelmingly reflects the relative ease and 
economy of maritime travel in comparison to land transport.
Four chief locations, above all, possessed varying 
degrees of the qualities mentioned above and, therefore, 
attracted attention for the construction of relatively short 
transisthmian roads. They include: the Isthmus of
Tehuantepec, the Honduran corridor, the San Juan del Sur-
Lake Nicaragua crossing and the Isthmus of Panamd (Map 3). 
For purposes of comparison we will consider each of the 
different transisthmian routes in greater detail. As in the 
previous sections of this chapter, our investigation will be 
guided by matters of site and situation, however at a larger 
scale. Of particular importance are the genesis, path, 
distance and strategy of each route. Moreover, we will 
appraise the life span of each route and its significance to 
colonial Latin America. A discussion of the transisthmian 
route across Honduras will follow in chapter three.
The Isthmus of Tehuantepec
Four of the routes Humboldt suggested as interoceanic 
links spanned the Central American isthmus. The 
northernmost of these was the Isthmus of Tehuantepec. 
Tehuantepec is located at that point where Mexico's horn 
tapers to a 125-mile wide waist that suggests a 
perpendicular north-south passage (Map 4). This region lies 
south and east of the convergence of the rugged Sierra Madre 
Oriental and Sierra Madre Occidental and the coastal Sierra 
Madre del Sur and the southern highlands. Hence, at 
Tehuantepec, the truncation in breadth of the isthmus 
coincides with an attenuation in its elevation. The lowest 
pass through the continental divide is less than 220 meters 
above sea level. The valley of the Coatzacoalcos River cuts 
across this narrow, low neck of land in an almost south to 
north orientation as it flows to the Gulf of Campeche.
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From soon after the arrival of the Spanish in 
Tenochtitlan to near the end of the nineteenth century this 
distinctive topography attracted attention as a possible 
location for construction of a transisthmian route. During 
this time, a commensurately distinctive trio fixed their 
sights on how best to cross Tehuantepec. Obviously, Baron 
von Humboldt is counted among these. Hernan Cort6s and 
James B. Eads complete the trinity. Cortds devoted two 
decades to bridging the Isthmus of Tehuantepec with a road. 
Eads engaged in considerable planning and promotion during 
the late 1870s and early '80s of the construction of a ship- 
railway across Tehuantepec (Phelps 1881).
So important was the discovery of the transisthmian 
strait that even before conquering Tenochtitlan, Cortds 
began the search. With a map provided by Moctezuma and his 
own observations and those of his men, Cortes focused on the 
Rio Coatzacoalcos as the best possibility. Accordingly, in 
1520, he sent a party from Veracruz to explore the river. 
The party reported that although the Coatzacoalcos was not 
the strait, there was an adequate harbor at its mouth and 
its channel was of sufficient depth to allow passage at 
least 30 leagues upstream. Cortes' responded to this news 
with the establishment by 1522 of two settlements on 
opposite sides of the isthmus to serve as termini for his 
planned inter-oceanic supply route: Espiritu Santo, four 
leagues upstream from the mouth in 1521, and the Zapotec
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village of Tehuantepec on the Pacific coast one year later 
(1947: 371).
Cortes wanted to create a road across Tehuantepec so he 
might establish a ship-building center on the Pacific Coast. 
From there he could dispatch ships to find a route to the 
Spice Islands and also to develop trade with Peru (Borah 
1954: 11). By 1522, the Spanish had already developed a 
shipyard at Zacatula, near the mouth of the Rio de las 
Balsas, but heavy essentials like anchors, cables, spikes 
and artillery had to be transported all the way from 
Veracruz to this site, a difficult trek of over 200 leagues 
(Moorhead 1947: 372). By 1526, ship-building on the Pacific 
coast had been moved to Tehuantepec to take advantage of the 
shorter passage; and Cortds had requested that the province 
of Tehuantepec be included in his marquisate (Borah 1954: 
23).
Without extant documentation of the date of first 
shipment across the Isthmus of Tehuantepec, Moorhead thought 
it occurred around 1526. Cargo was sent from Spain by way 
of Veracruz and included equipment for the vessels under 
construction such as "artillery, anchors, timber, spikes, 
rigging, ammunition, apothecary supplies, merchandise, and 
stores of sea-biscuit, wine, vinegar, olive oil, cheese, 
meat and fish" (Moorhead 1947: 373). According to Cortds, 
the cargo was "brought from ... Veracruz by sea to 
Coatzacoalcos and from Coatzacoalcos by river in canoes to
within twenty leagues of here [Pacific Coast]" (1947: 373). 
The last twenty leagues of the route led over the 
continental divide and down the Pacific Slope to the coast. 
Albeit a low pass, Cortds reported to Charles V that because 
of the rugged nature of the land transport demanded that 
tamemes [Aztec word for Indian porters], carry the cargo 
over this stretch rather than wagons or pack trains. 
Moorhead suggested that this was an exaggeration by Cortes 
intended to defend himself from retribution for having 
violated Charles7 proclamation of 1528 limiting the use of 
Indians as bearers (1947: 377). While there is merit to 
this suggestion, a survey of the isthmus reported that as of 
1850 there were still no cart roads over the continental 
divide, only a mule path (Williams 1852: 31). Nevertheless, 
Cortds' lapse in labor relations later proved to be the 
undoing of his plans for Tehuantepec.
Moorhead's attempt to reconstruct the course of 
interoceanic shipments during Cortds' time provides a useful 
description of the route's site and the nature of early 
colonial transport in the New World. As mentioned earlier, 
the Spanish preferred to keep cargo on the water as long as 
possible. Accordingly, shipments of ship-building equipment 
were transshipped from Veracruz to the mouth of the 
Coatzacoalcos, a trip of about 60 leagues requiring only two 
days in good weather. At either Espiritu Santo or the
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settlement Coatzacoalcos the cargo was transferred to canoes 
for the trip upstream.
The Coatzacoalcos in its lower stretches is a broad 
river of negligible current that meanders across the low, 
flat Atlantic coastal plain. Canoe travel followed this 
artery inland more than a third of the way across the 
isthmus in a relatively easy passage. However, the 
confluence of the Rio Jumuapan marks the ensuing 
topographical transition from the low plains to the uplands 
that comprise the continental divide. Appearance of a 
fragmented fall-line on the Coatzacoalcos and its 
tributaries, the Sarabia and the Malatengo reflects the 
change in topography. Despite the cataracts, Moorhead 
estimated that during the rainy season, June to December, 
canoes could navigate about 40 leagues inland to the fall 
line (1947: 374). This 12-day trip brought them more than 
two-thirds of the way across the isthmus.
The location of the break-in-bulk point is unclear. 
Moorhead suggested that because it was approximately 20 
leagues from the Pacific, Antigua Malpaso on the 
Coatzacoalcos, the oldest known landing, might have been the 
original site of disembarkment used by Cortes (1947: 375). 
However, the map that accompanied Williams7 survey of the 
isthmus shows two other landing sites in the vicinity of 
Antigua Malpaso that connect tributaries of the 
Coatzacoalcos to paths that lead to the Pacific. These
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sites could just as well have served Cortes. Moreover, a 
recent 1:250,000 scale topographical map contains a 
settlement located on the Rio Sarabia at approximately the 
same latitude as Antigua Malpaso. The settlement is called 
"Paso Real" (Mdxico. Carta Topografia: Juchitan, 1985). The 
name suggests that it also could have served as the route's 
break-in-bulk point.
Similar to the manner in which the route's fluvial 
possibilities branched out upstream from the confluence of 
the Jumuapan, the prospects for land travel, likewise, 
diverged soon after leaving the water. Williams' map shows 
mule paths leading from the landings to several passes 
through the continental divide, the Chivela, Mazahua and the 
Tarifa. Moorhead posed a path through the Chivela pass as 
the most convenient and noted that Cortds increased this 
advantage when he assumed control of several Indian villages 
on either side of the divide (1947: 375).
Once across the divide, travel became less problematic, 
as the Pacific coastal plain slopes gently to the sea. 
However, the exact route is uncertain because the location 
of Cortes' ship-building center is uncertain. There appear 
to have been three possible sites. The defining 
characteristic shared by these sites was their proximity to 
a river mouth. Such a situation was desirable for the 
launching of ships (Moorhead 1947: 376).
Establishment of the route was undermined by the demand 
that Cortes respond to charges of violating Indian labor 
laws. During a trip to Spain, the Audiencia of Mexico shut 
down his ship-building operation near Tehuantepec and 
allowed the ships built in 1527 to rot. Undaunted, Cortes 
took up residence in Tehuantepec in 1532 and resumed 
construction. By 1533 four vessels were completed (Moorhead 
1947: 373). However, legal troubles returned to haunt
Cortes. In 1540 in retaliation for his unauthorized 
explorations north along the Pacific coast, Cortes' vessels 
and naval stores were confiscated and the port at 
Tehuantepec closed. Thus, after two decades of effort 
Cortds' plans to entrench interoceanic transport across the 
isthmus of Tehuantepec failed.
Nevertheless, Cortes' trail, or at least an 
approximation of it, endured. In the 1550s, travelers 
wishing to journey from Mexico City to the Pacific coast 
port of Huatulco, 80 miles up the coast from Tehuantepec, 
faced a difficult three to four week overland trip. An 
alternative route led travelers from Mexico City to Veracruz 
from which a vessel carried them to Coatzacoalcos. From 
this point they were transferred to canoes, manned by 
Indians rowers from Cortes' marquisate, which transported 
them to the continental divide. Whereupon they resumed land 
travel and concluded their journey to Huatulco (Borah 1954: 
28-29). Moreover, between 1561 and 1610 emergency shipments
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of artillery or ship supplies for the Manila galleon fleet 
were carried across the isthmus rather than over the onerous 
road from Veracruz to Acapulco (Moorhead 1947: 379).
In the past three centuries proposals for canal, 
highway and railroad projects have been directed at the 
Tehuantepec's peculiar site and situation. The measure of 
Cortes' grasp of this geography is confirmed in the 
transisthmian railroad, completed in 1894, that presently 
runs through the pass at Chivela (Winberry 1980: 113-115), 
or by Mexico's transisthmian Highway 185 that carries 
motorists through the pass at Mazahua.
The Nicaragua Rift
In 1522, the same year that Cortds established 
terminals on both coasts for his interoceanic route at the 
Isthmus of Tehuantepec, Gil Gonzales Ddvila led his horse 
into the water of a large lake that natives loyal to the 
local cacique [chief], a man whose name was recorded by 
Gonzdles Davila as Nicaragua, called Cocibolca (Radell 1970: 
112). Because of the breadth of the lake's bounds and the 
freshness of its water Gonzales Davila called it "El Mar 
Dulce" (Harrison 1971: 15). Despite the natives' statements 
to the contrary, the lake's lack of salinity suggested that 
it had a drainage outlet, a desaguadero, to either the North 
or South Sea. The results of a brief excursion by the 
party's pilots into the lake convinced them that, indeed, 
there was an outlet to the sea. However, ensuing conflicts
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with the natives forced the party's retreat, thus preventing 
the Spaniards from discovering the Desaguadero.
Nevertheless, this incomplete discovery soon captured 
the attention of Spanish explorers throughout the isthmus. 
To wit, the following year Pedrarias dispatched a party, led 
by Francisco Herndndez de Cdrdoba, from Panama to conquer 
the region surrounding the lake. This party established a 
settlement, Granada, on the north shore of Lake Nicaragua. 
McAlister (1954: 266) and Maxwell (1971: 122) suggested that 
Cortes, too, had designs on the region. They reasoned that 
Cortes sent Cristdbal de Olid to the Gulf of Honduras in 
1524 because he had learned that Gonzalez Ddvila believed 
the Desaguadero emptied into the Caribbean at that point. 
To these parties is added Gonzdlez Ddvila who converged on 
the region to reassert his own claim to the territory by 
right of discovery. The wrangling for control of the region 
is beyond our current concerns. However, the reason why 
this lake and its, as yet undiscovered, outlet inspired such 
controversy is significant.
Lake Nicaragua and its supposed drainage outlet 
represented a waterway that led from the Caribbean to within 
two to three level leagues of the Pacific, the waters 
separated only by the narrow Isthmus of Rivas (Map 5). The 
American isthmus offered no other passage that so nearly 
approached a transisthmian strait. All three parties must 
have realized that, lacking the strait, this route would
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become the chosen avenue for interoceanic transport.
Moreover, the benefits of this trade would accrue to those
who had established control of the region. Hence, as stated
by Bolanos in Williams' study of the route, the discovery of
a navigable outlet leading from Lake Nicaragua to the
Caribbean would
dio a la ciudad de Granada las posibilidades que tuvo en 
el siglo siguiente para enriquecerce y llegar a ser una 
de las mas opulentas ciudades de la America Central
[give to Granada the possibilities in the ensuing 
century to develop into one of the most opulent cities 
in Central America] (1971: 38).
Lake Nicaragua's outlet, previously called Desaguadero 
and presently called Rio San Juan, was evident by 1525 
(Williams 1971: 24). However, because of a number of
factors, not the least among them a series of eight 
cataracts on the river, the Spanish did not descend to the 
mouth of the Desaguadero until 1539 (Incer 1990: 200).
However, as early as 1536, Rodrigo de Contreras, the 
province's governor, had suggested the possibility that the 
Lakes Nicaragua and Managua and the Desaguadero could serve 
as a transisthmian passage. In 1540, they established the 
port San Juan de la Cruz at the river's mouth (Incer 1990: 
201). During this extended period of alternating inactivity 
and exploration Granada served as the base of operations for 
the conquest of other parts of Central America and later 
became a crossroads for transisthmian trade across Nicaragua 
(Williams 1971: 24).
The slave trade was the first profitable venture for 
the region. The first shipload of Nicaraguan slaves arrived 
at Panama in 1526. With the arrival of Pedrarias in 1528 
slaving rapidly expanded. By 1533, the slave trade was 
primarily conducted out of the port at Realejo, located on 
the Pacific coast north of Lake Nicaragua. Realejo was 
discovered during Gonzales Ddvila's initial exploration of 
the region. In concert with the trade in human chattel, and 
because of the abundance of its hinterland's natural
resources, this all but forgotten port developed into
Spain's major Pacific coast ship-building center during the 
16th century, supplying vessels for the Manila galleons and 
the trade between Mdxico and Peru (Radell and Parsons 1971: 
300). During the early decades of Spanish settlement in 
Nicaragua, Indian slaves were shipped from Reale jo to Panama 
and across the isthmus and on to Caribbean ports or,
following Pizarro's conquest, to Peru to work in the mines. 
Following 1540, slaves bound for these locations were also 
sent down the Desaguadero (Williams 1971: 41).
Nicaragua also emerged as a supplier of agricultural 
products. The earliest trade of this sort along the
Desaguadero was conducted between Granada and Nombre de Dios 
and Cartagena, with colonial staples like corn and poultry 
flowing south in return for manufactured goods from Spain 
and later African slaves (Radell 1970: 119). During the 
1540s colonial Nicaragua's market expanded as it became an
important supplier to the viceroyalty of Peru (Radell and 
Parsons 1971: 295). Products such as cacao, pork, cotton, 
indigo, tobacco, dye-woods, flax and sugar cane were sent 
down the Desaguadero to Nombre de Dios and then carried 
across Panama and shipped south (Williams 1971: 119). Why 
the Spanish chose to follow this course rather than to 
establish an actual transisthmian route by constructing a 
wagon road across the Isthmus of Rivas, possibly linking 
Granada to Realejo, is a question that remains unanswered. 
One possible explanation is the hazardous navigation that 
awaited ships in the Gulf of Papagayos. This stretch of 
coast is characterized by strong offshore winds, papagayos, 
and turbulent ocean currents (Radell and Parsons 1971: 300). 
However, despite this barrier, already in the 1530s merchant 
ships sailed from Realejo to Panama and Perti on a regular 
schedule (Borah 1954: 7).
When freebooters imperiled trade in the Caribbean 
beginning in the 1570s, Central American commerce was 
directed to the protection of its Pacific ports like Iztapa, 
Amapala and the Gulf of Nicoya. The Desaguadero was
effectively shut down in 1573 when pirates interrupted a 
quartet of frigates en route to Nombre de Dios (Radell 1970: 
119). However, when Sir Francis Drake began terrorizing 
Central America's Pacific coast in 1579, Granada recouped 
its losses and assumed an even greater commercial 
importance. Because its interior position made it
presumably safe from attack, Granada became an entrepot for 
products from all over Central America. Hence, all mule 
trains led to Granada rather than to the coasts. The 
economic boom that this created peaked in the 1590s, when 
the town numbered 200 Spanish vecinos [citizens]. In 
response, pirates established a stronghold at Bluefields on 
the Caribbean coast in the 1580s. Nevertheless, so great 
was the trade on the Desaguadero that by the 1600s Granada 
regularly sent a frigate to join the fleet at Havana for the 
return trip to Spain (Radell 1970: 54-57).
Despite the profitability of the trade conducted 
through the Desaguadero and the concomitant pirate threat no 
Crown-sponsored fortifications were constructed along the 
route, or major colonial settlements other than those at 
either end of the waterway, until 1602. Then a fort, San 
Juan de Santa Cruz, was erected at a site probably located 
two-thirds of the way up the river at the series of rapids 
El Diablo or El Castillo (Williams 1976: 49). The
triviality of this paltry effort was exposed in 1665 when 
John Davis, a Dutch pirate, led 120 men up the Desaguadero 
and across the lake to sack Granada (Radell 1970: 121). The 
city was sacked again by pirates who used the same route in 
1670. In response to these demonstrations of the 
settlement's vulnerability, Granada numbered only 12 vecinos 
in 1679. In 1683 it was sacked yet again, this time from 
the Pacific coast. "By the end of the seventeenth century,
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the waterway lay almost empty of traffic" (Williams 1971: 
65-66).
Granada and the Desaguadero recovered during the first 
half of the next century. Its recovery prompted the belated 
construction of twelve military posts along its course in 
1727 (Williams 1971: 67). Nevertheless, the Desaguadero
remained a two-edged sword for colonial Nicaragua. It 
provided a maritime outlet for trade. Yet, it also provided 
an artery for the penetration of the interior by unfriendly 
forces. During the eighteenth century, the Miskito Indians 
in collaboration with the British took advantage of this 
gateway (Williams 1971: 70).
The California Gold Rush was the catalyst that finally 
provoked the exploitation of the Rio San Juan-Lake Nicaragua 
route's interoceanic possibilities. To extend his passenger 
service to the Pacific coast and take advantage of the 
feverish migration of prospectors out to "strike it rich", 
Cornelius Vanderbilt signed a contract in 1849 to open a 
ship canal across Nicaragua (Williams 1971: 115). By 1851 
the first steamer ascended the Rio San Juan to the El 
Castillo rapids, whereupon travelers were transferred to a 
bongo. This huge shallow draft dugout canoe negotiated a 
series of cataracts, after which passengers boarded a second 
steamer for the rest of the trip upriver and across the 
southern margin of Lake Nicaragua to Virgen on its western 
shore. At this point passengers rode on horseback 12 miles
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across the Isthmus of Rivas to San Juan del Sur on the 
Pacific coast (Williams 1971: 121). The trip was a little 
less than 200 miles in total: 120 miles on the Desaguadero 
and 70 miles farther to the coast. A bongo could travel 
from San Juan to Granada and back in twenty to thirty days 
(Williams 1976: 123-144). In the late 1850s steamers could 
make the round-trip river run in 3 days. Crossing Lake 
Nicaragua from San Carlos to Virgen took twelve to fourteen 
hours. Actual travel time from the Atlantic to Pacific was 
21 hours and 30 minutes.
An example of the recurrent interest in the Nicaragua 
Rift as a transisthmian passage came in a December 18, 1964 
speech by President Lyndon Baines Johnson when he suggested 
that, because of the impending expiration of the Panama 
Canal Treaty and the inadequacies of that canal, the United 
States should study new locations for a interoceanic canal 
(Klette 1967: 37). Among the four possible sites he
mentioned was a line that ran along the Rio San Juan across 
Lake Nicaragua and on to Salinas Bay. And as this sentence 
is being written, Nicaraguan politicians and ecologists are 
in serious discussion over the possibilities and 
consequences of a "canal seco" (dry canal) across this 
route.
The Isthmus of Panama
In 1517, four years after Balboa crossed the Isthmus of 
Panama and discovered the South Sea, Pedrarias, founded a
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port settlement called Panama on the Pacific coast.
According to Pablo Rubiano (1944: 144), Pedrarias'
biographer, such a settlement was an integral part of the
old conquistador's plan for Panama:
Debian atravesar, conforme a las instruciones de 
Pedrarias, el istmo por su parte norte, buscando la 
parte mas estrecha, a fin de determinar un camino corto 
y seguro de un oceano a otro, y de establecer tres 
poblados, uno en cada una de las costas, y otro en un 
punto intermedio, para asegurar el transito
[Pedrarias ordered explorers to look for the narrowest
stretch of the isthmus and determine the shortest and
most easily secured interoceanic route. They were then 
to establish three settlements. One on each coast, and 
one on the road].
Two years later, the Spanish founded Nombre de Dios on the
Atlantic coast. An almost due north-south transect across
approximately 40 miles of "horrible mountaynes, and many
great riuers" separated these two settlements (Map 6)
(Martyr 1812, 254). It was over this "18 leagues of misery
and curses" that the Spanish established their first
transisthmian camino real (Church 1902: 325).
A wealth of literature discusses the various proposals 
and projects for crossing the isthmus of Panamd. A
comprehensive review of that literature is beyond the scope 
of this investigation. Therefore, this summary of the 
colonial crossings of the isthmus of Panama will be guided 
by but a few valuable sources. Chief among these 
will be Clarence Haring's Trade and Navigation Between Spain 
and the Indies (1964) and Gerstle Mack's The Land Divided:
The P a n a m a  
C r o s s i n g
(Old
\  P a n a m a— — Overload routes
50 Km25 00' —
P a n a m a
sbrady
Map 6. The Panamd Crossing
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A History of the Panama Canal and Other Isthmian Canal 
Projects (1974).
Among first cargo to be transported along the camino 
real were gold and Indian slaves,, taken by Spanish exploring 
expeditions along isthmus' Pacific coast. In the 1520s, 
during which time Spain held the claim to the Moluccas, the 
possibility of directing the spice trade across Panama 
focused attention on the crossing. However, this venture 
never came to fruition and 1529 Charles V sold his claim to 
the Moluccas to Portugal. Nevertheless, with Pizarro's 
conquest of Peru in the 1530s and the subsequent discovery 
of Potosi's silver deposits the camino real across the 
Isthmus of Panamd "became the most vital link in the 
transportation system between Spain and Peru" (Haring 1964: 
181).
The camino real, actually more of a mule path than a 
road, led over approximately 50 miles of uneven terrain. 
Opening the road was one of Pedrarias' notable achievements 
in the region. For about half of its extent, the route was 
essentially a fluvial route, for it followed a series of 
river valleys that had been cut down into the narrow 
cordillera. Departing from Panama on the Pacific coast, a 
typical transit struck out almost due north, crossing a 
relatively level stretch until fording the Rio Chagres just 
upriver from its confluence with the Rio Pequeni. From this 
point, the route continued north along the course of the
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Pequenl. Upon fording this river, once again upriver from 
a confluence, the camino real switched to the valley of the 
Rio Boqueron. The trip to this river's headwaters brought 
travelers out of the highlands and to within 10 miles of 
Nombre de Dios, the remaining stretch leading over isthmus's 
narrow rim of coastal lowlands. The trip usually required 
four days (Mack 1974: 53). And as discussed previously, the 
infrastructure for long-distance pedestrian or animal- 
powered travel extended beyond the road itself. Rather, it 
usually included a system of regularly spaced settlements 
that provided shelter and provisions to travelers. By 1535, 
the Spanish had established three ventas along the route: 
Venta de Chagres, located at that river's crossing; La 
Junta; and Capira (Haring 1964: 183).
Despite optimistic projections for a two cart-wide, 
partially paved road as early as 1521 (Rubiano 1944: 233- 
234), actual construction of a cart road over this wearisome 
route proved unrealistic for the inhabitants of the two 
small communities, Panama and Nombre de Dios, that the road 
was to link together. Obstacles to construction included 
the mountainous terrain, dense tropical forests, water­
logged swamps, and a debilitating hot and humid climate. 
The dominance of these conditions prevailed until the 
eighteenth century when the first "permanent, stone-paved 
road was constructed across the isthmus" (Haring 1964: 181- 
183).
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Pedrarias sought and received the Crown's aid for the
arduous task of building the first road. In 1521 the Crown
granted him 60,000 maravedises for "gastos e obras"
[expenses and labor] (Carlos 1521c: 540). In comparison,
the Crown paid Pedrarias 150,000 maravedises per year as
governor of Castilla de Oro (Carlos 1521d: 541). In 1521,
Pedrarias also was given permission to utilize the caciques
and Indians along the route as workers and settlers (Carlos
1521b: 539). Three years later he was granted an additional
4,000 pesos of gold for the road (Carlos 1524a: 546). The
Crown later approved repartimiento of the route's center
para seguridad del dicho camino y para la contratacion 
que se espera que ha de aver y la dicha poblacion a de 
ser muy necessaria entiendese que en el comedio dellos
[in order to provide security for this road and for the 
trade and settlement that it is hoped will develop] 
(Rubiano 1944: 298-299).
Despite these efforts and funds, a visitor to Castilla de
Oro reported that in 1527 the road was still not completed
(Carlos 1527: 579). Nevertheless people still used the
passage to cross from coast to coast.
The Spanish found an early alternative to the demanding 
overland camino real in the form of the Rio Chagres. The 
Chagres follows a meandering course that approximates the 
shape of a boomerang with both ends, its headwaters and its 
mouth on the Atlantic coast, facing north, its bend located 
on the Pacific half of the isthmus facing south. The 
Spanish explored this river between 1527 and 1533 and found
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it suitable for transport during the rainy season, May to 
December. This new outlet was a convenient complement to 
the original camino real, for the land route became a 
transisthmian quagmire during the rainy season. 
Accordingly, in 1536 a warehouse was constructed at the head 
of navigation, Venta de Cruces, just upstream from the 
river's great bend (Mack 1974: 53-54).
Thus, there emerged a seasonal fluctuation of flows 
across the isthmus. During the wet season recuas laden with 
cargo were led from Panama to Venta de Cruces, the break in 
bulk point, a distance of five leagues. From there goods, 
especially those with a relatively low unit value, were 
transferred to boats for transport downriver. The distance 
from Venta de Cruces to the Chagres7 mouth was 18 leagues. 
The journey lasted between three and twelve days. Another 
eight to ten hours were required to complete the trip to 
Nombre de Dios (Haring 1964: 184).
During the low water season on the Chagres, recuas were 
led from Panama along the camino real, a difficult, 
dangerous and expensive trip that covered 18 leagues and, as 
mentioned earlier, usually took four days. The previously 
mentioned obstacles to road-building understandably also 
hindered travel on the camino real. High mule mortality 
rates resulted from these conditions and the unreasonable 
loads that mules were forced to carry; this, in turn, 
increased the cost of travel. Moreover, the overland route
was plagued by cimarrones [escaped African slaves] who 
regularly preyed on the slow-moving pack trains. Such was 
the menace of these desperadoes to transisthmian trade that 
in 1554 the Spanish authorities at Nombre de Dios launched 
a prolonged campaign against them. Nevertheless, by 1570 
the cimarrones were said to have numbered 3,000 (Mack 1974: 
54-55). In the next chapter we will see that the drag these 
difficulties exerted on the profitability of transisthmian 
trade was noted by colonial authorities throughout the 
isthmus, especially those who claimed dominion over 
potential alternatives.
Transisthmian transit across the Isthmus of Panamd was 
plagued further by the dreadful ports, Nombre de Dios and 
Porto Bello, that the camino real linked. In 1596 the
Spanish improved this situation by abandoning their Atlantic 
port, Nombre de Dios, and establishing a new port, Porto 
Bello, five leagues to the west (Mack 1974: 57). The move 
was triggered by several factors. They included (1) as 
stated above, Nombre de Dios was a wretched site for a port. 
It was surrounded by miasmatic, wet lowlands unsuitable for 
cultivation and worse for human health. Its wide harbor 
mouth faced north, and was, thus, exposed to north winds and 
too broad to defend. (2) Nombre de Dios was regularly 
threatened by intruders. Chief among these was Sir Francis 
Drake who raided the settlement in 1572 and sacked and 
burned it in 1596. (3) Porto Bello was located nearer than
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Nombre de Dios to the mouth of the Chagres. And, despite 
possessing the same difficult climate as Nombre de Dios, 
Porto Bello was located on a deeper and better protected 
harbor. Haring (1964: 185) called it "perhaps the best
natural harbor on the Atlantic side of the isthmus." Thus, 
the camino real was re-routed from Nombre de Dios to Porto 
Bello.
A raid on the camino real's Pacific terminus, Panamd, 
in 1671 by the Welsh buccaneer Henry Morgan, forced the 
Spaniards to make a practical decision: move the port. The 
original site of Panama abutted a harbor that experiences an 
tremendous tidal range, eighteen to twenty feet. Moreover, 
the harbor bottom slopes to the sea so gradually that larger 
ships had to anchor two leagues to the west and transship 
their cargoes to port on smaller draft vessels (Mack 1971: 
49 and Haring 1964: 187). Accompanying this premature
break-in-bulk point were wearisome living conditions ashore 
that rivalled those of Nombre de Dios (Mack 1974: 49). To 
the Fray Tomds de Berlanga, Panama was a "cueva de ladrones 
e sepultura de peligrinos1 [den of thieves and sepulchre of 
pilgrims] (1535a: 532). The new settlement of Panama was 
founded in 1674 two leagues west of the old settlement (Mack 
1974: 76).
Despite the port improvements on both coasts and the 
utilization of the Chagres for seasonal transport, 
relentless attacks by buccaneers and English fleets forced
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the weakened Spanish to abandon their convoy system in 1748 
and direct their ships around Cape Horn (Mack 1974: 93). As 
a result, trade across the isthmus descended into an 
extended period of dormancy, only to revive a century later 
with the onset of the California Gold Rush.
However, even before that momentous discovery, a flood 
of foreign interests had converged on the isthmus with 
proposals to develop a transisthmian passage. Their arrival 
coincided with the province's declaration of independence 
from Spain in 1821 and voluntary inclusion in Simon 
Bolivar's republic of Gran Colombia. The first passage, the 
Panama Railroad, was completed in 1855, long after Bolivar 
had died and his republic had trifurcated. The railroad 
surveyors wisely avoided the route of the camino real and 
instead followed the previous rainy season route that led 
from Panama to Venta de Cruces and then along the Rio 
Chagres to Limon Bay. - Fifty-nine years after this 
development, and over 360 years after G6mara first proposed 
a transisthmian canal to Charles V, the Panama Canal was 
completed. Its path followed that of the railroad line. To 
ensure that the canal and its locks had an adequate year- 
round water supply, the upper reaches of the Rio Chagres 
were dammed in 1935. The large reservoir that resulted is 
called Madden Lake. The lake appears to have submerged 
Venta de Chagres and hence, represents a lacustrine 
interruption in the path of the old camino real.
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Points Parallel and Peculiar
This inquiry into the site and situation of the three 
primary colonial transisthmian routes has uncovered several 
similarities and several fundamental differences. Chief 
among the similarities was the coincidence of route 
locations with relatively narrow and low spans of the 
Central American isthmus. This reflects the Spaniards7 
obvious desire to curtail the terrestrial interruption in 
their maritime trade network; it also underscores the 
difficulties of overland travel, by foot, mule or cart, 
during the early colonial period. Despite the brevity 
provided by these short, low spans, relief still plagued 
isthmian traffic. The contest against slope was probably 
greatest in Panama. However, even water transport faced 
steep ascents and descents in the Rio San Juan7 s series of 
treacherous cataracts. Cortes7 justification of his use of 
indigenous bearers rather than mules or carts suggests that 
neither was the Tehuantepec crossing spared the suffering of 
slope.
All three routes incorporated water courses. The 
recurring presence of this feature further emphasizes the 
Spaniards7 disdain for terrestrial transport. However, the 
incorporation of streams also reflects prior purposes. 
Discovery of at least two of these waterways, the 
Coatzocoalcos and the San Juan, resulted from the search for 
the transisthmian strait.
The absence of a complete water passage demanded that 
the Spanish use both water and land transport. Because each 
of these modes of travel employed its own particular manner 
of packing and hauling cargo, each isthmian passage 
contained a break-in-bulk settlement. In Panama, Venta de 
Cruces served this purpose. In Nicaragua, Granada was a 
break-in-bulk point, as well as an inland port. Antigua 
Malpaso or Paso Real possibly served this purpose at 
Tehuantepec. Additional settlements emerged along the 
routes to function as points of defense or posts of shelter 
and sustenance. Examples of these include: the tardily 
constructed, and ill-manned fortifications on the Rio San 
Juan and the ventas on the camino real across Panama.
The transisthmian routes were conspicuously deficient 
concerning the sites of their ports. However, the Spanish 
had little choice in these matters. Port settlements were 
relegated by nature to the isthmus1 fringe of tropical 
lowlands. Moreover, the pool of port sites was further 
limited to those few truncations in the isthmus that were 
suitable for transport. As a result, transisthmian routes, 
sufficiently difficult throughout their spans, were plagued 
by pestiferous settlements like Porto Bello, Panama, Nombre 
de Dios and San Juan de la Cruz at their margins.
As demonstrated in the previous chapter, the 
relationship between routes and settlement is a recurrent 
theme of route geography. Having already noted instances of
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route-related settlement and the parallels between the 
Panama and Nicaragua routes, it is interesting to now note 
the differences that developed in settlement along these two 
routes.
Despite the flaws of Panama's ports, these settlements, 
primarily Panama, contained the majority of the route 
corridor's population. In contrast, Granada, an interior 
settlement, dominated Nicaragua's route corridor. The 
differences in the distribution of population reflect 
differences in the nature and function of the respective 
routes. Because the Panamd route was relatively short, a 
major midway settlement was unnecessary. Moreover, the land 
between Porto Bello and Panama was ill-endowed to support 
such a settlement. Hence, to the Spanish the Panama 
corridor ultimately was just an interruption in their 
maritime flow of trade: something to get past, not to
develop. It is not unreasonable to liken the green jungles 
of the Panama corridor to the green vegetables that cruelly 
separate a boy from his dessert. To secure the sweets, the 
poor child's only course of action is to close his eyes, 
hold his nose and swallow the loathsome stalks and sprouts. 
Only the extraordinary wealth the Spanish transported across 
the isthmus persuaded them to swallow this execrable passage 
for so long.
Nicaragua's route corridor differed from Panama's in a 
number of ways. Obviously, the approximately two hundred
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mile Nicaraguan transit was much longer than Panama's. More 
importantly, as stated earlier, the Nicaraguan passage was 
rarely, if ever, used as a true transisthmian passage during 
the early colonial period. Instead, it served as the 
beginning of funnel's narrow end. Overland trade routes 
from throughout the isthmus converged on Granada, whereupon 
cargo was transferred to boats for the trip down the 
Desaguadero. Hence, Granada functioned as an inland port 
and break-in-bulk settlement.
In stark contrast to the difficult coastal locations of 
Panama's primary settlements, Granada was situated in the 
Nicaraguan Depression, a fertile interior region overlain by 
rich volcanic soils. Both before and after the conquest, 
this region supported a large population and was 
agriculturally productive. Panama's port settlements lacked 
the benefits of such a hinterland. As mentioned earlier, 
because of Panama's lack, Nicaragua functioned as Panama's 
hinterland, supplying slaves and foodstuffs. Moreover, the 
depression supported a prosperous colonial population. 
Evidence that seems to reflect the relative prosperity of 
the area is the fact that in 1542 Nicaragua's governor, 
Rodrigo de Contreras, led one of mainland colonial Latin 
America's earliest rebellions against Spain's autonomy in 
the New World (Williams 1971: 47).
Nicaragua's transisthmian corridor does not completely 
explain the rise of Granada and the surrounding areas.
Nevertheless, interoceanic traffic was undoubtedly 
significant to the development of the province. The case of 
Granada, therefore, presents a model of route-related 
colonial development vastly different than that of Panama's. 
The discovery and exploitation of the Nicaraguan corridor 
caused, or coincided with, colonial development of the 
interior.
As this chapter concludes and attention is directed to 
Honduras it is useful to keep in mind the development of the 
transisthmian passages at Tehuantepec, Panama and especially 
Nicaragua. For these passages exerted important influence 
on the destiny of Honduras' transisthmian corridor. 
Moreover, many of the patterns and events, sites and 
situations common to these crossings were retraced in 
Honduran corridor.
CHAPTER THREE
THE PROGRESS OF THE HONDURAN PASSAGE
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As we have seen, the isthmus of Honduras was designated 
as early as 1540 as affording superior advantages to any 
other route of communication then known for land 
transport between the oceans (Squier 1858: 678).
To carry goods to New Galicia via Honduras and the 
Pacific was as about as practicable as by the way of the 
St. Lawrence and the Great Lakes. And the physical 
difficulties attending the isthmian (Panama) route bore 
no relation to those involved in the passage through 
Honduras and Guatemala (Haring 1964: 185).
Route History
When offering suggestions for possible interoceanic 
passages, Baron von Humboldt apparently was not privy to 
Squier's sources, for he omitted Honduras' transisthmian 
corridor. More than one hundred and fifty years later, 
Clarence Haring (1964: 185) indirectly concurred with
Humboldt, when he attributed the recurring interest in the 
Honduran passage during the colonial period "to the 
Spaniards' gross ignorance of the geography of these 
regions." Humboldt's omission reflected the prudence of 
Haring's observation. Yet, the concurrence of the omission 
and the observation are problematic because they obscure the 
significance of Honduras' transisthmian corridor. The 
problem is one of scale. At a small scale, one which 
sacrifices the subtleties of a thousand individual brush 
strokes for the sake of the big picture, evidence 
demonstrates that Honduran corridor, when compared to Panama 
and Nicaragua, was only a marginal prospect as an avenue for 
colonial interoceanic commerce: a colonial pipe dream. At
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a larger scale, however, it was precisely that small-scale 
potential that dominated the early life of the corridor. In 
the language of Sauer, Burghardt, and Rees, the prospect of 
capturing the trade that flowed from Peril and across Panama 
was a significant catalyst, or innovation, that stimulated 
the early stages of the region's development.
In this chapter we will explore that critical period in 
which a colonial route network was initially etched into the 
cultural landscape of the Honduran corridor and a spatial 
inertia, was thus entrenched. Essential to this endeavor, 
are the following tasks: 1) a chronology of the actions, and 
identification of the actors, that promoted route 
development; 2) the geographical knowledge that informed 
route planners; and 3) the constellation of factors, 
physical and cultural, that influenced early route 
development. Because these concerns become unwieldy when 
separated, this chapter will explore them collectively. The 
result is a chapter in which the elements essential to the 
development to the development of the idea of a passage 
across the Honduran corridor are identified and examined.
The early colonial history of Honduras defies a simple 
time line. It can be characterized as a tottering parade 
plagued by sputtering false starts, ill-timed departures and 
internecine struggles and miscommunications by men both 
mighty and mediocre. Fortunately, Robert Chamberlain 
untangled much of this story's snarl of strands in The
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Conquest and Colonization of Honduras (1953). One strand 
identified by Chamberlain that figures prominently in the 
first few decades of the region's development was the 
continued preoccupation of colonial officials with 
development of the transisthmian corridor. By tracing this 
corridor's evolution one necessarily explores the 
surrounding region's history. However, a focus on the 
corridor filters out much of the wearisome, peripheral 
minutiae. The primary stages and phases of interest in the 
evolution of the transisthmian route are: 1) the chain of 
events by which the corridor became known to the Spaniards; 
2) the establishment of control over the route by the 
Spaniards; and 3) the actual development of the route.
The Dawn of an Idea
The earliest evidence of a Spanish knowledge of an 
interoceanic passage across Honduras appeared in 1529 when 
Rodrigo del Castillo and Andrds Cerezeda reported to the 
Crown that
yo lo he visto por vista de ojos y otros muchos que lo 
habemos andado que el Puerto de Honduras esta casi Norte 
Sur con esta Ciudad de Leon y que hay de ancho de tierra 
por esta parte cien leguas y mas e ansi mismo seyendo 
verdad que el Golfo Fonseca de la mar del Sur que llaman 
por otro nombre Chorotega-matelaca, esta norte sur o 
casi con el puerto de caballos de la mar del Norte que 
esta en el medio de la Gobernacion del dicho Diego Lopez 
de Honduras e Higueras y que no hay por alii de mar del 
norte a la mar del Sur mas de sesenta y cinco leguas y 
de buen camino segun lo que todos los que lo han andado 
lo dicen
[The port of Honduras is located almost directly north 
of Le6n. These two locations are separated by more than 
100 leagues. The Gulf of Fonseca (also known as
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Chorotega-matelaca) on the South Sea is located directly 
south of Puerto Caballos on the North Sea. This land is 
in the province of Diego Lopez of Honduras-Higueras.
At this stretch, the two seas are separated by only 75 
leagues of easily travelled land according to everyone 
who has made the trip] (1529: 656).
This passage partially indicates the extent that the region
had been explored and reflects some of the reasons for that
exploration. Apparently, this is the earliest document that
recognized and identified the Honduran corridor and its two
termini, Puerto Caballos and the Gulf of Fonseca, by name
(refer to Map 1). The Gulf was discovered in 1523 by Andres
Nino during the same voyage in which Gil Gonzalez Davila
discovered Lake Nicaragua. Davila named the large bay after
his friend, Juan Rodriguez de Fonseca, Bishop of Burgos and
royal minister of the Indies (Anderson 1911: 221).
Davila also figured in the discovery and naming of the 
corridor's Atlantic terminus, Puerto Caballos. As mentioned 
in the previous chapter, Davila sailed from Santo Domingo, 
in 1524, to the north coast of Honduras because he believed 
the Desaguadero emptied the waters of Lake Nicaragua into 
the Caribbean in that general location. Davila's party 
encountered a storm off the north coast and had to jettison 
a number of caballos [horses] overboard to the lighten the 
vessels (Pedraza 1544: 403). Hence the name Puerto
Caballos. Davila's journey later took him west to Golfo 
Dulce, then east beyond Puerto Caballos to the vicinity of 
Trujillo and then back to Puerto Caballos (Chamberlain 1953: 
11). The first attempt at establishing a settlement at
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Puerto Caballos occurred in 1525 during Cortes' Honduran 
campaign when he founded the short-lived Natividad de 
Nuestra Seiiora (Chamberlain 1953: 17). Despite Ddvila and 
Cortds' early efforts, Spanish slaving expeditions are 
believed to have used the port even earlier, possibly as 
early as 1515 (MacLeod 1984: 50)
The Spanish passage above also indicates that the 
Spaniards had knowledge of the region's interior; indeed, by 
1529 they had already the traversed the lengths of two 
Honduran corridors. Cerezeda identified and quantified 
these two north-south corridors. Knowledge of both of these 
passages resulted from a series expeditions that had been 
sent north from Nicaragua, beginning as early 1524 
(Chamberlain 1953: 11; 18-20). The purpose of these
expeditions, similar to Davila's, was to find an appropriate 
site for an Atlantic port for Nicaragua. This sort of 
search was re-enacted throughout Central America during the 
colonial period in response to the region's fundamental 
geographical problem: during the early colonial period
Central America was essentially a Pacific province separated 
from its maritime lifeline to Europe by an underdeveloped 
Atlantic lowland (MacLeod 1984: 44). Therefore, Pacific 
concentrations of settlements required overland outlets to 
Atlantic ports. They needed roads.
The corridors investigated by Nicaraguan interests were 
determined by the two leading port possibilities, Puerto
103
Caballos in the west and the Cape of Honduras, now Trujillo, 
in the east. However, as will be shown later, only the 
passage between Puerto Caballos and the Gulf of Fonseca can 
correctly be considered a corridor in terms of its physical 
geography. Nevertheless, the passage between Leon and the 
Cape of Honduras was important because it led through the 
Olancho Valley, an important early interior mining region 
and hinterland of Trujillo (Mack 1996).
Other useful information contained in the passage above 
includes the distance measures for each route. 
Understanding the spatial relations that influenced, and 
later were influenced by, the colonial route network depends 
on knowledge of colonial conceptions of distance. The 
standard itinerary unit of measure in colonial Latin America 
was the legua legal (Chardon 1980: 129-153). This unit was 
"a time-distance concept ... defined in terms of distance 
walked in an hour". The distance denoted by one league was 
equivalent to approximately 2.6 English statute miles. 
Despite this precision, Chardon pointed out that during the 
early colonial period, linear measures were regarded as only 
"rough indicators of distance". Nevertheless, the league 
was a distance measure based on the experience of someone 
who had walked a certain distance. Hence, the occurrences 
of league measurements in early colonial documents usually 
indicate that the distances have been walked. Thus, there 
is knowledge of the land that lies between the point of
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departure and the destination. Although this point perhaps 
seems trivial, it is essential for determining the 
geographical knowledge that informed early colonial route 
planning.
Because the league was, at best, an approximate measure 
there were numerous estimates of the length of the Puerto 
Caballos-Golfo Fonseca corridor that varied widely. Apart 
from the variation caused by the unit of measure, 
unscrupulous promoters of the route also frustrated accurate 
measurement. Their desires were furthered by a shortened 
route. Because the league was based on time of travel, 
another explanation of the variation in measurement was the 
ease, or difficulty, of travel. This depended on the 
qualities of the route. Two routes of equal distance could 
be assigned unequal measures because of a difference in the 
time required to traverse each. Accordingly, a good road 
would be ascribed a lower league value than a bad road. The 
passage above recorded the first measure of the Puerto 
Caballos-Golfo Fonseca route, seventy-five leagues. This 
one hundred and ninety-five miles (312 kms.) shrank 
throughout the life of the route because the route improved.
In 1532, Andres de Cerezeda, co-author of the above 
passage, was chosen the acting governor and contador 
[comptroller] of the Provincia de Higueras e Cabo de 
Honduras (Chamberlain 1953: 26). As the title suggests, 
this province contained two parts: a western district,
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called Higueras, that stretched along the Caribbean coast, 
roughly, from the Rio Ulua to the Gulfo Dulce and extended 
south to the Gulf of Fonseca, thus including the 
transisthmian corridor; and an eastern district, called 
Honduras, that stretched from Cape Honduras to Cabo Camaron 
and extended south to include the large Olancho Valley. 
Hence, both districts contained north-south passages and 
north coast ports: Puerto Caballos and Trujillo, founded in 
1525. Among Cerezeda's colonization strategies were plans 
to initiate settlement in Higueras, primarily in the valley 
of Naco, just interior to Puerto Caballos, and to exploit 
the eastern passage by establishing a town on the route that 
led to Nicaragua to secure regular communications with that 
province (Chamberlain 1953: 26-29).
Three years later Cerezeda hatched a plan that combined 
his desire for interior settlement and westward expansion. 
He sent a letter to the Crown that promoted the 
establishment of a settlement at a location midway between 
Puerto Caballos and the Gulf of Fonseca. According to 
Cerezeda, a corridor that was especially suitable for the 
construction of an interoceanic road extended 25 leagues 
north and south of the settlement site (Chamberlain 1946a: 
62). This seems to be the corridor he mentioned six years 
earlier; however, either the passage of time or Cerezeda's 
fervor condensed this corridor by 25 leagues, or 65 miles. 
This lapse in accuracy of measurement notwithstanding,
106
Cerezeda reasoned that should such a road be built, this 
Honduran passage would far surpass the Panama passage for 
transisthmian trade, especially that from Peru. Counted 
among the proposed advantages of the Puerto Caballos-Golfo 
Fonseca corridor were a more salubrious climate than that of 
Panama, good bays for ports and a shorter passage from Peru 
to Havana. Moreover, relocation of Spain's transisthmian 
trade to the Honduran corridor would establish the midway 
settlement as the commercial center of the region 
(Chamberlain 1953: 62).
This design depended on a profound development that had 
arisen in the New World between 1529 and 1535, the date of 
Cerezeda's letters. This was the discovery and conquest of 
the Incan Empire, a process that began with Francisco 
Pizarro's first voyage to Peril in 1524 (Anderson 1911: 236) 
and climaxed with the execution of the Incan leader 
Atahuallpa in 1533 (Prescott 1851: 485). Beginning in 1533 
when Hernando Pizarro carried the first large shipment of 
Peruvian treasure back to Spain, the riches of the Incas 
flowed from the "South Sea" to the "North Sea" across Panamd 
(26). As noted in Chapter Two, the pattern of the Spanish 
galleons that carried this cargo back to Spain was 
established in 1537 and institutionalized in 1544. Clearly, 
Cerezeda wanted the corridor between Puerto Caballos and the 
Gulf of Fonseca to be a part of that pattern. He, therefore
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aggrandized the simple 75-league passage into a 50-league 
replacement for the Panama route.
This plan dominated the life of the Honduran corridor 
during the early colonial period. For the remainder of the 
colonial period, the Crown received testimonios containing 
similar proposals. E. G. Squier, author of the optimistic 
quote that introduced this chapter, revived the 
transisthmian idea in the 1850s when he proposed the 
construction of an interoceanic railway through the 
corridor. In every instance, these proposals were based on 
the belief that a transisthmian artery of trade was the key 
to developing the region. Cerezeda's plan can be thought of 
as the innovation that initiated some spatial permanence in 
the young province. The repeated proposals mentioned above 
support this claim, as do the actions that Cerezeda's plan 
inspired.
Gaining Control
The merits of Cerezeda's plan kindled the interests of 
other colonial leaders in Central America, most notably 
Pedro de Alvarado, Adelantado [commander of an occupying 
force in colonial Latin America (Hoffman 1980: 264)] of 
Guatemala, and Francisco Montejo, Adelantado of Yucatdn. 
However, even prior to Cerezeda's proposal, these two had 
been drawn into the destiny of the province of Higueras and 
Honduras. Already in 1528, Montejo had sailed along the 
eastern coast of Yucatdn and continued as far east as the
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Rio Ulua. Apparently impressed by what he saw, he sent a 
dispatch to the Crown in 1529 proposing the extension of his 
realm in Yucatan eastward to this river. In 1533 Montejo 
made a formal claim for this extension. By the end of 1535 
Montejo had been appointed governor of Higueras and Honduras 
and that province had been administratively united with 
Yucatdn (Chamberlain 1953: 43-45). Montejo's proposal was 
probably guided by his knowledge of the substantial trade 
that existed between the lower Ulua, a rich cacao-producing 
region (Bergman 1969: 94), and Yucatan (Roys and Scholes 
1968: 132). Whether he knew of, or had plans for, the
transisthmian corridor is uncertain.
Despite this apparently favorable progression of 
events, Montejo's claim to Higueras and Honduras was 
undermined by prior actions of the Crown and Cerezeda and by 
his own failures in Yucatan. The Crown muddled the 
situation between 1532 and 1533 by granting to Alvarado, 
Montejo and Diego Alvxtez, an early governor of Honduras, 
the right to colonize the Naco Valley and the region 
surrounding Puerto Caballos (Chamberlain 1953: 30). In
1535, an Indian uprising in Yucatan distressed Montejo to 
the point that he requested to the Crown and Alvarado that 
he be absolved of the authority over Higueras and Honduras 
in favor of Alvarado (Chamberlain 1953: 49-51). Around the 
same time, efforts by Cerezeda's treasurer, Diego Garcia de 
Cells, induced Alvarado, unaware that the Crown had refused
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Montejo's request and ordered him to Higueras-Honduras, to
assume control of the region. This almost comically tragic
scenario demonstrates that efforts to colonize the province
were plagued by a lack of coordination. Chamberlain
captured the essence of the early colonial situation in
Higueras-Honduras in the following passage.
Although many captains and hundreds of men-more than 
Pizarro needed to overthrow the vast, populous, and 
fabulously rich Inca Empire-had come to Honduras since 
the beginnings of colonization, the Spaniards had so 
dissipated their strength in internecine quarrels that 
Trujillo, with less than 200 citizens, alone was left of 
the many efforts at settlement (1953: 28).
Alvarado, 1536
Pedro de Alvarado advanced the evolution of the Puerto
Caballos-Golfo Fonseca corridor by directing expeditions of
conquest throughout its extent and by founding a major
settlement, San Pedro, on the axis. These activities
contributed to the knowledge, control and development of the
corridor.
Alvarado's interest in Higueras came by way of his 
desire to establish a port on the Caribbean coast to serve 
Guatemala. In 1534 the Crown issued a royal provision, 
apparently in response to an earlier request by Alvarado, 
that granted him permission to look for and establish such 
a port (1534: 187-190). This document demonstrates
Guatemala's need for an outlet to the north by illustrating 
the disadvantages of its present patterns of overland 
transport. Alvarado's capital, Santiago de Guatemala, was
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linked to its primary port, San Juan de Veracruz, by 300 
leagues of road that led over treacherous terrain. The 
smaller and less distant port at Coatzoacoalcos was 
separated from Santiago de Guatemala by 40 leagues (Alvarado 
1536a: 247). The Spaniards were forced to use Indians as 
beasts of burden over this stretch "por no los poder llevar 
en bestias por la aspereza de los caminos" [because it is 
impossible to carry with beasts because of the ruggedness of 
the roads] (Carlos 1534: 188). Evidently this means of 
transport was expensive, for merchants who travelled over 
this stretch were said to have charged exorbitant prices for 
their wares.
Therefore, in 1534, while Pedro de Alvarado was leading 
an expedition to Peru, his brother Jorge sent an expedition 
to establish a north coast port (Chamberlain 1947: 625). 
Rather than actually founding a port settlement, the 
company, led by Cristobal de la Cueva, met Cerezeda in 
Higueras and reached an agreement that a road should be 
built between Santiago de Guatemala and a North Sea port in 
Higueras (Chamberlain 1953: 33).
Upon returning from Peru, Pedro de Alvarado was 
persuaded to march to Honduras and establish Spanish 
authority over the region. According to Chamberlain his 
journey took him from Santiago de Guatemala through the 
western interior of Higueras and finally to Buena Esperanza 
(1953: 55). The precise location of Buena Esperanza is
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uncertain. One document (Cerezeda 1535) places it 23 
leagues from Puerto Caballos, seven leagues from the pueblo 
of Naco and three leagues from Quimistan (Chamberlain 1953: 
32). Such a location must therefore be west of Quimistan up 
the Rio Chamelecon and in the modern Sula Valley, as 
confirmed by another document (Cerezeda 1534). A document 
from 1536 reported that Buena Esperanza was located in the 
Naco Valley (Cava 1536: 289), but the author was probably 
writing with only general geographical information and noted 
only the most important settlement —  at Naco.
During approximately four months in the province,
Alvarado acted somewhat in concert with Cerezeda's plans to
develop the transisthmian corridor. Early on, he sent a
party to establish the province's capital city, Gracias a
Dios, in the province's interior, midway between the north
and south coasts. However, rather than choose a location
within the transisthmian corridor, Alvarado's men chose a
site far to the west on the Rio Mejocote. This choice
reflected Alvarado's desire to establish a communication and
supply route between Higueras and Guatemala (Chamberlain
1946b: 8; Newson 1986: 99). The location may also have been
associated with Alvarado's own plans for a transisthmian
passage that did not coincide with Cerezeda's. In a letter
to the Crown from 1536, Alvarado revealed his thoughts.
Yo buscare si obiese puerto, y siendo de tal 
dispusicion, que conbenga poblar y que se puedan 
sostener vecinos espanoles, yo poblare una villa, y 
haciendose, se bar a una de las cosas mas provechosas que
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en estas partes se haya hecho, por la brevedad 
navegacion que hay desde las Islas Espahola e 
Fernandina, e otras Islas a esta Costa del Norte, y 
della a la de la Mar del Sur a donde se ha descobierto 
un muy buen puerto hondable y seguro en la boca del rrio 
de Lempa, donde se ha poblado una Villa que se llama de 
San Miguel, donde se podran proveer todos los navios 
que alii aportaren e se puede dar carena e cargar; y 
desta manera se comunicara con poco trabaxo la Mar del 
Norte con la del Sur, sera gran provecho para si se 
descobriese algo por ella
[I will check if the port site (Puerto Caballos) can 
support settlement of Spanish citizens. If it can, I 
will establish a villa. The deed will be one of the 
most beneficial in this area. For this site provides 
the shortest route between the north coast and 
Hispanola, Fernandina and the other islands. Moreover, 
a deep protected port has been discovered on the South 
Sea at the mouth of the Rio Lempa. A villa called San 
Miguel has been founded at this site. The location 
could sustain arriving ships with cargo and place to 
careen. In this manner, with little effort, 
communication between the North and South Seas could be 
established) (1536a: 246-247).
The location of the passage implied in this excerpt reflects
Alvarado's desire that any interoceanic trade in the region
should pass as close as possible to the jurisdiction of
Guatemala. A passage that ran from the mouth of the Rio
Lempa through Gracias a Dios and on to the north coast would
have been closer to Santiago de Guatemala than would have
the Puerto Caballos-Golfo Fonseca corridor. Alvarado's
experience in the province also might have influenced the
site of Gracias a Dios. According to Chamberlain, Alvarado
had passed through this region en route to Buena Esperanza
(1953: 55). Possibly he chose an appropriate site during
his march to Buena Esperanza.
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Before returning to Spain, Alvarado also conquered the 
lower Ulua and on June 26, 1536 he founded the Villa de Sant 
Pedro de Puerto Caballos near the Indian pueblo called 
Tholoma (1536b: 530-538) just north of modern San Pedro
Sula. These actions were taken after Alvarado had met with 
Cerezeda and possibly resulted from the latter's counsel, or 
his previous desire for a North Sea port. There are no 
explicit references to the transisthmian corridor in 
Alvarado's report to the Crown of his founding San Pedro. 
However, he did emphasize the advantages of the lower Ulua 
and Higueras in general. Alvarado predicted the Crown would 
increase its tax collection with the establishment of a 
settlement such as San Pedro because it would stimulate 
commerce by serving merchants, retailers and others who 
sailed to Puerto Caballos (1536b: 532). Alvarado also
claimed that communication between Spain and Guatemala and 
the Pacific coast would be improved, because Puerto Caballos 
was separated from Spain by only a relatively short passage 
(1536b: 532). Hence, both Cerezeda and Alvarado wrote to 
the Crown of the region's promising commercial potential, a 
future based on Higueras' function as a passage or port for 
trade.
About three weeks after founding San Pedro, Alvarado 
divided the lands surrounding Gracias a Dios and San Pedro 
into repartimientos (1536c: 20-30; 1536d: 5-20). His two 
related dispatches are useful because they report the names
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of the Indian pueblos contained in each repartimiento and, 
occasionally, some information about the location of the 
pueblos. Because some of these indigenous names have 
persisted and can be found on a current map of Honduras, it 
is possible to determine in part where Alvarado and his men 
travelled in the region. However, Chamberlain was skeptical 
of the value of the reports of Alvarado's repartimientos 
(1953: 60-61). He believed that they were based on
"insufficient and inaccurate" intelligence. Nevertheless, 
the information should not be diminished entirely. 
Certainly, Alvarado's men must have reported correctly the 
names and locations of some of the pueblos. And in cases in 
which they erred, it is possible that their past errors have 
since become current facts on the map of Honduras.
Alvarado reported dispensing 99 repartimientos in the 
area of Gracias a Dios. The pueblos listed in his report 
suggest that the "area" was quite large, extending far to 
the south and east of Gracias a Dios. Included in the 
report were two pueblos located in the Comayagua Valley, 
Leyamane (Lejamani) and Alamani (Lamani) at the valley's 
southern rim. Teguycegalpa (Tegucigalpa), even farther to 
the east, was also included as was Indepuca (Intibuca), in 
the south.
The area closer to San Pedro was divided into 39 
repartimientos. The majority of the pueblos granted were 
located in the Ulua drainage, the Naco Valley or on the
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nearby Caribbean coast. Similar to Gracias a Dios, this 
region of repartimientos was far-flung, extending as far 
south and north as two pueblos called Comayagua in the 
interior and Tolian (Tulian) on the north coast, and into 
the Yoro valley in the east and the Naco valley in the west.
Neither of these documents (Alvarado 1536c and 1536d) 
mentioned the transisthmian corridor. However, eight of the 
pueblos, nine including San Pedro, that were granted in 
repartimiento were also located on the transisthmian camino 
real. They include from north to south, Tolian, Choloma, 
Despolonal (Pimiento), Aramani, Meambar, Maniani (Espino 
Valley), Comayagua and Alamani; and, linked together they 
comprise approximately two thirds of the interoceanic 
passage (Map 7). Inclusion of these settlements in 
repartimiento demonstrates that during his whirlwind 
campaign in 1536 Alvarado gained at least second-hand 
knowledge and temporary control of two thirds of the 
transisthmian corridor. The possibility that Pedro de 
Alvarado departed from Puerto Caballos in August of 1536 
with the knowledge of a pre-existing indigenous route that 
ran through the corridor will be considered in a later 
chapter.
San Miguel
The southern third of the Puerto Caballos-Golfo Fonseca 
corridor extends southward from the continental divide to 
the Pacific Ocean along the Rio San Juan-Rio Goascoran.
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Map 7. Probable Pueblo Locations from Alvarado's 1536 Repartimientos
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Presently, the Goascoran serves as the border between 
southeastern El Salvador and Honduras. Similarly, in the 
early colonial period the southern third of the 
transisthmian corridor ran between Higueras and a province 
to the west, San Miguel. The limits of San Miguel stretched 
from the Rio Lempa to the Bahia de Fonseca and from the 
Pacific coast inland to a nebulous border with Higueras, in 
a mountainous region south of the continental divide 
(Chamberlain 1947: 623-624). Centrally located within these 
bounds was the town of San Miguel, founded in 1530 by Luis 
de Moscoso on behalf of the province of Guatemala. Similar 
to Higueras-Honduras, San Miguel, town and province, 
experienced a sputtering development.
In 1535, the year of Cerezeda's second letter, San 
Miguel was re-founded by Cristobal de la Cueva, mentioned 
earlier as the leader of the expedition to found a North Sea 
port. La Cueva had to resettle San Miguel because the 
region had been deserted by colonists dissatisfied with the 
area's prospects and those who were persuaded to join 
Alvarado on his expedition to Peril (Chamberlain 1947: 624- 
627). La Cueva's action was important to the transisthmian 
corridor and Cerezeda's plan because it re-introduced the 
jurisdiction of Guatemala into the area. Matters of 
jurisdiction over San Miguel and the Gulf of Fonseca vexed 
subsequent efforts by Honduran officials to develop the 
transisthmian corridor.
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Because of la Cueva's efforts, when Pedro de Alvarado 
sailed to Spain in 1536 to secure the right to govern 
Higueras-Honduras and to garner support for further South 
Sea expeditions, his claim was supported by his conquest, if 
only temporarily, of the north-south sweep of the 
transisthmian corridor.
Montejo, 1536-1539
In his book, Spanish Central America: A Socioeconomic 
History, 1520-1720, (1973: 43-47) Murdo MacLeod singled out 
Francisco Montejo as the only early colonial official who 
possessed a "great interest in Central America from the 
point of view of development or administration". Montejo's 
example provided a stark contrast to the horde of raiding 
campaigns that defined the first few decades of Spanish 
occupation following conquest of the region. Similar to 
Andres de Cerezeda, Montejo's vision for the development of 
Higueras-Honduras focused on the commercial exploitation of 
the transisthmian corridor. However, in contrast to 
Cerezeda, Monte jo came to a known and, at least momentarily, 
conquered corridor. Indian settlements throughout the 
corridor had been assigned, however hastily, to individual 
conquistadors. Moreover, Montejo's vision was accompanied 
by the resolve and power necessary to effect change on the 
ground. Therefore, after a campaign of reconquest, Montejo 
resumed the development of the corridor.
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As mentioned earlier, Montejo made his early mark in 
the region as the conqueror and adelantado of Yucatan. He 
sought to broaden his authority by extending the limits of 
his government south and east to the Ulua and west to 
Chiapas and Tabasco. The smooth progress of these plans was 
interrupted by an epidemic Indian rebellion in Yucatan after 
which Montejo requested that the Crown absolve him of his 
authority over Higueras-Honduras and instead grant Pedro de 
Alvarado dominion over the province. His request denied, 
Montejo marched from Mexico City to Gracias a Dios, arriving 
in the spring of 1537 (Chamberlain 1953: 74-75).
Montejo's arrival in Higueras-Honduras was heralded by 
his lieutenant governor, Alonso de Cdceres. Caceres arrived 
in Gracias a Dios late in 1536 and established Montejo's 
authority (Chamberlain 1953: 70-78). Montejo reached there 
in March. Their initial activities were to establish 
authority over those scattered pockets of Spanish settlement 
within the province. Therefore, Montejo headed first to San 
Pedro and the Naco Valley.
The first efforts of Montejo's administration directed 
toward the transisthmian corridor were carried out by 
Cdceres and directed at its center, the Valle de Comayagua. 
Cerezeda, undoubtedly, had this broad upland valley in mind 
when in 1535 he recommended that a midway settlement be 
founded. Cdceres conquered part of the Comayagua valley 
late in 1536 (Chamberlain 1953: 74-76). Early the next
120
summer, he returned to valley and founded the villa of Santa 
Maria de Comayagua. As will be demonstrated later, this 
valley and its primary settlement became the focus of 
development in the corridor and all of Honduras, just as 
Cerezeda had proposed.
Following the founding of Comayagua, an Indian uprising
throughout Higueras and San Miguel paralyzed Montejo's
development efforts between late 1537 and the spring of 1539
(Chamberlain 1953: 82-98). Nevertheless, it was an
expedition associated with this uprising that crystallized
the concept of a transisthmian route for Montejo. During
the spring of 1539 Montejo travelled from Gracias a Dios to
the villa of San Miguel to help put down a rebellion. The
following passage is a record of what he discovered and
Montejo's first description of his plans for the Puerto
Caballos-Golfo Fonseca corridor.
[Y]o llegue a vista de la mar del sur y del puerto de 
Fonseca, y desde una sierra descubri el camino y envie 
gente a vello; y desde el Puerto de Fonseca hasta la 
villa de Comayagua, hay veinte leguas de buen camino 
podriase hacer muy mejor; e desde la villa de Comayagua 
hasta la villa de S. Pedro, hay veinte y cinco leguas, 
y desde la villa de S. Pedro al Puerto Caballos, hay
siete leguas, de manera, que Puerto de Fonseca al de
Caballos hay cincuenta y dos leguas, y a poca costa se 
podra hacer el camino para recuas y aun el tiempo 
andando para carretas. Que no ha sido poco, descubrir 
tan buen camino en tan aspera tierra, e puertos tan 
provechosos para la mar del sur, asi por lo que he 
dicho, como por ser la tierra muy sana y apacible por 
donde se ha contratar. Porque la villa de Comayagua 
esta en un valle muy hermoso e muy frutifero e muy
sano, e la villa S. Pedro, aunquel asiento que agora
tiene no es tan sano, yo trabajare de mudallo a otro 
asiento, tres leguas de alii mas hacia la villa de 
Comayagua e hacia el valle de Naco, donde se apartan los
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caminos, que tiene muy hermoso asiento e muy sano; e 
hecho esto, ninguna gente que a ellos venga adolescera. 
Y todo el trato de la mar del sur serapor este pueblo, 
asi por la seguridad de la mar, como por la sanidad de 
la tierra y brevedad y bondad del camino; siendo V.M. 
servido de mandar se haga merced a esta tierra e 
gobernacion de algunos negros para abrir los caminos, 
porque la tierra es aspera y los indios pocos, no se 
podria sufrir hacer ellos los caminos, que todos no se 
destruyesen y se perdiesen; e sin ello, aprovecharia 
poco la bondad e riqueza de la tierra
[I arrived at a vista of the South Sea and the Gulf of 
Fonseca. From a ridge I discovered the road and sent 
people to go see it. From the Puerto de Fonseca to the 
town of Comayagua there are 20 leagues of good road that 
could be improved. From Comayagua to the town of San 
Pedro there are 25 leagues and San Pedro is separated 
from Puerto Caballos by seven leagues. So, from Puerto 
de Fonseca to Puerto Caballos there are 52 leagues. For 
little expense one could build a mule road and 
eventually a wagon road along between the ports. It has 
been no small deed to find such a good road in such 
rugged land and ports so advantageous on both coasts. 
For these reasons this a good place for trade. Because 
the town of Comayagua is in a valley very beautiful and 
fruitful and healthful and the town of San Pedro is 
presently located in an unhealthy site, I am working to 
move the settlement three leagues closer to Comayagua 
and in the Naco Valley. The roads fork here and there 
is a very beautiful and healthful settlement site. And 
accomplishing this, no one will suffer. And all the 
trade of the South Sea -would be for this province 
because of the security of the port, the healthfulness 
of the land and the brevity and goodness of the road. 
Your Majesty would be served by granting to this 
province some Africans to open roads because the land is 
rugged and the Indians are few. The Indians could not 
survive the work of opening roads. Without this, one 
will profit little from the goodness and riches of this 
land] (1539a: 220-221).
This passage contains part of the text for Montejo's 
map of Higueras' transisthmian corridor. It was contained 
in a letter to the Crown. In this passage and throughout 
the letter Montejo identified, located, measured and 
evaluated the corridor's principal features and settled on
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the means to exploit them. With this persuasive map Montejo 
wanted to show the Crown that the Puerto Caballos-Golfo 
Fonseca passage was relatively short, fifty-two leagues, and 
bracketed by two suitable ports; that the nature of the land 
would allow easy construction of a mule path, possibly even 
a cart road, no small achievement in a region of such rugged 
terrain; that in contrast with Panama's sweltering 
quagmirous corridor, Higueras' corridor led through 
temperate uplands for much of its length; and above all, 
that the Higueras corridor was an opportune replacement for 
Spain's interoceanic traffic.
Cognizant that project proposals are often served by 
results in advance, Montejo pressed his case by 
demonstrating that development had already begun. The town 
of Comayagua had been established in the major central 
valley, the height of beauty, and the fecundity and location 
of recently discovered silver mines that "tienen infinito 
metal, ay tantas, que sobran para toda la Nueva Espana1 
[contain infinite metal, more than all that of Nueva Espana] 
(1539a: 232). And with his new site for San Pedro, the
corridor would be served by another settlement of 
commensurate fruitfulness. Moreover, later in the same 
letter Montejo reported of ongoing efforts to establish a 
port at Puerto Caballos, in an admittedly less salubrious 
clime. And finally, in a statement that either undermines 
his integrity or testifies to his wit, Montejo reported that
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early attempts at agriculture were encouraging, with the 
vines heavy laden "with grapes more beautiful than any 
others he had seen in these parts" (1539a: 233).
The final section of the passage above points out one 
of the plan's, and Higueras-Honduras', important drawbacks. 
Indian labor was lacking. So, similar to route promoters in 
Nicaragua and Panamd, Montejo asked the Crown for a grant of 
African slaves to do the work of opening the road.
Later in the same letter, Montejo filled in the
southern reaches of his map. He claimed that the town and
province of San Miguel should be included in his
jurisdiction. Included among Montejo's reasons were: San
Miguel's proximity to Comayagua, eight leagues; the prior
depopulation of the province's Indians by agents of
Guatemala; and most importantly, because
estar Norte Sur el Puerto de Fonseca del Puerto de 
Caballos, e no haber mas de cinquenta e dos leguas de 
Puerto a Puerto, por donde ha de ser toda la 
contratacion
[The Gulf of Fonseca and Puerto Caballos lie in a north- 
south line, no more than 52 leagues apart. This is 
where all of Spain's transisthmian trade could be 
funneled] (1539a: 233).
Montejo's ideas and efforts stimulated support among 
his benefactors and associates. Evidence of this is found 
in letters sent to the Crown in 1539. These letters 
illuminate Montejo's plan. Montejo's friend Juan de Lerma 
wrote from Guatemala of the present conditions of overland 
transport and suggested solutions (1539). While he limited
his discussion primarily to transport between Guatemala and 
Puerto Caballos, he extended his solution, the construction 
of mule roads, to the region in general. As mentioned in 
Chapter Two, in doing so de Lerma identified a critical 
transition in colonial transport, the shift from human 
bearers, tamemes, to beasts of burden, burros. His call for 
the Crown to support the opening mule roads was based on his 
knowledge that bearing over difficult stretches, like that 
between Guatemala and Chiapas, caused "el daiio e desminicion 
que reciben los naturalesn [the damage and decrease 
experienced by the Indians]. De Lerma also argued that mule 
roads would serve those regions, like much of the stretch 
between Guatemala and Puerto Caballos, that in contrast to 
Guatemala, possessed a dearth of Indians. At that time, 
colonists in those areas faced the prospect of advancing 
colonization and settlement without a reliable means to 
conduct overland trade. In an association of which Montejo 
would have approved, de Lerma presented the camino real that 
led from Veracruz to Mexico City as the model for the mule 
roads to be built in Guatemala and Higueras.
In an article from 1946, Chamberlain (1946a: 63-65)
included an extensive passage of another letter written in 
1539 that promoted Montejo's plans for Higueras-Honduras. 
The letter was written by Cristobal de Pedraza, Protector of 
the Indians and later Bishop of Honduras. In this letter to 
the Crown, Pedraza presented arguments to the Crown on
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Montejo's behalf. He echoed Montejo's argument that the
Honduran passage was shorter and less dangerous than
Panama's. Pedraza also glorified the benefits of the
Comayagua Valley.
[QJual villa esta poblada e asentada en lo mas 
conveniente de toda la tierra y en el mejor asiento 
della cercado de oro y de plata porq tiene las mejors y 
mas riccas minas por la una parte y por la otra de oro 
y plata q ay en toda esta tierra casi dentro en casa y 
... el asiento della esta en el mas hermoso valle y mas 
frutifero de toda esta tierra y donde se dan todas las 
cosas de toda ella y se daran todas las de cast ill a pan 
y vino ganados especialmente ovejas por ... ser la 
cibdad principal y todo lo principal de toda esta tierra 
aunq ay muy pocos yndios en ella y todo el ser y bien d 
ella por el trato de la una mar y de la otra
[The town (Comayagua) is populated and situated in the 
most convenient location in the land and in the best 
site near gold and silver. The best and richest gold 
and silver mines in this land are very near the town. 
The town is located in the most beautiful and fruitful 
valley in the land. It could produce all the products 
of Castile: bread, wine, livestock (especially sheep). 
The town should be the principal city of this land. 
However, there is lack of Indians in the land. But it 
would be good site for interoceanic trade (1946a: 64).
Later in the letter, Pedraza argued for the inclusion of San
Miguel in Higueras-Honduras, in light of its position
relative to the transisthmian corridor and on the grounds
that a province lacking in so much, was of little value to
a province as well-endowed as Guatemala.
In a later passage Pedraza seems to have betrayed his 
calling. He claimed that overland travellers arrived at 
Puerto Caballos every day from places as far away as the 
border of Veracruz, 600 leagues to the west, Guatemala, Leon 
and Peril to secure passage to Spain or Santo Domingo (1946a:
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65). That Puerto Caballos was such a bustling and 
cosmopolitan port in 1539 seems highly unlikely considering 
that during the Indian uprising of the previous one and half 
years no ships called there (Chamberlain 1953: 136).
Considering his profession, it is possible that the same the 
fervor and devotion that served the bishop's missionary 
activities also colored his efforts on behalf of the 
development of Higueras-Honduras.
The previously mentioned article by Chamberlain also 
included a lengthy passage of a letter sent to the Crown in 
1539 by the cabildo [municipal council] of Comayagua (1946a: 
65-66). Not surprisingly, the cabildo echoed and further 
fleshed out Montejo's plans for the Higueras corridor. A 
significant feature of their letter was language suggesting 
that the transisthmian road, beyond mere prospect, actually 
existed. The cabildo identified themselves as inhabitants 
of a town that was "asentada en medio dl camino de entre la 
mar dl norte y la mar dl sur" [situated on the road between 
the North and South Seas] (1946a: 65). This seems to be the 
first denotation of such a road. Cerezeda in 1529 and 
Montejo ten years later both characterized the corridor as 
being "de buen camino." However, this phrase does not 
necessarily indicate the presence of a road. Rather, it can 
merely imply that the area was easily traversed and thus, 
possessed the potential for the construction of a road. The 
choice of language perhaps can be traced to an
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understandable spirit of self-interest on the part of the
cabildo. They also reported the length of this road as
being fifty leagues rather than the 52, 53 or 75 previously
described by Montejo and Pedraza and Cerezeda, respectively
(1946a: 65). Just as likely, however, the cabildo could
have been referring to a series of Indian paths that
connected pueblos along the corridor. Nevertheless, the
camino was mentioned.
Because the Spanish vecinos of Comayagua had served on
Alvarado and Montejo's campaigns in the province, the
cabildo was knowledgeable about that section of the corridor
that connected Comayagua with Puerto Caballos. The cabildo
claimed that transport over those twenty-four leagues could
be improved by water transport.
[A]y un rio q viene dsdl puerto caballos hasta doze 
leguas dl dha villa por el qal pueden venir canoas hasta 
las dhas doze leguas y alii esta un pueblo de yndios 
donde se puede hacer una casa en nobre de V mgt donde 
todas las mercadurias vengan de dl dho puerto en las 
dhas canoas muy seguramente y desdel desembarcadero 
hasta donde es la villa ay doze leguas d camino muy 
llano q pueden yr carretas demas desto junto a la villa
[There is river (Ulud-Humuya) that comes from Puerto 
Caballos to within 12 leagues of this town. Canoes can 
ascend this river to within 12 leagues of this town. At 
the 12 league mark there is an Indian pueblo where one 
could build a warehouse in the name of Your Majesty. 
All goods could be brought safely from Puerto Caballos 
to this disembarcadero in canoes. This settlement is 
separated from Comayagua by 12 leagues of level road 
suitable for wagons] (reproduced in Chamberlain 1946a: 
65).
This idea is reminiscent of plans for transisthmian passages 
discussed previously. The central element is the use of a
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river as a more easily travelled line of penetration to the 
interior. Accompanying such a line is a break-in-bulk 
settlement at the river's head of navigation where cargo is 
unloaded and stored or transshipped. The distances in this 
letter, Montejo's previously discussed plans to move San 
Pedro three leagues inland and a survey from 1590 (Antonelli 
and Quintanilla 1590) point to San Pedro as the ultimate 
break-in-bulk settlement (refer to Map 7). The river of 
penetration was the Rio Chamelecon.
Despite the practicality of shipping cargo twelve 
leagues inland, the cabildo's claims about the remaining 
twelve leagues are reckless. As will be demonstrated later, 
there is no "muy. llano" passage that leads to Comayagua.
Not surprisingly, the cabildo also shone considerable 
light on the surpassing advantages of the Comayagua Valley 
(Map 10).
[Y] es tierra donde se d!an todas las cosas de castilla 
abundantemente trigo y vinas y todas las otras arvoles 
de castilla y todo los ganados della ansi vacas como 
ovejas y cabras porq tiene los mejores pastos y aguas y 
monte de toda la tierra y es tierra muy templada dado un 
temple maravilloso ni muy caliente ni muy frio cercada 
de dos rrios donde se da mucho pescado y las aguas muy 
buenas y abundancia d huerta q en ella ay e por las 
cosas de castilla se an se an senbrado en ellas esta en 
un valle muy deleytable
[And this valley produces all the products of Castile 
abundantly: wheat, vines, trees like those of Castile. 
Livestock like cattle, sheep and goats thrive because of 
good pasture, water and forest. The valley possesses a 
temperate climate. There are two rivers that possess 
much fish and good water for irrigated fields. And all 
the crops from Castile have produced delightfully, 
(reproduced in Chamberlain 1946a: 65).
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The cabildo also argued that the villa Comayagua should be 
made the principal city of the province at the expense of 
Gracias a Dios, a ciudad that the cabildo claimed could not 
support many more than the thirty vecinos it presently 
possessed. Comayagua, in contrast, could easily support 
sixty. They claimed further, that should transisthmian 
trade develop, Comayagua would exceed Santiago de Guatemala 
and rival Mexico City.
With authority over a passable corridor that led from 
the South Sea to the North Sea, Montejo envisioned Higueras- 
Honduras as a commercial center on two counts. Firstly, the 
lucrative transisthmian trade from Peru and Castile would 
relocate from Panama. Trans-shipment and distribution 
centers, such as San Pedro and San Miguel would emerge to 
serve both ports (Chamberlain 1953: 106). And, whereas the 
Panama passage offered only steep, steamy slopes for 
interior settlement, the Higueras corridor possessed a 
veritable Garden of Eden in the broad, clement Comayagua 
Valley. Secondly, because of its position between Guatemala 
and Nicaragua, two provinces with unsatisfactory Atlantic 
ports, Higueras-Honduras would become the hub of regional 
trade. Therefore, complementing the primary north-south and 
south-north flow would be a crisscrossing network of roads 
that would link the corridor with the rest of Higueras- 
Honduras and Nicaragua and Guatemala. The depth and sweep
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of these plans largely explain MacLeod's previously- 
mentioned appraisal of Francisco Montejo's motives. 
Alvarado Again
Nevertheless, despite the grandeur of these plans and 
the support they prompted, the momentum of Montejo's 
development efforts was extinguished in the middle of 1539 
with the return of Pedro de Alvarado. Alvarado had departed 
from Puerto Caballos in August of 1536 to secure royal 
sanction to govern Higueras-Honduras. He returned to Puerto 
Caballos on Good Friday [Viernes Sante] of 1539, having 
gained a decision from the Crown in his favor and at the 
expense of Montejo. After several months of contentious 
legal wrangling between the two adelantados, in August of 
that year Montejo and Alvarado came to terms. In late 1539, 
Montejo departed Higueras-Honduras for Chiapas (Chamberlain 
1953: 174-175).
Alvarado's account of his disembarkation at Puerto 
Caballos demonstrated that Montejo's development plans, 
especially road-building, had progressed little beyond the 
drawing board. Alvarado reported meeting a man near the 
port who claimed to have been wandering for six days in the 
surrounding monte [forests] looking for a road that led to 
San Pedro (1539: 312). Apparently Alvarado could not find 
the road either. Accordingly, he took two hundred men with 
pick-axes, machetes and hatchets and opened a road all the 
way to San Pedro. The project took ten days. The road was
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wide enough for one recua. Alvarado returned to Puerto 
Caballos to unload the cargo from his ships. On his return 
to San Pedro, Alvarado floated his "municiones y hato de la 
Mar en barriles por un rlo arriJba" [ammunition and gear from 
the sea in barrels upstream] and carried the rest of the 
cargo overland and his new bride on twenty-four mules he had 
brought from Santo Domingo (1539: 313). Alvarado's use of 
the Rio Chamelecon for inland transport possibly informed 
the cabildo of Comayagua's previously noted suggestion 
because their letter was sent after Alvarado's penetration. 
Thus, we have our first account of overland transport of 
cargo on the Puerto Caballos-Golfo Fonseca road.
The apparent vigor with which Alvarado opened this 
important section of the transisthmian road and demonstrated 
its utility is misleading. For, similar to his previous 
campaign in Higueras-Honduras, Alvarado's pursuits in the 
province, though certainly significant, were essentially 
fleeting. His interest in developing Higueras-Honduras 
paled in comparison to his desire to explore the riches of 
South Sea. This being the case, Alvarado departed the 
region less than six months after arriving, never to return 
(Chamberlain 1953: 178). The notable achievement of his 
second tour in Higueras-Honduras was the relocation of the 
capital from Gracias a Dios to Comayagua. In the five years 
between 1536 and Alvarado's death (1541), this governor of 
Higueras-Honduras spent less than a year in the province.
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Jurisdictional Interlude
Following the departure of Francisco Montejo and the 
death of Pedro de Alvarado, Higueras-Honduras was plunged 
further into a morass of jurisdictional disputes and civil 
strife. The audiencias of New Spain and Santo Domingo both 
claimed authority over the province (Chamberlain 1953: 214). 
Moreover, three Spaniards, Montejo among them, vied for 
governorship of the territory. Not surprisingly, this 
environment of contested control created a leadership vacuum 
that thwarted development of the region in general and the 
Puerto Caballos-Golfo Fonseca corridor in particular. It is 
rich irony that at this same juncture, 1539-1542, and later 
in the mid 1540s, Honduran mines, primarily in Olancho along 
the Rio Guayape, were producing their greatest exports 
levels during the early colonial period (MacLeod 1973: 55). 
Hence, with valuable cargo to transport, the time seems to 
have been ripe finally to establish a suitable 
infrastructure.
On the contrary, following the departure of the two 
great adelantados, interest in a passage for transisthmian 
trade seems to have contracted into half-hearted efforts to 
merely establish a permanent port settlement at Puerto 
Caballos and an inland break-in-bulk center at San Pedro. 
In 1541 the Crown ordered the construction of a defensive 
fortress at Puerto Caballos (Chamberlain 1953: 231-232). By 
1542, a small, permanent settlement had emerged at the port.
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Similar to the ports at Panama, the population at Puerto
Caballos temporarily swelled with the arrival of ships.
However even in 1542, the stretch between the port and San
Pedro still lacked a functional road. The absence of such
an important passage to the interior made Puerto Caballos
less attractive to merchants.
In early 1543, Alonso Maldonado wrote to the Crown
complaining of the region's insufficient infrastructure.
Moreover, he established the link between route deficiency
and Indian mortality. According to Maldonado, roads linking
major settlements like Gracias a Dios, Comayagua and the
mines in Olancho to Puerto Caballos were so miserable that
they precluded mule and cart traffic. Therefore, Indians
were utilized as bearers, with many perishing as a result
(Maldonado 1543). The Crown was already familiar with the
relationship between bearing and death. Pedro de Alvarado
described the atrocity a decade earlier. While in Nicaragua
he observed that one did not need a guide to travel from
Ledn or Granada to the province's mines, and
ni preguntar por el camino, mas de irse por el rrastro 
de los huesos de indios muertos que hay hasta alia
[One need not ask for the road. One merely need follow 
the trail of Indians' bone that lead from here to there] 
(Alvarado 1533: 199).
Audiencia de los Confines
To remedy the region's governmental gauntlet and to
establish royal authority over the recently productive gold-
producing centers near locations such as Trujillo, the Aguan
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valley, San Pedro and Gracias a Dios (Wortman 1982: 6), the 
Crown created the Audiencia de los Confines in 1543 to 
exercise jurisdiction over Higueras-Honduras, Guatemala, San 
Salvador, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Panamd, Chiapas, Tabasco 
and Yucatan (Chamberlain 1953: 215). The aforementioned 
Alonso Maldonado served as the Audiencia's first president. 
In a nod to the Honduran corridor's commercial promise, 
Comayagua functioned as its original capital. Puerto 
Caballos was its primary Atlantic port (MacLeod 1973: 156). 
However, with the depletion of gold deposits in Honduras, 
Santiago de Guatemala exerted an even greater attractive 
force throughout the region, so that by 1548 the capital had 
been relocated to that city following a short interlude in 
Gracias a Dios (Newson 1986: 99). A letter sent to the 
Crown in 1549 reported that none of these capital locations 
were linked to its major port, Puerto Caballos, by suitable 
roads (Cerrato 1549).
Thus, during the twenty years after Cerezeda first 
identified the Puerto Caballos-Golfo Fonseca corridor, 
efforts to develop it were thrice quashed by Guatemalan 
interests. Alvarado doused any momentum the project had 
gathered by first deserting the province and by later 
expelling the plan's master, Montejo. Then, the Crown's 
designation of Comayagua as the new audiencia's capital 
resurrected the corridor's prospects, only for the 
entrenched primacy of Guatemala to undermine the revival.
135
Nevertheless, promoters of the Higueras corridor 
surfaced several times more during the colonial period and 
spurred renewed interest in the passage. Following the 
efforts of Monte jo, the transisthmian artery experienced two 
principal pulses of activity before the Crown removed the 
Honduras flotilla from its regular trade network in 1633.
Both pulses were instigated by Juan Garcia de 
Hermosilla. In the mid-1550s, Hermosilla wrote to the Crown 
that the Perti trade should be moved to Honduras. His 
argument focussed on the well-worn criticisms of Panama's 
ports and overland route and the stock claim that the voyage 
from Perti to the Gulf of Fonseca was shorter than to Panama. 
In response,' the Crown instructed Hermosilla to prepare a 
report on the feasibility of opening a road across Honduras 
and the suitability of its ports (Squier 1858: 670).
Not surprisingly, Hermosilla found that relocating the 
overland passage to Honduras would be in the Crown's best 
interest. In an indictment of Panamd, Hermosilla reported 
that "1000 cristianos" perished every year at Nombre de Dios 
and overland transport was threatened by 800 cimarrones. As 
result, travel was expensive, pack-mules costing three times 
the price paid in Honduras (Hermosillo 1556). He suggested 
that both Puerto Caballos and Trujillo were suitable 
Atlantic ports that surpassed Nombre de Dios in size. They 
also lacked the shipworms and wood lice [bromas and 
carcomas] that plagued Panama's ports. Hermosilla proffered
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the shipbuilding center Realejo as an alternative to the 
Gulf of Fonseca for a South Sea port. The combination of 
Trujillo and Realejo suggest a revival of the eastern 
corridor that Cerezeda mentioned in 1529, the route passing 
via Leon, Nicaragua. To Hermosilla's credit, he refrained 
from further decreasing the distance that separated the 
North Sea from the South Sea. He reported it as sixty 
leagues (1556). In 1558, Hermosilla made his report to the 
sovereign in person (Squier 1858: 670). Two years later, 
the Crown agreed that the Perd trade should be relocated to 
Honduras (MacLeod 1973: 162). Unfortunately, for the
colonists of the region, this potential boon languished 
while Spain was involved in one of Philip II's numerous and 
expensive wars. Moreover, the move to relocate faltered in 
the face of Panama's entrenchment.
In 1572, Hermosilla appears to have resumed his 
promotion of the Honduran corridor. The qualifier "appears" 
is used because of the peculiar nature of the source of this 
information. It comes from Piraterias en Honduras (1955), 
Conrado Bonilla's published collection of transcriptions of 
colonial documents. This volume contains excerpts from a 
memorial [petition] that Hermosilla supposedly sent from 
Santiago de Guatemala to the King in 1572. These passages 
repeated the merits of moving transisthmian traffic from 
Panama to Honduras. The accuracy of the date attributed to 
them becomes questionable when one notices that these
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passages are word for word copies of passages contained in 
Hermosilla's 1556 report to the King. There are three 
possible explanations for this mess: 1) The 1556 document 
was incorrectly dated by the archives; 2) Bonilla 
incorrectly dated the 1572 document; and 3) Hermosilla 
relied on his own information that was sixteen years old 
when he recommenced his promotion of the Honduran passage.
The problems mentioned above notwithstanding, Juan 
Garcia de Hermosilla undoubtedly was a factor in the final 
flourish of interest in the Puerto Caballos-Golfo Fonseca 
corridor in the sixteenth century. During the century's 
final two decades, this corridor, and its promise as a 
transisthmian passage, received its most intense scrutiny. 
This interest was motivated by Spain's acknowledgement that 
Nombre de Dios could not be adequately fortified (Hoffman 
1980: 202-203). Drake's raids on Panama in the 1570s had, 
all too well, demonstrated this fact.
Accordingly, in November of 1588 the King Philip II 
ordered that a survey party examine the road between Puerto 
Caballos and Fonseca so that he might make decision whether
to move transisthmian traffic from Panama to Honduras
(Bonilla 1955: 224). Included in the party that was
instructed to sail from Spain were Antonelli, Francisco de 
Valverde, Pedro Ochoa de Leguizamo and Juan Garcia de
Hermosillo. In the next chapter, we will discuss at length
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the details of the survey guidelines that the King sent with 
these men and the survey reports [relaciones] that resulted.
Before October of 1590, two separate surveys of the 
corridor had been conducted and dispatched to Spain, one by 
Francisco Valverde: Relacion geografica de D. Francisco
valverde acerca de la mudanza de la navegacion del pueblo 
del Nombre de Dios al de Caballos (1590), the other by a 
trio of investigators led by Juan Bautista Antonelli: 
Relacion del Puerto Caballos y su Fortificacion (Antonelli 
and Quintanilla 1590). While agreeing in many respects, 
Antonelli and Valverde came to opposite conclusions 
concerning the suitability of the Honduran corridor as a 
replacement for Panama as Spain's artery for transisthmian 
traffic. Valverde favored the substitution of Honduras for 
Panama. Antonelli and his party concluded that such action 
would be unwise.
The difference of opinion possibly reflects the 
differing interests of the two reporters. MacLeod 
characterized Valverde as an "intensely partisan reporter" 
(1973: 162). Indeed, the Crown had heard from him nine 
years earlier when he wrote bemoaning the living standards 
in San Pedro in comparison to those in Guatemala. He also 
asked that the Crown support the construction and 
provisioning of a royal hospital at Puerto Caballos to serve 
the fleets (Valverde 1581). There are also indications that 
he previously had received money from King Philip to open
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roads (Bonilla 1955: 225). Antonelli, on the other hand, 
was an Italian engineer who appears not to have had any 
interest in redirecting Spain's trade flows to Honduras. He 
had previous experience in the New World as a one of several 
planners of the sea-wall fortifications on the island of San 
Juan de Ulua near Veracruz (Antonelli 1590) and apparently 
represented but one of several generations of Antonelli 
engineers who worked in the New World (Munoz 1991: 3; Kubler 
1948: 207). Possibly on the basis of that experience he 
disagreed with Valverde and reported to Philip that the 
prohibitive expense of developing the corridor for 
transisthmian trade should disqualify the project from 
further consideration (1590: 35-36). The Crown sided with 
Antonelli.
The importance was further diminished in 1633 when the 
Crown suspended the Honduran fleet (Milla 1963: 269). This 
action effectively terminated the transisthmian life of the 
Puerto Caballos-Golfo Fonseca corridor during the early 
colonial period. The letters, testimonies and surveys 
collected during more than one hundred years had not brought 
Spain's interoceanic commerce to Honduras. Thus, the 
province did not become a significant artery in the small- 
scale circulatory system of Spain's expansive empire. 
Accordingly, the development Cerezeda and Monte jo envisioned 
was not realized. The failure of the idea appears to have 
resulted, at least to some extent, from the fact that the
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promoters of the Honduran corridor and the Crown were at 
cross-purposes. Montejo viewed transisthmian trade and the 
infrastructure it required as a means to develop his colony 
and its own infrastructure. The primary interoceanic north- 
south axis, with Comayagua in the large valley at the 
center, would have attracted a spoke-like collection of 
secondary axes that linked the region's scatter of 
fledgling population centers to the corridor. Thus, 
Honduras' transisthmian corridor, though much longer than 
Panama's, presented expanded opportunities.
That the route across Panamd was chosen as Spain's 
primary transisthmian artery demonstrates the expensive and 
difficult nature of overland transport and, more 
importantly, that during the early colonial period Spain 
valued the expedient extraction of New World resources over 
enduring development. Hence, they relegated themselves to 
a narrow ribbon of earth that, indeed, possessed all of the 




Camino real: El construido a expensas del estado, mas 
ancho que los otros, capaz para carruajes, 
y que pone en comunicacion entre si 
poblaciones de cierta importancia
-...y pues ya viene la noche, retiremonos 
del camino real algun trecho, etc.
Ceirvantes
-No podian salir de los caminos reales de 
la provincia donde iban, porque si los 
hallaban fuera de ellos, perdian el fuero 
y la inmunidad.
Antonio de Solis
-Entonces no habia el camino real de que te 
hablo, que es de ayer, y habia que ir a 
buscarle mas lejos.
Jose M. De Pereda
Camino real (fig): Medio mas facil y seguro para la 
consecucion de algun fin.
-No es menos buena nuestra alegre suerte 
Que la que en este caso declaramos,
Pues el demente cielo nos advierte 
Del rico bien del templo que fundamos;
Y mas, si vale para que se acierte 
El camino real a que aspiramos, etc.
Cristobal de Virues
(Pages 1932: 81)
To search beyond the Diccionario de la Lengua 
Castellana de Autoridades for insight into the meaning of 
the words "camino real", one might turn to a university 
library's computerized card catalog. Upon typing "k = 
camino real," into LSU's LOLA system, an index of twenty- 
eight titles magically will appear. Though each of the 
items in this collection contains the keywords "camino 
real," the subject matter ranges widely. Included are a 
study of El Camino Real Elementary School in Irvine,
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California, the 1950 play Camino Real by Tennessee Williams, 
and a report from the International Conference on Vesicular 
Stomatitis held in the Hotel Camino Real in Mexico City in 
1984. The index also contains a scattering of camino real 
road studies just barely relevant to the purpose of this 
study like Felix Riesenberg's The Golden Road: The Story of 
California's Spanish Mission Trail (1962). These camino 
real studies commonly were sponsored by local or regional 
historical associations such as the Texas Trails Society or, 
as in Riesenberg's case, were installments in a series like 
The American Trails Series. In either case, the works were 
essentially popular regional history. As such, they 
recounted important dates, characters and interesting 
anecdotes related to each particular road.
More pertinent to this study, a recent work, A Texas 
Legacy the Old San Antonio Road and the Camino Reales: A 
Tricentennial History, 1691 (McGraw, Clark and Robbins
1991), captured the significance of the camino real in 
colonial America. Stephen Hardin, a contributing author, 
posed the camino real as a "conduit of the imperial will" 
and a "vital administrative unit" (1991: 235). As such, the 
series of caminos reales linked New Spain's "instruments of 
conquest and consolidation": the presidio, the mission, and 
the civil settlement. Because the survival and efficiency 
of these instruments depended on constant, unimpeded flows 
along the caminos reales of supplies, raw goods, soldiers,
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priests, royal orders and decrees, "travelers on the king's 
roads were assured the king's protection.1 Undoubtedly, 
this "protection" regularly lacked any palpable guarantee. 
Nevertheless, assaults on travelers on the caminos reales 
represented assaults on the Crown.
Jesus de la Teja, another contributor to the Texas 
study, asserted that the camino real was more than merely a 
colonial administrative transportation unit. In agreement 
with some of the route geographers discussed in the Chapter 
One, de la Teja conceived of the road as "a complex set of 
relationships between travelers and nature, buyers and 
sellers, governors and governed" all of which "made their 
own distinct contributions to the quality, and even the 
quantity, of life at a given place" (1991: 43). Ensuing 
chapters identify and examine the integral features of that 
'complex set of relationships' in colonial Latin America in 
general, and the Honduran transisthmian corridor in 
particular. Of special interest are: 1) the template that 
pre-Columbian road networks provided for the Spanish and 
Portuguese; 2) the manner in which the early colonial roads 
were planned, paid for and built; 3) the character of the 
early roads and road networks built by the Europeans; 4) the 
manner in which goods and people were transported; and 5) 
the nature of settlement that emerged throughout the 
colonial route networks.
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Early Precedents From Panama
In September of 1521 Pedrarias, governor of Castilla 
del Oro, received an affirmative royal response to his 
request for permission to utilize native caciques and their 
subjects as laborers on and settlers along the cart road 
that he was constructing from the Pacific to the Atlantic 
coast of the Panamanian isthmus (Carlos 1521a: 530-531). 
Pedrarias wanted to settle the Indians in a trio of 
settlements along the road that would serve transisthmian 
travelers (Carlos 1521b: 538-540). During the same month of 
the same year, Pedrarias also received a royal grant of 
60,000 maravedises per annum to open the same road (Carlos 
1521c: 540). He successfully milked the treasury twice more 
in the succeeding 3 years for a total of 5,000 pesos of gold 
for construction of the road (Carlos 1524a: 546; Carlos
1524c: 550). Despite these grants, a royal document from 
1527 reported that because of mud and difficult terrain the 
cart road between Nombre de Dios and Panama still had not 
been completed. Instead of carts, transisthmian travelers 
depended on beasts of burden, animal or human (Carlos 1527: 
579).
Much of this information was introduced in the previous 
description of the development of the Panamd passage. This 
brief account bears repeating because it derives from one of 
the earliest examples of correspondence between the American 
mainland and Spain that concerned the construction of roads.
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As such, it reveals initial features of road-building, 
features that recurred repeatedly throughout the early 
colonial period. Hence, we can extract several precedents 
of colonial road-building from the situation in Panama. 
They include the following: 1) Early colonial road
construction depended on royal funds and native labor; 2) 
Early transport depended on the use of Indian bearers, 
tamemes, and later, mules; 3) Planned cart roads only rarely 
developed beyond narrow mule traces in the early colonial 
period; and 4) Colonial roads depended on native settlements 
to provide sustenance for travelers before a network of 
inns, ventas, was established.
In the next few chapters we will revisit these features 
of early colonial road-building as we consider the camino 
real that the Spaniards considered establishing throughout 
the length the Honduran corridor.
The isthmus' indigenous population figures prominently 
in three of these four precedents from Panama. Although 
they were generally treated as if they were expendable, the 
utility of the indigenous population as road-crew laborers, 
bearers and providers of foodstuffs and shelter made them 
indispensable to the Spaniards' early transport. Therefore, 
their numbers and distribution were of importance in the 
initial stages of colonial route-planning. Beyond their 
labor, the native poplation influenced early transport with 
the pre-Columbian networks of communication that they and
their ancestors had etched into the landscape. The ensuing 
chapter considers the transport template that Cortes, 







The route of the colonial Honduran passage did not 
emerge from a blank pre-Columbian landscape. Rather, 
scattered references from a collection of archaeological 
surveys suggest that the transisthmian corridor possessed a 
crude infrastructure that served pre-Columbian travelers. 
Detailed written accounts from the time of the Spanish 
conquest placed parts of the corridor within a larger trade 
network that extended to the Central Valley of Mexico. 
These accounts, moreover, identify the traders, their wares 
and the location of their sources. Examination of this 
information reveals the transport template that the Spanish 
probably encountered upon first coming to the region. 
Chapter Eight considers the short-term and long-term 
colonial utility of this template.
Archaeology
In addition to its place on the geographic grid, 
archaeologists of Middle America have located the Honduran 
corridor in terms of its cultural context. The corridor 
marks the approximate southeastern periphery of Mesoamerica, 
the "high culture" region that extends from north of the 
Valley of Mexico throughout Guatemala and Yucatan. The 
corridor also marks the northwestern edge of the 
"Intermediate Area," also referred to as Lowland Central 
America, that extends through the remaining length of the 
Central American isthmus (Healy 1987: 85). Located in the
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transition zone between these two realms, archaeological 
sites within the corridor have offered up a mixture of 
Mesoamerican and Lowland Central American artifacts. This 
blend suggests that the Honduran corridor was a zone at 
which cultural influences moved in opposing directions, 
southeast and northwest, and converged. No archaeological 
study has discovered evidence of significant, long-term use 
of the corridor as a passage for north-south movement. 
However, several studies have suggested that such 
communication existed (Yde 1935, Stone 1942 and 1972). The 
following survey of the region's archaeology turns up 
evidence for pre-Colombian movement along Honduras' 
transisthmian corridor.
With artifacts primarily found at sites in the Ulua 
Valley, near Lake Yojoa, and the Comayagua Valley 
archaeologists have rendered a chronological sketch of the 
region's inhabitants and their communication networks. By 
800 B.C., or the Pre-Classic period, stratified chiefdoms 
appear to have already emerged in these three areas (Healy 
1987: 87-91). Until 1 B.C. these societies underwent a
"Mesoamericanization" with the "erection of Mesoamerican 
style temple-pyramid mounds, the layout of plaza groups ... 
the working of jade" and the efforts directed towards long­
distance trade (Healy 1987: 100). Sites such as Yarumela in 
the Comayagua Valley, Los Naranjos near Lake Yojoa and Playa 
de los Muertos in the Ulua Valley included large public
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structures, such as mounds, ditches and stone boulder ramps, 
that required collective enterprise. Accompanying these 
structures were luxury goods from distant sources, such as 
jade from the Motagua River Valley to the east, carved 
Pacific marine shells and Usulutan ceramics probably from 
highlands of El Salvador from the south (Healy 1987: 91-98). 
Apart from receiving long-distance goods evidence suggests 
that high value goods from the vicinity of the Honduran 
corridor were traded to distant locations. Obsidian 
fragments from Wild Cane Key off the coast of Belize have 
been traced to upland western Honduras (McKillop and Jackson 
1989: 63). Tozzer (1941: I82n) noted that the sacred cenote 
at Chichen Itza in the northern Yucatan contained, among 
other items from a wide range of sources, copper and tin 
from Honduras.
Ceramics discovered near Naco to the west of the 
corridor in the Chamelecon River Valley were found to be of 
a similar style and age as those found at Comayagua, Yojoa, 
and the Ulua Valley. This suggests that, in addition to 
early long distance trade in luxury goods, during the Pre- 
Classic the corridor was also linked to network of 
interregional trade in western Honduras (Healy 1987: 97;
Henderson 1977: 374).
Ceramics found at the Playa de los Muertos site 
supported the notion that the corridor's frontier setting 
possessed a blend of Mesoamerican and Lowland Central
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American influences (Kennedy 1986). Kennedy postulated that 
"there was a long-term, if indirect, connection of at least 
equal significance between the Sula Plain, or the eastern 
lowland corridor of Central America, and northern South 
America" and the Sula Plain was "hooked up to an extensive 
ethnic trade network spanning portions of both highland and 
lowland Mesoamerica as well as western Honduras and points 
east and south" (1986: 189). Dixon (1989: 257) continued 
this train of thought and reasoned that the Comayagua 
Valley, located at the transisthmian corridor's center 
"represents a primary corridor for human communication 
between Middle America and Lower Central America." These 
sentiments follow conclusions drawn by Doris Stone, one of 
the first archaeologists who worked in the region (1942: 
385) .
Studies of later periods have also concerned lines of 
communication. In his review of the archaeology of the 
Comayagua Valley, Agurcia Fasquelle (1986) supported the 
notion that there was communication between settlement 
centers within the corridor. He reported that Late Classic 
sites at Yarumela and Tenampua, a fortress site located on 
the southeast rim of the Comayagua Valley, contained Ulua 
Polychrome ceramics (1986: 267, 270). The presence of
similar solid figurines at Playa de los Muertos and Yarumela 
supports this north-south movement within the corridor 
(Agurcia Fasquelle 1986: 259).
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Joyce (1986: 313) used artifact distributions to
describe two "interaction networks" that prevailed during 
the Late, Terminal and Post Classic periods in the southern 
Mesoamerican periphery. One of these was based in the 
highlands of El Salvador and Honduras and extended 
communication to the east and west. The other was centered 
in lowlands of the north coast and linked the Ulua Valley 
with Belize and the Maya lowlands. Neither of these 
coincided with the Honduran corridor. Instead, they 
possibly intersected with segments of the passage, thereby 
linking it to both networks. Joyce, thus, conceived of 
central Honduras as an "interface between the two spheres" 
of interaction (1986: 321). The presence of Delirio red-on- 
white pottery from Quelepa in the highlands of El Salvador 
at Copan, the Peten and the Ulua Plain support this notion.
Additional evidence for interaction between the two 
spheres by way of the Honduran corridor came from the 
distribution of Late Classic Spondylus princeps shell caches 
that contained jade beads (1986: 324). The materials of 
these artifacts suggest north-south movement. Roys (1943: 
54) suggested that these shells came "from the Pacific coast 
of Nicaragua by way of Honduras." The jade is thought to 
have come from workshops on the middle Motagua. The 
artifacts themselves, were found in sites in Belize, at 
Copan, Amatitlan, Tenampua and at Travesia in the Ulua 
Valley.
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Thus, the archaeological record suggests that the 
entire span of the Honduran corridor was linked to a pre- 
Columbian communication network that connected the frontier 
periphery to the Mesoamerican highlands and lowlands to the 
west and north. Although the predominant directions of flow 
within this network were from east to west and northwest to 
southeast, there also appear to have existed perpendicular 
flows along the transisthmian corridor that linked the Sula 
Plain, the Comayagua Valley, the highlands of El Salvador 
and the Pacific coast. As the focus now shifts to written 
accounts of the early exploration and conquest of the 
region, the region's aboriginal transport network, and its 
linkages, the function of the Honduran corridor become 
clearer.
The Land of Gold, Feathers, and Cacao
As previously noted, Carl Sauer (1941: 354) viewed the 
first few decades following European contact as a fertile 
period of inquiry for historical geographers. In these few 
decades the Spanish manipulated the New World's extant 
cultural landscape, including the predominant flows of 
communication and commerce, to suit their colonial 
aspirations. By establishing the general patterns of trade 
and travel in the region surrounding the Honduran corridor 
at the time of contact we will have a model with which to 
compare the patterns that the Spanish instituted. Such a 
comparison is vital to learning whether Montejo's and the
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other Spaniards ideas concerning the transisthmian corridor 
represented cases of transport continuity or discontinuity.
During the twentieth century, Puerto Cortes, the 
settlement that North American fruit companies built near 
Puerto Caballos' former location, has been Central America's 
largest port, handling as much as half of Honduras' foreign 
trade (West 1976: 437). From this port, relatively low unit 
value Honduran products such as bananas, pineapples, sugar 
cane, animal and timber products are shipped to North 
American, European and Caribbean destinations. In return, 
Puerto Cortes receives the country's imports of high value 
manufactured goods like autos and electronic equipment. In 
a nod to continuous use, the first Spanish accounts of the 
region report that this point on the Ulua Valley's broad 
coastal terminus has long functioned in such a manner. 
Though, in contrast to the present situation of economic 
exchange, it is possible that Honduras' aboriginal north 
coast port had the upper hand in the value of its exports as 
compared to its imports.
According to Roys (1943: 55), at the time of contact 
the Maya of the Yucatan referred to the Ulua Valley as "the 
land of gold, feathers, and cacao". Similar to today's 
electronic goods, cacao and gold possessed a high unit value 
because of their compactness. Conversely, a resident of the 
Ulua Valley might have referred to the Yucatan as "the land 
of cotton cloth, salt and slaves" as these bulky items were
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the peninsula's primary trading goods (Wonderley 1985: 257). 
Other goods provided to Yucatan by Honduras and coastal 
lands to the east include copper, obsidian and the 
previously-mentioned Spondylus shells (Roys 1943: 52).
More important than the actual articles of trade and 
their relative unit values, the exchange between the Yucatan 
and Ulua represented but one pathway of commerce in a larger 
region that possessed intersecting exchange networks that 
linked northwestern Honduras to highland and lowland Maya to 
the north and west (Henderson 1977: 363), and beyond these 
to the Valley of Mexico (Scholes and Roys 1968: 15), and, 
finally, to Nahuatl settlements on the Pacific coast 
(Henderson 1977: 370).
Located within this long-distance communication network 
was "an economic unit ... united by commercial relations, 
which constituted a common bond of interest” (Scholes and 
Roys 1968: 3). It consisted of the portion of the
relatively wide coastal plain that extended from Tabasco to 
the Ulua and including trade connections with the interior 
highlands. Thus including coast, coastal plain and 
highlands, the region's major transport routes combined 
water and overland travel (Lee 1978: 55). Beyond commerce, 
the unity of the region of was served by the similarities of 
the languages spoken therein. The Choi, Chontal and Chorti 
languages spoken in the area were "dialectical variants of 
the same language" and similar to Yucatdn Mayan (Scholes
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and Roys 1968: 317) Thus, for this trading region, language 
presented no real bar to communication. Montejo's later 
efforts at consolidating his territory in Yucatan with that 
of Honduras reflected the adelantado's awareness of the 
strands of commerce that bound together this far-flung 
region.
Roads and Rivers
In 1524 Hernan Cortes embarked from Espiritu Santo near 
the mouth of the Rio Coatzocoalcos on a long overland 
journey. Accompanying him was a large company of Spaniards, 
Indians and 150 horses and, according to his orders, two 
caravels loaded with provisions to sail along the coast 
ahead of him. Cortes' destination was a faltering Spanish 
settlement called Nito located near the Bahia de Amatique. 
He recorded the details of what appears to have been a 
fantastically difficult journey in his Fifth Letter to King 
Charles V (Padgen 1986). From this letter and several other 
sources focussed primarily on the Yucatan peninsula, the 
details of the region's trade network at contact emerges.
Evidence of the region's bustling trade came to Cortes 
before his departure from Espiritu Santo in the form of a 
map painted by Indians from Potonchan and Xicalango on 
cotton cloth. According to Cortes, the map located almost 
all of the villages on the coast as far as to Pedrarias' 
realm (Padgen 1986: 339-340). The cartographers'
information about Mayan ports on the Yucatdn's fringe hinted
to Cortes the extent of the region's trade and its use of 
water-borne traffic. The cartographers complied with 
Cortes' desire to travel to Nito over land. The map, 
therefore, contained evidence of routes for travel afoot, 
including the route to Nito (Lopez de Gomara 1943, 2: 13). 
Lopez de Gomara, Cortes' biographer, and Herrera y 
Tordesillas (1726-30, dec. 3, bk. 6, ch. 12) indicated that 
Cortes was referring to Pedrarias' residence in Nicaragua 
rather than Panama. The route, thus led across the isthmus 
beyond Nito. Roys (1943: 55), however, believed that from 
Nito one branch led along the Caribbean coast to Panama, and 
the other to the Pacific coast of Nicaragua. The 
controversy of the number of routes notwithstanding, at some 
point the map provided information about overland transport 
across the isthmus to the Pacific coast. Unfortunately 
Cortes did not follow the map all the way to the Pacific 
coast. Therefore, we do not know the path of the 
transisthmian route. We do know, however, that there was 
overland transisthmian communication.
Once en route, Cortes' march demonstrated that trade 
from Tabasco to Yucatan was served by a coast road to the 
vicinity of the Rio Seco, beyond which transport depended on 
canoes (Lee 1978: 53). In the 35 low, wet leagues that lay 
between Coatzocoalcos and Rio Copilco on the coastal route, 
bridges provided passage across the many marshes and 
streams. Despite the good fortune of finding existing
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bridges, some of the most arduous efforts described in the 
Cortes' Fifth Letter, are those devoted to bridge-building. 
This is because the Spaniard insisted on traveling overland 
with horses and did not benefit from canoe travel. Thus, 
when the overland route terminated near the region of 
Copilco, Cortes was faced with travel over a flat, marshy 
expanse that possessed little infrastructure. In the region 
surrounding Copilco alone, Cortes, rather proudly, reported 
constructing more than 50 bridges (Pagden 1986: 343-344). 
It should be noted that the actual work was done by the
Indians that accompanied Cortes on this campaign.
Cortes scarcely described the quality of the existing 
roads. He primarily reported whether his path followed an 
Indian track or if his men had to cut open roads. 
Nevertheless, because his route crossed the southern Yucatan 
peninsula, and because he was in some cases following a map 
drawn by people familiar with the region, Cortes' progress, 
at least when he was correctly following directions, 
occasionally benefited from extant or remnant portions of 
the occasionally raised and/or paved sacbeob that linked 
Mayan settlements (Hauck 1975; Romanov 1973). In a note to 
his translation of Bishop Landa's relacion of 1566, Tozzer 
(1941: 109n) cites the following contemporary description of 
these roads:
[T]here are remains of paved highways which traverse the 
all this kingdom and they say ended in the east on the
seashore where it crosses an arm of the sea for the
distance of four leagues which divides the mainland from
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that island. These highways were like the caminos 
reales, which guided them with no fear of going astray 
so that they might arrive at Cozumel.
We should be careful not project the whole of Cortes'
progress onto these "white ways" because they primarily
served ceremonial centers, while overland long-distance
trade journeys followed narrow single-file trails (Chapman
1957: 137). The majority of Cortes' journey was on such
passages.
Nito was also connected by a path to Naco on the Rio 
Chamelecon. This river flows northeast into the Ulua Plain 
at the transisthmian corridor's northern end. Thus, at 
contact, the Honduran corridor was probably linked to the 
Yucatan and Tabasco by means of either canoe or foot travel 
along the Chamelecon. Evidence for similar linkages at the 
corridor's Pacific terminus will be discussed later in this 
chapter.
The canoe travel that Cortes, to his regret, passed up 
was an important component of the region's pre-Columbian 
trade. The coastal orientation of the map drawn for Cortes 
reflected this fact. Travel in dugout canoes represented a 
"substantial increase in transport efficiency, especially 
for low-bulk cargo" (Tourtellot 1978: 75). The
preponderance of canoe travel also corresponded with the 
ubiquity of watercourses and swamps from Coatzocoalcos to 
Laguna de Terminos on the west side of the Yucatan 
peninsula, and from Bahia de la Ascensidn to the Ulua on the
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east side, such that for much of the region's population 
water transportation was readily accessible (Scholes and 
Roys 1968: 29). Early Spanish reports indicate that canoe 
routes led along the coasts of Yucatan (Edwards 1978: 199- 
209). Bishop Landa was informed that previously merchants 
from the commercial center Chichdn Itza regularly traveled 
overland to Bahia de la Ascension from which they embarked 
in salt and cloth-laden trading canoes bound for Honduras 
(Ciudad Real 1932: 325; Wonderley 1985: 257). Early in the 
colonial period, salt produced in the vast salt marshes 
between Isla Mugeres and Campeche was still carried by water 
to Honduras (Tozzer 1941: 189).
Scholes' and Roys' (1968: 317) claim that merchants of 
southwestern Yucatan and Tabasco maintained "factories" or 
warehouses on Rio Ulua suggests that canoe travel skirted 
the whole peninsula. Roys (1943: 56) broached this
suggestion earlier on the basis of the pilgrims from Tabasco 
who voyaged to Cozumel. This pilgrimage made more sense to 
him if "the island lay on a water route connecting Tabasco 
with Honduras." Thus, in addition to its overland 
connection by way of Naco and Nito, the Honduran corridor's 
northern terminus at the mouth of the Ulua was linked to the 
eastern Yucatan and probably Tabasco by lines of maritime 
travel.
Francisco de Valverde's survey of the Honduran route 
suggested that canoe travel extended inland at least ten
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leagues on the Rio Chamelecon (1590: 6). As mentioned in 
the previous chapter, the cabildo of Comayagua extended 
navigation to 12 leagues inland from the coast. These 
colonial claims taken with Wonderley's (1985: 267) findings 
that late settlement sites in the Ulud Valley congregated 
along waterways suggest that pre-Columbian transport in this 
region depended at least partially on canoe traffic. Hence, 
pre-Columbian maritime trade appears to have penetrated into 
the northern quarter of the transisthmian corridor by means 
of the Rio Ulua; possibly connecting water transport to the 
"warehouses" mentioned above.
Merchant Enclaves
At Teutiacar on the Rio San Pedro in easternmost 
Tabasco, Cortds met a wealthy "leader" named Apaspolon, who 
was probably an Aztec trader or pochteca. Apaspolon drew 
Cortes another map that led from that location to Nito. 
More importantly, Apaspolon informed Cortds that at least a 
portion of the region's long distance trade was transacted 
by trading agents who resided in settlements in Honduras, 
including Nito and Naco (Padgen 1986: 368). By means of 
these far removed enclaves Apaspolon expanded his region's 
resource base and the markets for its manufactures. The 
wares his agents secured included cacao, dyes, body ink, 
torches for light, pine resin for incensing, colored beads 
from shell, and a little gold.
The matter of merchant enclaves in the Ulua and 
Chamelecon Valleys - indeed, throughout central and western 
Honduras - at the time of the Conquest has received 
considerable attention from archaeologists and 
ethnohistorians. Henderson (1977: 368) concluded that
merchant "enclaves" or "barrios," within larger settlements, 
were "common features of Mesoamerican territorial 
organization." Moreover, frontier areas like western 
Honduras, and including the transisthmian corridor, because 
of their intermediate relative locations, "may be 
characterized as zones of maximum density of enclaves" 
(368). In accordance with this view, Roys (1943: 117-118) 
suggested that there was a network of Nahua trading colonies 
scattered throughout and beyond the Mayan periphery in 
Honduras. The strands of this network converged on 
locations such as Naco, Olancho, Comayagua and the Pacific 
Coast.
Other than information from traders, like that received 
by Cortes, evidence for the presence of merchant enclaves in 
Honduras comes from early colonial reports of languages 
spoken throughout the region. One prime example is Fray 
Alonso Ponce's account of his journey throughout the isthmus 
in the 1580s. Ponce (1873: 347) reported that in Comayagua 
there were Indians who spoke "la mexican o pipil•" 
Moreover, farther south in Pacific Nicaragua the Indians
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spoke "la mexicana corrupta" and "lengua naual1 (1873: 351- 
352) .
"Nahua" refers to Nahuat-speaking peoples. Central 
America received migrations of Nahuat-speaking peoples in 
various places and at various times prior to the Conquest. 
Groups included in these migrations were the Pipil who 
"probably arrived during the ninth and tenth centuries AD" 
and "Aztec traders" who "began to establish colonies in the 
area between the fourteenth and sixteenth centuries" (Newson 
1986: 30). Nahuat-speakers inhabited the Pacific coastal 
plain from the Gulf of Fonseca to Nicoya (Fowler 1989). 
Within in this region was a distinct group called the 
Nicarao who inhabited the Pacific fringe from the northern 
tip of Lake Nicaragua to Nicoya.
Map 8 shows a compilation of the suggested Nahua and 
Choi enclaves at the time of the Conquest. The combination 
of these locations and the characterization of Nahuat- 
speakers in the Chontal area as "active traders" (Scholes 
and Roys 1968: 318), have led others to conclude that
"[c]ertainly there was trade between the Pacific Coast and 
the Gulf of Honduras" (Henderson 1977: 370). It seems
likely that prior to the Conquest, some trade, indeed, was 
directed along the transisthmian passage in Honduras.
Thus, at contact, the transisthmian corridor across 
Honduras, especially its northern terminus, was linked to a 
expansive network of overland trails and fluvial and
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maritime routes. These routes allowed a regular exchange 
of goods between the Yucatan peninsula and the Ulua Valley. 
The distribution of prehistoric artifacts, especially 
Spondylus shells, and the historic distribution of Choi and 
Nahua merchant enclaves suggest that trade could have also 
have been conducted throughout the whole of the corridor's 
north-south span.
To some of the conquering Spaniards, forward-looking 
men, like Monte jo, who were intent on colonizing the region, 
the aboriginal trade infrastructure in western Honduras and 
the Yucatan must have appeared like the initial lightly- 
etched guidelines that precede a woodcut's bold, deep 
carvings. The craft of the colonial knife will be 
considered in the following few chapters.
CHAPTER FIVE




[E]n lugares frios sean las calles anchas, y en los 
calientes angostas
[In cold places streets should be wide, and in warm 
places they should be narrow] (Felipe II, no date: 21).
This perplexing aphorism is the only regulation
contained in the Recopilacion de las leyes de estos reynos
(1943) that directly concerns the actual planning of road
construction in colonial Latin America, a subject that
previous scholars have found to be only scarcely documented
(Kubler 1948: 177). This dearth is somewhat puzzling when
one considers that the Recopilacion is a compilation of all
the Laws of the Indies up to 1640, the body of decrees
mandated by the Crown to govern the wide range of her
subjects7 endeavors in Latin America.
Chance fortuitously anticipated the Recopilacion7s 
deficiencies regarding road planning and construction and 
subrogated three invaluable sources. Happily, these sources 
derive from the planning and examination of the Puerto
Caballos-Golfo Fonseca corridor.
As mentioned in chapter two, the final twelve years of 
the sixteenth century witnessed a resurgence of interest in 
moving Spain7s transisthmian passage from Panama to
Honduras. In 1588 King Philip II commissioned a survey of 
the corridor to determine the feasibility of the switch. 
The king included in his order several instructions to guide 
the surveyors (Bonilla 1955: 224-227). Appendix A of this
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study is a summary of these guidelines. These detailed 
instructions indicate some of the concerns that guided road 
planning on the part of the Crown during the early colonial 
period.
By October of 1590, King Philip received two relaciones 
in response to his commission of a single survey. The 
principal authors of the respective reports were Juan 
Bautista Antonelli and Francisco Valverde. Appendices B and 
C contain summaries of the route information contained in 
these reports. As mentioned in the previous chapter, 
Antonelli and Valverde arrived at opposite conclusions about 
the corridor's promise as Spain's primary transisthmian 
passage. Valverde favored the idea. Antonelli thought that 
the project was too costly and impractical. King Philip 
heeded Antonelli's advice.
Antonelli's and Valverde's surveys complement the 
king's instructions by answering his questions in a 
comprehensive manner. They, thus, further illuminate road- 
planning and, in addition, explain some aspects of colonial 
road construction.
King Philip organized his instructions into twelve 
individual sections that addressed several primary concerns. 
Sections 1, 2, 3, 8, 9 and 12 were devoted to ocean
transport and ports. The surveyors were directed to 
concentrate on essential information such as: 1) the nature 
of navigation to Puerto Caballos, and from Golfo Fonseca to
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Spain's points of interest in the Pacific Ocean; 2) harbor 
depths, anchorages and the absence or presence of shipworms; 
3) settlement possibilities near the ports and prospects for 
fortification of the harbors. Moreover, information 
contained in section 9 suggests that the King had indeed 
considered funneling all of Spain's Pacific transport, from 
Peru, India and the Philippines, into the Golfo Fonseca.
Sections 4, 5, 6, 7 and 10 pertained to matters of
overland transport. Of initial concern was the physical 
characterization of the route, the surface of overland 
transport. Just what sort of land did/would the camino real 
traverse? Mountainous? Arcabuco [impenetrable thicket]? 
Could carts travel over it? Because the king, apparently, 
was aware of the importance of river crossings, he directed 
his advisers to pay close attention the qualities of the 
streams to be crossed by the road. Were the streams 
voluminous? Did they regularly spill their banks? How long 
did it take for high stages to subside? Were streams 
passable only seasonally, or year-round? What would be the 
most effective mode of crossing for each stream? Appendices 
B and C indicate that these royal inquiries prompted 
thorough rejoinders from the surveyors.
Beyond the route's physical nature, the sovereign 
wanted to know if the corridor's human population could 
support overland transisthmian traffic. Specifically, did 
the corridor's present inhabitants raise beasts of burden?
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How many were there? How much did they cost? Did the 
corridor's inhabitants grow sufficient staple crops to 
provision travelers? And again, at what price?
In item 11 the king projected the corridor into the 
future as his realm's principal transisthmian passage and 
extractive development tool. In that particular future, 
because of a dramatic increase in commerce, the corridor's 
population would significantly increase. The enlarged labor 
supply, in turn, finally would extract the colony's mineral 
wealth and capitalize on the land's latent fertility. 
Ultimately, of course, these boons would accrue to the 
Crown.
In item 8 King Philip demonstrated his understanding 
that suitable port sites, as intersections of travel upon 
road and sea, must combine the features essential for land 
and water transport. Previously, in his instructions he 
discussed the factors of ocean travel with regard to port 
location. However, available anchorages and defendable 
harbors were not sufficient determinants for choosing ports, 
especially for transisthmian traffic. Beyond accommodating 
ships, these ports needed to have the capacity to succor the 
recuas of mules, and horses and oxen that carried cargo 
along the camino real to the ports. Therefore, pasture and 
fresh water were needed. Because the ports also had to 
house the cargo and travelers, the king directed the 
surveyors' attention to the availability of firewood and
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building materials, especially stones and wood, near port 
locations. Lime and gypsum [cal and yeso] were desired as 
bonding agents. In item 8 the king also intimated his 
solution should coastal marshes have plagued prospective 
port locations. He inquired after the availability of 
"piedra bastante para los tremedales11 [enough stones for 
quagmires] (1955: 225). Unfortunately, he did not indicate 
exactly how they should be used. It seems plausible that 
the stones simply were intended for use in building up a 
solid, elevated and reasonably dry road bed that would drain 
readily.
Sections 5 and 10 reveal the king's concerns about 
actually paying for the road and the return on the 
investment. Item 5 instructed the surveyors to make note of 
the flimsier, yet still costly, specimens of roads that 
recently had been built by the colonists, including 
Valverde, and funded by the Crown. Such an order, if 
obeyed, would no doubt have tempered the surveyors' optimism 
for the Honduran project. Even a cursory investigation 
would have revealed that during the sixteenth century road 
projects had experienced little success.
Item 10 suggests that merchants who conducted 
transisthmian commerce in the corridor already had 
established a means of paying for its maintenance. The king 
reported that export duties were said to have been collected 
for every cargo that crossed the isthmus. I have found no
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document to corroborate this royal hearsay and consider it 
to be a case of "pie in the sky" boosterism on the part of 
some colonial promoter. To King Philip's credit, he 
directed his surveyors to investigate. He needed this 
information to plan the funding of such a project. 
Specifically, he wanted to know how much construction of the 
transisthmian camino real would drain the royal treasury. 
Beyond these calculations, as mentioned earlier, the king 
projected the economics of transport into the future. He 
reasoned that with whatever burden of payment he initially 
imposed on the colonists, he must also take into account the 
subsequent inflation of prices on travel-related goods and 
services that would result from the increase in the volume 
of transport across the Honduran corridor.
These survey instructions suggest a notable measure of 
forethought on the part of the king or his advisors. As a 
body of guidelines, they imposed a rigorous standard of 
inquiry on the project's surveyors. Accordingly, the 
resulting relaciones exhibited a corresponding degree of 
care. From these reports, and additional colonial sources, 
we can learn even more about colonial road planning and 
construction.
The Physical Character of the Corridor
Among the reasons that the attention of the Spaniards 
was initially directed to the Honduran corridor was that it 
was a relatively gentle pause in the region's rugged
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topography that spanned the isthmus. This interruption in 
the east-west trending Cordilleras is the surface 
manifestation of a series of north-south trending faults and 
grabens (Weyl 1980). The Sula Graben extends almost 60 
miles inland from the Caribbean Sea. The Sula Plain lies 
atop this graben. This flat, lowland is shaped like a 
narrow isoceles triangle, with its shortest side lining the 
coast and the opposite vertex located between San Pedro Sula 
and Lake Yojoa. At the base of the Sula Valley's southern 
rim, elevations are less than 200 meters.
The Sula Valley is separated from the Comayagua Graben 
to the southeast by approximately 40 miles of saw-toothed 
uplands that climb to elevations of 2000 meters. The 
Comayagua Valley sits atop the Comayagua Graben. At the 
valley's northern end elevations are approximately 600 
meters; at the southern end, 25 miles away, 640 meters. 
Twelve miles south of the Comayagua Valley, the isthmian 
divide rises to a low pass at 740 meters. The Humuya- 
Comayagua-Ulua rivers drain the northern side of the divide 
through the Comayagua Valley and the rest of the corridor.
South of the Comayagua Graben, the Goascoran Fault 
extends the remaining length of the corridor to the narrow 
Pacific Coastal Plain and on to the Gulf of Fonseca (Weyl 
1980). The Rio Goascoran follows the path of this fault as 
does the transisthmian corridor. Between the southern rim 
of the Comayagua Valley and the coastal plain, the
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corridor's topography is rugged like that between the Sula 
Plain and the northern limit of the Comayagua Valley.
"Abriendo los caminos"
Unfortunately, there is little specific information 
about the actual construction of roads in colonial Latin 
America. However, the language used in Valverde's and 
Antonelli's reports and other colonial documents captures, 
at least partially, the essence of the work. Abrir, 
literally "to open", is the verb most commonly employed to 
describe the work of constructing roads. This term is apt 
because the construction of Central America's colonial roads 
commonly involved the opening of a network of seams within 
a sometimes densely woven fabric of vegetation. In cases 
where colonial roads followed single-file Indian paths, 
these pedestrian creases necessarily were opened wider to 
accommodate recuas or carts. Both situations required that 
companies of men, like those previously mentioned in the 
service of Alvarado, armed with hatchets and spades or hoes, 
[hachas and azadones], cut open ribbon-like passages through 
the tangled arcabuco surface covering.
Antonelli and Valverde prescribed a similar solution 
for much of the humid, low-lying northern third of the 
Puerto Caballos-Golfo de Fonseca corridor. Both prescribed 
opening up a swath seventy to eighty pasos wide, 
approximately four hundred feet (Chardon 1980: 144), through 
the dense vegetation. So opened, the cleared corridor would
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be exposed to the sun and wind and would, thus, dry out and 
allow road construction (Antonelli 1590: 12; Valverde 1590: 
4).
Dimensions for the width of the actual roadbed are less 
certain. Kubler reported that according to plans for Mexico 
City from 1537, the c alles [streets] were to be 14 varas, or 
about 52 feet, wide (1948: 160). More appropriate
concerning our purposes, when seeking royal funding for 
Panama's transisthmian road, Pedrarias optimistically 
projected that the finished project would be a stone-paved 
roadway with a breadth of two cart widths (Rubiano 1944: 
233-234). Unfortunately, Pedrarias did not provide the 
dimensions of the cart to which he was referring. There 
were numerous cart styles and widths in colonial Latin 
America. One of the few descriptions of cart dimensions 
comes from an account of travel in Argentina in 1776 which 
reported that an approximately twelve foot long axle passed 
through a carro's [cart] wheels (Concolorcorvo 1942: 88). 
Such a span suggests quite a wide road across Panama. 
However, Ringrose has pointed out that these carts were much 
larger than those of Castile in the sixteenth century (1970: 
44). Pedrarias undoubtedly had the Castilian cart in mind. 
Nevertheless, as mentioned in chapter Two, Pedrarias' 
projections for a paved transisthmian cart passage were far 
from realized during his lifetime.
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As noted previously, the king's instructions suggest 
that another common strategy for road construction in low 
areas involved establishing a solid elevated stone roadbed. 
Correspondingly, among the solutions that Antonelli offered 
for passage through the swampy lowlands near the Gulf of 
Fonseca was the construction of a "calzada,11 a stone 
causeway (1590: 20). The term calzada is derived from the 
Latin via calciata which means *'road paved with limestone1 
(Webster's 1989: 235). From Valverde's survey (1590: 7) it 
appears that the necessary resource, limestone, was present 
in the vicinity.
However, construction of a stone transport surface 
extended beyond low, wet spots and beyond the sixteenth 
century. Presently, in the calles of the many isolated 
colonial settlements in Honduras one often can find the 
tidy, regular pattern of stone pavement. Field observation 
along the Honduran corridor has also revealed deeply incised 
sections of road that possessed a single layer of pavement 
composed of fairly large round, smoothly surfaced stones. 
The widths of these sections were approximately 3 meters. 
Other similar sections of incised stone road were discovered 
on the camino real that led from Trujillo to Sonaguera 
(Photograph 1). There is no evidence to confirm absolutely 
that these are road remnants from the early colonial period. 
However, it is not unlikely that these stone-paved sections 
were constructed with a level of technology and availability
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Photograph 1. Sunken road stonework, 1993 (Photo by author)
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of resources and for a mode of transport similar those which 
Antonelli and Valverde had in mind. Beyond stone pavement, 
Sidney Markman (1993: 44) cited a colonial document from 
1690 that reported that during the rainy season in the 
district of San Pedro Soloma, north of Huehuetenango, 
slippery mountain roads were covered with logs to improve 
footing.
Antonelli and Quintanilla's treatment of the route 
segment that led from Aguanqueterique, just south of the 
continental divide, to Goascordn near the Gulf of Fonseca 
indicated other construction strategies. Because of the 
tortuous terrain and seasonal torrents that plagued this 
stretch, the engineer called this "el peor camino que hay de 
Comayagua a Fonseca" [the worst road that there is from 
Comayagua to Fonseca] (1590: 19). Antonelli and Quintanilla 
believed that this route was unsuitable for the construction 
of a cart road. They suggested that the better location for 
a cart road through this section was on the west side of the 
Rio Goascordn rather than on the east. Nevertheless, they 
described the measures that would be required for opening a 
cart road on the east side, the preferred location of 
transport at that time. Antonelli and company felt that a 
ridge would have to be levelled. The tools they suggested 
for this task were azaddnes and long spade-like tools with 
a long crooked bill called picos (1590: 20). Two leagues of 
the road would run along another ridge's piedmont, a common
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strategy in mountainous terrain and one that both survey 
parties prescribed for the road north of San Pedro. Despite 
the routine nature of this strategy, Antonelli foresaw great 
difficulty. As mentioned earlier, running water was the 
culprit. For the piedmont road to be passable throughout 
the entire year and functional for a substantial amount of 
time, Antonelli felt that "paredes" [retaining walls] were 
necessary. In some parts the walls could be built by simply 
stacking stones. In other, no doubt more vulnerable, 
places, Antonelli (1590: 20) thought that "mamposteria"
[walls of rubble masonry] (Annis, 1968: 22), would be
necessary. According to Antonelli, these measures would be 
very expensive.
It is interesting to note that either because of 
regional geopolitics [the Goascoran serves as a border 
between El Salvador and Honduras] or route inertia, travel 
between Aguanqueterique and Goascor&n currently runs on the 
Rio Goascoran's east side. However, out of respect for 
Antonelli's prudent judgement from four centuries past, it 
should be noted that during three recent visits to this 
stretch of road, earth-moving equipment was always present. 
Moreover, bridges still are regularly washed out by the 
torrents that seasonally rush down the quebradas [ravines]. 
"No se puede vadear"
Gonzalo Menendez Pidal (1951: 92) claimed that the
Spaniards7 bridge-building was the most notable of their
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improvements to early colonial transport in the Indies for 
it allowed more direct routes of travel. Such prominence 
was accorded to bridge-building because running water posed 
such a formidable barrier to road construction. As alluded 
to above, running water's erosive capacity was a 
particularly imposing hindrance to colonial road 
construction. Moreover, beyond overland flow, running water 
confined to stream channels provided additional, equally 
frustrating, impediments. Accordingly, and as ordered by 
King Philip, Antonelli and Valverde's parties paid careful 
attention to stream crossings. An investigation of these 
descriptions demonstrates additional route planning and 
construction methods in the early colonial period.
Antonelli and Valverde reported the number and nature 
of the streams that had to be crossed. Streams were 
designated rios, arroyos and quebradas. Arroyos and 
quebradas generally were considered fordable in the dry and 
wet seasons. However, during the wet invierno travellers 
commonly were detained from fording these streams until 
pulses of high water subsided. Such delays could last 
several hours. Bridges and ferries were reserved for rios. 
Yet, many rios were also considered fordable and thus, did 
not require bridges or ferries.
The only fording strategy contained in the surveys was 
described by Valverde. Throughout the segment of the 
corridor that extended south from Estancia de Armenta in the
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southern Ultia valley to Maniani in the Valle de Espino, he 
reported that there were twelve fordable "rios." According 
to Valverde, "no estorban el paso por tener la acogida 
cerca" [crossing is not hindered because the confluence is 
nearby] (1590: 6). Hence, ease of fording was attributed to 
the nearby presence of the confluence of that river with 
another. Presumably this situation allowed travellers to 
ford two relatively small separate streams rather than a 
single large united one. It is interesting to note that 
Antonelli only reported one actual rio in this region. The 
other streams he designated "arroyos." He reported that 
several of these could be forded in the wet season, but only 
after waiting for high stages to subside. These 
discrepancies in the surveyors7 accounts suggest that 
fording streams near their confluences was effective 
primarily for arroyos and quebradas.
The surveyors found that fording was not sufficient for 
overcoming all of the streams or the deep, steep-sided 
barrancas [gorges] that bedeviled travelers throughout the 
Honduran corridor. Therefore, bridge construction or 
ferries would be required. As noted above, Antonelli, the 
engineer, and Valverde provided relatively detailed 
solutions for crossing each of the unfordable streams in 
their path. We will consider a few such cases that 
demonstrate the range of their solutions.
Proceeding south from Puerto Caballos, the first stream 
that required a bridge was the Rio Chamelecon (refer to Map 
1). Valverde reported that travelers presently relied on 
canoes for crossing this river (1590: 5). He thought a 
bridge of a width of about one hundred and twenty feet was 
necessary. The bridge would have to be especially solid, 
and therefore expensive, because of the avenidas [freshets] 
that regularly coursed through the channel. Upriver from 
the present crossing place Antonelli noted a suitable site 
for construction that provided a stone surface on which to 
erect the bridge and a supply of stones with which to build 
it. He envisioned a bridge with stone pillars that would 
support arches. He neglected to say how many. The arches 
would elevate the balustrade to a height safely above flood 
stages. To decrease the project's expense, Antonelli 
suggested that the balustrade could be covered with large 
prepared tree trunks rather than stonework (1590: 13).
Although stone arches do not necessarily require mortar, 
Valverde's mention of the presence of lime on the site, 
suggests that they thought a bonding agent would be 
necessary.
All of the stone bridges throughout the corridor were 
prescribed to be arched bridges. Unfortunately, because 
Valverde and Antonelli omitted necessary information or gave 
conflicting reports in the few instances in which they 
actually mentioned arch widths, it is not possible to
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determine whether there was a general pattern, specifically 
arch dimensions, for these bridges. To wit, both surveyors 
thought that the Rio Goascoran needed a bridge near 
Aguangueterique because the projected cart road was to cross 
from the river's east side to its west side at that point. 
Valverde reported that this crossing would require a bridge 
of forty-five pasos [equivalent to five feet, two 2.5 feet 
steps] width. He claimed that this distance could be 
spanned with one arch (1590: 7). Antonelli agreed that the 
bridge required only one arch. However, he estimated the 
span of that arch to be eighty pies [feet] (1590: 19).
Thus, despite the unequal estimates of distance, we at 
least can surmise that arches of at least 225 feet were 
considered either possible or practical. This appears to 
have been close to the limit, for when describing the 
construction of a bridge over the Rio Goascoran near the 
pueblo of Goascoran, Valverde claimed that, even though 
there were stones and lime on-site, it would be particularly 
expensive because one of its arches would have to be more 
that 50 pasos, 250 feet (1590: 7).
However, in another case, Antonelli reported that 
bridging the Rio Pasaquina would require "three large and 
one small arches" (1590: 20). Unfortunately, he neglected 
to state the width of the bridge. From a 1: 50,000
topographic map, the Pasaquina appears to be less than 300 
feet in width (Honduras. Carta Topografia: Goascoran, 1987).
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This suggests that Antonelli's "large arches" were smaller 
than Valverde's or that Valverde exaggerated.
Three and one half leagues beyond the Chamelecdn the 
surveyors encountered another wide, caudaloso [voluminous] 
stream, the Rio Ulua, for which they suggested a different 
solution. Because this river widened from two hundred pasos 
to four hundred pasos following torrential rains they 
believed that constructing a bridge would be expensive 
(Antonelli and Quintanilla 1590: 5). Moreover, the river's 
banks were not solid. Thus, Valverde's and Antonelli's 
reports agreed that such a project was impractical. 
Nevertheless, that river had to be crossed and the present 
system of canoe passage encountered misfortune with 
unacceptable frequency. Therefore, the surveyors suggested 
that a ferry system consisting of a trio of flat-bottomed 
barcas [barks] with the capacity of carrying twenty to 
twenty-five mules be established (Antonelli and Quintanilla 
1590: 13).
Four leagues beyond the Uliia, Antonelli and Valverde 
planned another bridge. Valverde reported that the Rio 
Blanco was no more than forty feet wide. At this width, the 
surveyors agreed that a relatively inexpensive wooden bridge 
would suffice. This solution reflected to some extent the 
availability of resources near the site. The trees that 
grew on the river's banks were considered to be of good 
construction quality. They included: "madre de cacao,
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robles y encino" [madre de cacao and evergreen and deciduous 
oaks] (Antonelli and Quintanilla 1590: 5). The lack of 
adequate stones and lime near the site also favored a wooden 
structure. Moreover, some unidentified quality of the 
streambanks convinced the surveyors of appropriateness of 
the wooden bridge. Unfortunately, rather than describing 
the site's advantages, Antonelli merely characterized the 
banks as "buenas barrancas" (Antonelli and Quintanilla 1590: 
14).
The solutions that Antonelli and Valverde sketched out 
for these three stream crossings encompass the strategies 
that they prescribed for streams throughout the corridor. 
In each case the surveyors reported that even though there 
were suitable sites and materials for construction, 
including quarries in some locations, the bridges would be 
expensive. This expense prevented prompt implementation of 
these solutions. Implementation was also hindered by an 
unfavorable distribution of technical knowledge in Central 
America. Kubler (1948: 152) noted that for central Mexico 
in the sixteenth century "peripheral provinces were 
initially devoid of adequately trained craftsmen". It seems 
likely that the Honduran corridor, peripheral to Santiago de 
Guatemala's core, also lacked the technical skill for 
planning and building a series of arched stone bridges.
Kubler (1948: 152) reported that in Mexico the
Spaniards, especially religious orders, attempted to remedy
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the spotty availability of construction skills by either 
sending trained craftsmen from the capital to the provinces, 
or by sending Indians from the provinces "to be apprenticed 
to craftsmen in the capital" and returned to their pueblos. 
Construction of the camino real across the Honduran corridor 
would have required similar flows of technical knowledge. 
Funding
Funding for colonial public works, obras publicas 
[public works], like road and bridge construction came from 
three sources: the Crown, the colonies7 Indian population, 
and the colonies7 non-Indian population.
Pedrarias7 attempts at roadbuilding in Panama provided 
an early example of the dependence of such projects on royal 
grants or subsidies. Such grants were renewable. Pedrarias 
renewed his for three years. Kubler reported another 
example from mainland that demonstrates the extreme patience 
of the Crown7s largess. In 1544, the Augustinians received 
a royal grant of 3,000 pesos to rebuild a church and convent 
in Mexico City. The grant was renewed annually until 1587 
(Kubler 1948: 185). Kubler suggested that the Crown7s
generosity was among the factors that prolonged the project.
Admittedly, the construction of a religious edifice in 
the capital of New Spain must have claimed an exceptionally 
high priority for funding in comparison to road projects in 
the hinterlands of Spain7s New World colonies. However, as 
demonstrated in Chapter Two, construction of a transisthmian
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road also was accorded eminence among colonial projects. 
Thus, this example and that of Pedrarias aptly reflect the 
Crown's early willingness to support construction projects.
The contribution of the indigenous population to the 
creation of colonial Latin America is well known. Indians 
funded colonial projects with their free, or forced wage, 
labor and the tribute that they were obligated to pay as 
subjects of the King of Spain. An annual tribute payment 
worth two pesos was required from each healthy Indian male 
between the ages of eighteen and fifty (Wortman 1982: 25). 
In contrast to New Spain and Peru, where large mineral and 
agricultural based revenues were annually collected by the 
Crown, in Central America, tributes were most often in the 
form of some agricultural commodity rather than precious 
metals (1982: 25). The tribute contributed to the financing 
of the personnel and projects of the government and church. 
Thus, a portion of the Indian contributions to colonial 
public works projects was directed through the Crown 
largesse. As we will see later, in sparsely populated 
areas, like the Honduran corridor, Indian tribute payments 
scarcely supported large-scale public works projects like 
road construction.
Beyond their tribute, Barber claimed that the Indians' 
caja de comunidad, a community chest that held proceeds from 
each pueblo's common land, also was available to pay for 
public works projects (1932: 75).
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Some form of tribute was also sought from the non- 
Indian inhabitants of the colonies. The Crown charged a 
five percent levy on minerals, the quinto, and the alcabala, 
a two percent sales tax on merchandise purchases (Wortman, 
1982: 31-32). The colonists were also allowed to raise
funds for their cabildos, which directed public works 
projects.
The Recopilacion contains but a single law that
specifically addressed the funding of road construction and
maintenance. Nevertheless, this particular decree, issued
in 1563, identified another source of funds for road-
building. The colonists were instructed that
si en sus distritos es necesario hacer, y facilitar los 
caminos, fabricar, y aderezar las puentes, y hallando 
que conviene alguna de estas obras para el comercio, 
hagan tasar el costo
[If in your districts it is necessary to build and 
repair roads and bridges for the purpose of commerce, 
collect taxes to cover the costs] (Felipe II 1563b: 55).
Thus, they were given permission to collect taxes to support
road and bridge maintenance and construction. In a similar
vein, Sherman reported that eighteen years earlier the Crown
had ordered that public funds be used to open and maintain
roads in Guatemala and Honduras (1979: 120).
Beyond taxation, colonial officials also sought road 
funds by requesting that in lieu of necessary road work the 
Crown temporarily release colonists from the obligation of 
paying the quinto on the gold and silver they mined (Cava 
1536: 282). Wortman (1982: 26) reported that because of the
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relative poverty of Central America's mines, the rate was 
actually only ten and a half percent; moreover, because of 
a lack of colonial administrators, Honduras' scattered 
mining operations often went untaxed.
In 1576, the alcabala was instituted to fund defense, 
government and church expenses. This sales tax was supposed 
to be imposed each time an item was sold (Wortman 1982: 31). 
Wortman claimed that it was not until 1602 that this tax was 
actually charged and that only the first sale of an item was 
taxed (1982: 31). However, Antonelli found that, already in 
1589, the alcabala was being collected in Honduras (1590: 
27). His report confirmed Wortman's claim that the tax was 
only levied on the first sale. Antonelli projected a 
revenue windfall should the alcabala be exacted precisely.
As mentioned above, King Philip's instructions to 
Antonelli and Valverde revealed that the king had been 
informed that transisthmian travelers had already 
established a system of funding for their transisthmian 
infrastructure. Apparently, merchants were charged an fee 
of two pesos for each load carried. The surveyors were 
instructed to investigate this matter. Neither of the 
subsequent reports confirmed this claim. Indeed, Antonelli 
included such a fee among his other solutions for funding 
road construction and maintenance. Antonelli thought the 
two pesos levy should also be imposed on the recua owners 
who used the road to transport merchandise (1590: 28). He
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also suggested that a port fee should of eight pesos per
cargo should be charged on merchandise leaving Puerto
Caballos (1590: 28). Antonelli qualified his projections of
the revenues these taxes would garner for the crown and
colony in the following statement:
Como se viniesen a poblar estas provincias, entonces 
vendrian a quedar muchas mercaderias en las dichas 
provincias y estas vendrian a pagar a dos por ciento y, 
sin duda que vendria a ser una gran suma
[If these provinces were to be populated, trade would 
increase to the point that if a two percent tax was 
applied to each sale, a great sum doubtlessly would 
result] (1590: 28).
Thus, revenues depended on the region being populated.
Royal grants, Indian tribute and the "gran suma"
notwithstanding, Antonelli ultimately concluded that the
project should not be pursued, primarily, because it would
be too expensive. He estimated that constructing a cart
road through the corridor would cost two hundred and fifty
thousand ducados (1590: 20). Unfortunately he did not
itemize the projected expenditures. Instead, he itemized in
great detail the manpower, horsepower and cargo demands of
transisthmian traffic across the corridor (see Appendix D).
Antonelli did indicate that the cart road and the bridges
accounted for the majority of the expense (1590: 27). These
costs were compounded by the lack of a labor force. There
were numerous segments of the route where "no hay gente, ni
naturales" [there are no people or Indians] (1590: 27).
Antonelli thought the cost of filling this void by
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transplanting populations from Spain and Africa would be 
prohibitive. Valverde did not specifically quantify the 
cost. Instead, he reported simply that it would "costara 
muy gran cantidad de dinero" [cost a lot of money] (Bonilla 
1955: 232). Antonelli's conclusion demonstrated his doubt 
that settlement of the region would grow sufficiently to 
create and support transisthmian trade and pay for the 
maintenance of its infrastructure.
Antonelli and Quintanilla and Valverde responded to the 
king's instructions with thorough relaciones. The 
information contained in them portrayed the Honduran 
corridor, despite its advantages, as a difficult strip of 
earth on which to construct roads, for mules or carts. The 
low, densely forested and seasonally wet Sula Plain required 
clearing and draining. The rugged slopes between that flat- 
land and the Comayagua Valley precluded a cart road as did 
the mountains south of the isthmian divide. Should a road 
between Puerto Caballos and the Gulf of Fonseca have been 
opened, a series of expensive bridges, and other earthworks, 
would have been necessary.
Despite these difficulties, Chapter Six demostrates 
that the Honduran corridor possessed many of the raw 
materials necessary for such a roadbuilding project. 
However, as the king was obviously aware, such undertakings 
require funding too. Antonelli and Quintanilla reported 
that taxes on the province's population and trade could not
generate the funds to support such a project. The effort to 
remove Spain's transisthmian trade from Panama, thus, 
represented a potential increased drain on the Crown's 
treasury. Such a potential doomed the project.
CHAPTER SIX




As noted by Antonelli, human labor was a crucial 
feature in the establishment and maintenance of the colonial 
route network. Manpower was employed in primarily three 
ways: 1) the actual work of opening and repairing roads and 
bridges; 2) use as beasts of burden; and 3) provisioning 
travelers and their beasts of burden. The burden of these 
tasks, for the most part, fell upon the indigenous 
population. Their labor was exploited under of the auspices 
of two colonial institutions that dominated the sixteenth 
century: the encomienda and the repartimiento.
The encomienda was a royal grant of Indians to Spanish 
settlers. In return for the Indians' tribute and labor, the 
encomenderos were obligated to protect them and instruct 
them in the Catholic faith (Villamarin and Villamarin 1975:
12). As mentioned previously, tribute came mostly in the 
form of precious metals or agricultural produce. As early 
as 1509 on Hispahola, Indian labor, often referred to as 
personal service, also was allowed for paying tribute in 
lieu of metal or produce (1975: 12). Barber (1932: 18-19) 
noted that various types of personal service, known by a 
variety of names, were known in various parts of the New 
World, especially Peru, before the arrival of the Spaniards. 
These different systems provided labor for projects such as 
mining, agricultural field work, domestic service, and the 
construction of public buildings and roads (1932: 19).
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Similarly, the Spanish applied personal service to public 
works projects like road construction (MacLeod 1973: 206). 
Evidence of this practice in colonial Central America is 
found in a request made in 1545 by Alonso Maldonado, 
president of the Audiencia de los Confines. Maldonado asked 
that the Crown grant him the labor of the Indians who had 
once served Pedro de Alvarado, the deceased conqueror of 
Guatemala. Maldonado reported that many of these Indians 
were presently employed in public works. In the same 
letter, he reported that Indians in Comayagua were used for 
opening roads (1545: 348-349).
Aware that personal service, in many cases, had become 
a form of slavery Queen Isabella forbade the practice. 
However, her demands appear to have gone unheeded, for 
Carlos V issued decrees outlawing personal service in 1528, 
and with the New Laws of 1542 and again in 1549 (Barber 
1932: 70-71). Thus, personal service, or unpaid labor,
appears to have remained until 1550 (Kubler 1948: 134).
Despite the initial rejection of the Crown's corrective 
legislation, soon after mid-century the nature of Indian 
labor changed as various systems collectively grouped under 
the title of repartimiento emerged. This institution was 
the primary source of labor in Central America between 1570- 
1630 (MacLeod 1973: 208). It co-existed with and then
gradually replaced the encomienda. The repartimiento was 
essentially a draft system of forced wage labor (Kubler
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1948: 134) that provided non-encomenderos access to Indian 
labor. Indians were allocated by Crown officials to 
Spaniards to work on a wide range of public projects and 
occupations (Villamarin and Villamarin 1975: 17). MacLeod 
captured the essence of the repartimiento in the following 
passage:
In theory the system worked as follows. A given village 
was ordered to supply a given number of its able-bodied 
males for a certain number of days per month. Within 
each village liability for this draft was to rotate 
among the villagers regardless of rank or wealth. The 
Indians drafted from the village were ordered to report 
to a predetermined place, usually the main plaza of the 
nearest Spanish town. There they would be met and 
counted by a Spanish official, the juez or judge of the 
repartimiento. It was this official's responsibility to 
ensure that the draft was fair, and that the village was 
not excusing its more privileged members by sending the 
same macehuales time after time (1973: 207).
The Indian caciques, or alcaldes [mayors], were 
required to provide four percent of their pueblos' male 
population for repartimiento. The regidores [councilman] 
and alcalde ordinarios of the region's cabildos, in turn, 
distributed these forced laborers to the haciendas and 
public works projects throughout the region (Wortman 1982: 
66). In theory, this labor force was required to work 
Monday through Friday from eight in the morning until five 
in the afternoon with a two hour break for lunch. For their 
work, each laborer received one half of one real per day, 
while the Spanish recipients of their labor paid the 
cabildos one and one half of a real for the labor (1982:
13).
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Thus, in addition to the lucrative privileges of tax 
collecting, butchering meat and selling liquor or water, the 
cabildos were responsible for distributing Indian laborers, 
the region's primary labor source, throughout their 
districts (Wortman 1982: 65-66).
Locational Labor, Locational Projects
The Recopilacion contains no laws that specifically 
regulated the actual labor involved in road construction. 
Nevertheless, with colonial documents from Honduras and 
Guatemala and Kubler's (1948) two volume examination of 
Mexican architecture in the sixteenth century and Zavala and 
Castelo's (1963) eight volume collection of Mexican colonial 
documents related to labor practices during the early 
colonial period, a picture of early road construction 
emerges.
One facet of roadbuilding that can be drawn from these 
collections of documents is that the work was largely 
locational in nature. Road projects were manned by Indians 
who lived nearby. Conversely, unpopulated areas lagged 
behind in the extension of the colonial infrastructure.
Numerous documents establish that pueblos located near 
roads were responsible for their construction and 
maintenance (Enriquez 1579: 187; 1580: 281-282). One
document from Zavala and Castelo's collection is 
particularly instructive. In the province of Ocoytuco in 
1576, the alcalde determined that a deep barranca in the
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path of the local road required a stone bridge. Hence, the 
alcalde divided the various responsibilities in a manner 
that he believed would "evitar la vejacion de los dichos 
indios" [avoid harm to the Indians] (Enriquez 1576: 135- 
136). Pueblos located within one and one half leagues of 
the site provided wooden beams. Three pueblos located 
within one half of one league of the site provided lime. 
Other nearby pueblos provided "cincuenta indios peones y 
doce oficiales canteros (stone cutters) repartidos por el 
alcalde mayor de la dicha provincia de Ocoytuco" (1576: 
136). The alcalde also required the Spaniards who owned 
labranzas [farms] near the site to contribute the use of 
their oxen to the effort.
The readily available labor and resources made the 
Ocoytuco project above a simple matter of putting all of the 
pieces together. However, Indian pueblos were not evenly 
distributed along all of the paths that the Spanish wanted 
to travel in colonial Latin America. In another document 
from Zavala and Castelo's collection, an alcalde excused his 
inability to maintain a mountain pass on lack of Indian 
labor (Parada 1599: 288).
The uneven distribution of repartimiento roadbuilding 
labor was especially detrimental to Indian pueblos. The 
case of Aguajapa, a pueblo located in the path of a camino 
real, bears repeating. Its men were distributed to work on 
nearby wheat-producing haciendas and:
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the pueblo had to contribute labor to transport people 
and goods upon the road as well as provide work forces 
to the farms. When, in the first half of the 
seventeenth century, the next town along the royal road, 
Salpaltagua, was destroyed by an epidemic, the burden 
upon Aguajapa to transport goods and people on the road 
was increased by twice the old distance. The populace 
was now forced to bear the burden of communication and 
transportation over some seventeen leagues. Overwork on 
the road and the wheat fields caused illness, a decline 
in population and still greater pressure for labor 
(Wortman 1982: 13-14).
This situation was aggravated by the fact that the time
taken by a "reparted" Indian to walk to the Spanish town, or
work site, and back to his village was deducted from his
time served (MacLeod 1979: 207).
Colonial officials in Guatemala frequently recognized 
the damage that depopulated road pueblos, particularly in 
productive plantation regions, would have on commerce 
(Markman 1984). To remedy the problem, highland Indians 
repeatedly were resettled in regions like Soconusco (Markman 
1984: 49). Regular transplantings of Indian laborers from 
diverse regions, and speaking different languages, to camino 
real settlements might also have contributed to the 
extinction of local Indian languages (Markman 1984: 42).
Strangely, Indian labor on roads in more densely 
populated areas occasionally brought adjacent pueblos into 
dispute with one another. In the province Tapazcolula in 
New Spain, the pueblo of Tlaltepeque filed a grievance with 
the viceroy claiming that the nearby pueblo of Atoyaquillo 
had attempted to increase the land within its limits by
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extending the reach of its road maintenance activities on 
the local camino real (Enriquez 1576: 149).
Tools
An important question related to colonial roadbuilding 
that has received little attention is the matter of what 
sorts of tools were available to the Indian laborers. As 
described in the previous chapter, in 1539 Alvarado's men 
cleared a route from Puerto Caballos to San Pedro using 
hatchets and spades or hoes. It was not until some fifty 
years later that one encounters another mention of tools in 
relation to the Honduran corridor. Antonelli prescribed 
picos and azadones for cutting a road through an 
inconveniently placed ridge (1590: 20).
Kubler (1948) filled in some of the gaps of this 
incomplete record in his aforementioned study of sixteenth- 
century Mexico. He found that in that region by the decade 
of the 1570s, European hand-tools such as "planes, chisels, 
plumb-lines, saws, axes, hatchets and knives," in addition 
to a plethora of metal tools for horse care, were commonly 
used. He found, moreover, that a pre-Columbian tradition of 
employers supplying laborers with tools for public works had 
persisted. However, the high cost of tools in Mexico caused 
employers to protest this practice. Kubler cited a letter 
from Archbishop Montufar to the Council of the Indies that 
complained of rental of tools in Mexico often exceeding 
purchase prices in Spain (1948: 159). Thus, it appears that
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except for jobs like fine woodworking or intricate stone
cutting, whenever possible, Indian laborers did not use
European tools. The luxury of free or cheap Indian labor
made expensive tools unnecessary. As Kubler suggested:
in heavy manual operations, such as digging or piling 
earth and stone, the application of more labor was 
probably cheaper that the issue of metal picks and iron 
shovels (1948: 159).
In a region as remote as the Honduran corridor was in
the sixteenth century it seems likely that European tools
were even more expensive. Thus, Indian laborers on a road
crew were even less likely to have a pick or shovel in their
hands.
Imported Labor
Indian labor for roadbuilding seems not to have 
satisfied colonial demands in Central America. In 1543, 
President Maldonado wrote to the king that the Indians were 
not suited to the demands of colonial transport. Neither 
were they suited to the roadbuilding that was necessary to 
alleviate the Indians' bearing responsibilities. Maldonado, 
therefore, requested that forty Africans be sent to the 
colony to open roads (1543). Similar requests followed from 
Maldonado and other officials in ensuing years. There were 
three primary reasons for the requests: 1) the difficult 
nature of roadbuilding; and 2) the aforementioned shortages 
of Indians living near specific projects; and 3) the 
necessity to decrease the demand on Indians as beasts of 
burden.
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An excerpt from one of Maldonado's pleas provides the
essential features of colonial requests for Africans and
reveals the contradictions that Maldonado spawned in the
pursuit labor for his region. Prior to this passage
Maldonado explained that the construction of roads leading
from Gracias a Dios and Comayagua to Puerto Caballos was
desperately needed because of the harm that travel to the
coast caused the Indians.
[Y] mueren muchos en este camino; y esto no se puede 
hacer con indios, porque hay muy pocos. Ay necesidad que 
Vuestra Magestad haga merced de esta Governacion para 
este efeto, de quarenta negros que podra abrir los 
caminos; y los oficiales de Vuestra Magestad tendran 
cuidado de estas negros, como de cosa de Vuestra 
Magestad, y los venderan cuando se acaben los 
caminos, que se haran en poco tiempo
[A lot of Indians die on this road. Transport cannot be 
accomplished with Indians because there are too few. 
Your Majesty needs to grant 40 Africans to this province 
for opening roads. The officials of this province would 
care for these Africans as if they were possessions of 
Your Majesty. We would sell them when the roads are 
completed, which should not take a long time] (1545: 
347) .
This excerpt came from the same letter in which 
Maldonado asked for permission to use Indians for public 
works. Thus, almost in the same breath, he requested 
permission to use Indian labor and justified a request for 
African labor on the basis of the damage such labor caused 
the Indians.
Antonelli similarly prescribed the importation of a 
labor supply for the development of the Honduran corridor. 
The immigrants he sought were to come from Castile and
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Africa: the Castilians to farm and pay taxes; the Africans 
to build and repair roads and travel with the recuas (1590: 
28-29) .
In contrast to Antonelli's plans, Africans brought to 
Central America were used primarily for mining. Documents 
also reveal that colonial officials desired their labor for 
other arduous endeavors. One such example was the clearing 
of the Rio San Juan in Nicaragua for navigation (Espino 
1544: 368). Ultimately, the request for African slaves is 
a testament to the harsh exertion that was roadbuilding. 
Human Beasts of Burden
The extensive legislation contained in the Recopilacion 
concerning tamemes reflects its importance to colonial 
transport and the Crown's concern about this practice. As 
can be seen throughout this study, the Crown's interest in 
roadbuilding was often a function of its distaste for the 
use of Indians as bearers. Repeatedly, colonial officials 
requested that the hardships caused by royal restrictions on 
this practice be alleviated by royal support for road 
construction. All know that until proper cart roads were 
built or until mules became more abundant and affordable, 
the colonists had no choice but to use the Indians as 
bearers.
An examination of laws from the Recopilacion, and 
Sherman's Forced Native Labor in Sixteenth Century Central 
America, (1979), among other sources, reveals the character
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of tameme use. The use of tamemes was a pre-Columbian 
tradition that served cultures that neither used wheeled 
transport nor possessed draft animals (1979: 111). The need 
to transport goods was, thus, met by a class of human 
bearers. Bearing constituted their primary economic 
function.
Transport demands increased with the arrival of the 
Spanish. Far from contenting themselves with the region's 
extant goods and trade flows, the new settlers demanded 
regular infusions of merchandise like wine, oil, vinegar, 
books, paper, plants, etc. from Spain (Sherman 1979: 111). 
Thus, new traffic flows were established to connect lowland 
tropical Atlantic ports with the cool interior highlands. 
These new flows outstripped the construction of cart roads 
or mule paths, thus, increasing the demand for tamemes and 
perpetuating their use.
Beyond the mere expansion in cargo to be carried, the 
routes traveled were also more difficult. Travel to the 
ports forced tamemes to leave the cool, upland climates to 
which they were accustomed and descend into warm, humid 
Atlantic lowlands. The Spanish belatedly became aware that 
subjecting the Indians to such climatic extremes was 
detrimental to their health. In 1535 Bishop Marroquin, 
bishop of Guatemala, instructed the king that because of the 
climatic extremes experienced by travel from the highlands 
to the warm lowlands:
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es muy necessario que V.M. mande que los de la una 
tierra no pasen a los de otra cargados, porque de diez 
no bueluen a sus casas cinco
fit is very necessary that Your Majesty mandate that 
Indians not be forced to bear to unfamiliar regions, 
because five out of 10 will not return] (1535: 418).
Newson (1986) cited a report from Bishop Pedraza in which he
likewise complained that when Indians were forced to carry
loads of three to four arrobas [one arroba weighs
approximately 25 pounds] from Comayagua in the highland
interior to San Pedro and on to Puerto Caballos at least one
third of the bearers died or became ill on the journey
(1986; 105). In 1588, Felipe II, ordered that Indians could
not be reparted to unfamiliar climatic regions (1588: 292-
293).
Other decrees were issued throughout the century to 
regulate the system of transport. One particular order, 
issued in 1549 and reissued in 1579, granted that in areas 
where there were no open roads or beasts of burden Indians 
could be used as bearers. Limits on weight, distance and 
recompense were to be set by the Audiencia (Carlos 1549: 
288). Within this decree is found the essence of the
guidelines that directed the colonists' use of tamemes. 
From an ocean away the Crown threw up its hands and 
capitulated: "Do it if you absolutely must. But please
follow these rules."
Among the rules, was a law preventing Indians younger 
than eighteen years of age from being forced to bear (Carlos
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1538a: 288). Another decree set the load limit at two
arrobas, with adjustments in this amount according to the
quality of the road (Carlos 1533: 289). In the previously
cited report from Bishop Pedraza, he claimed that this limit
was often exceeded, sometimes doubled (1986: 105). In the
following passage, Sherman conjured up an image of a
similarly overburdened tameme.
Picture the carriers traversing those slopes in driving 
rain, bent under packs of 75 to 100 pounds, slogging 
through mud, slipping and sliding, goaded on by a driver 
with a schedule to meet. If a tameme did not drop from 
exhaustion, he might well become ill from exposure, 
drown in a river swollen by flash floods, or have some 
accident that would lay him up, perhaps crippled for 
life. The latter possibility would be seen by some as 
a blessing that would take them out of the carrying 
trade (115).
The crown's failure to rid the colonies of tameme use 
was a function of the snail's pace at which cart roads and 
mule paths were opened. The lethargic pace at which road 
construction progressed was not for lack of royal 
initiative. Sherman (1979) noted the instance in 1545 when, 
after hearing of an adequate supply of mules and horses in 
the region, the king mandated that roads be built in 
Guatemala and Honduras. Moreover, he ordered that roads be 
maintained semi-annually and the work be financed by public 
works funds. The purpose of this order was to remove the 
need for tamemes. Two years later, no roads had been opened 
(1979: 120). The presence of a supply of mules failed to 
induce travel by pack train because even after mules had 
become commonplace throughout the region, they were
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expensive. The speed of tameme transport also appears to 
have been as much as 1 kilometer per hour faster than that 
of mule trains (Adams 1978: 27). Thus, tamemes, at very low 
cost, remained the colonists' favored beast of burden 
(Sherman 1979: 118).
The rare exceptions to the early colonial acceptance of 
tameme use failed. Rodrigo de Contreras unsuccessfully 
outlawed tamemes in Nicaragua to stimulate cart production 
and road construction in Nicaragua. Even in flat areas 
where transport was easy, only two carts were built in 
response to Contreras' order (Sherman 1979: 119).
The series of royal decrees issued throughout the 
sixteenth century reflected the crown's inability to remedy 
the onerous problem that transport posed for them and their 
colonists. A system of cart roads, or at least pack trails, 
supplied with an abundant supply of affordable hoofed beasts 
of burden was the solution. As was seen in Chapter Two with 
regard to developing the primary transisthmian passages and 
in Chapter Three with regard to developing the Honduran 
corridor, such a solution, though seeming simple enough, was 
long in coming.
The Honduran Corridor's Labor Supply
Funding for road projects, labor for road crews and 
labor for bearing cargo depended to varying degrees on the 
geographical distribution of colonial Central America's 
Indian population. Cabildos' public works projects were
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limited by the amount of tribute paid by the pueblos in 
their jurisdiction. The amount of tribute was directly 
related to the Indian population. Encomienda and 
repartimiento labor was also dependent on the size of the 
Indian population. Laws that restricted the movement of 
tamemes resulted in a similar dependence of early transport 
on the distribution of the Indian population. Although the 
dilatory increase in the region's mule population eventually 
deflated the importance of tameme distribution, colonial 
planners could not escape the need for the region's 
indigenous people. Therefore, the success in early road 
construction, largely, was served by favorable distributions 
of the indigenous population. Conversely, early road 
failures often resulted from unfavorable distributions.
Of all of the transisthmian passages, the dependence on 
the Indian population applied most profoundly to the 
Honduran corridor, because it was the longest passage and 
required overland travel over almost the entirety of its 
length. Overland travel required roads and beasts of 
burden, human or animal. The relationship between the 
Indian population and colonial overland transport did not 
escape Antonelli. As mentioned previously, he reported to 
the king that settlement throughout the corridor was 
essential should transisthmian trade be established. To 
wit, he recorded the population of the pueblos located on 
the proposed route, as did Valverde, and predicted the
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number of people that the full development of this route 
required. Table 1 shows the results of Antonelli's and 
Valverde's population surveys. Because these surveys 
recorded only each settlement's tributary Indians, married 
male Indians between the ages of 18 and 50, they are not 
accurate population estimates. Newson (1982: 265) has
suggested that a multiplication factor of four could be 
applied to such tribute assessments to reach a figure for 
total population. The multiplication factor
notwithstanding, Antonelli's population survey did not 
reflect the corridor's population. He noted only the 
several Indian pueblos located on the transisthmian camino 
real. Valverde's survey, on the other hand, in addition to 
covering most of Honduras, also covered a wider 
transisthmian alley. He presented his memorial as a survey 
of
todos los pueblos ... que estan en el camino real del 
dicho puerto [Fonseca] hasta el de Caballos, y diez 
leguas comarcanas al dicho camino
[all of the pueblos that are on the camino real from 
Fonseca to Puerto Caballos and 10 leagues adjacent to 
this road] (Bonilla 1955: 238).
It is uncertain whether "diez leguas comarcanas" extended on
either side of the road, thus making survey path 20 leagues
wide, or whether the road split the 10 leagues down the
middle. In either case, Valverde's survey represents the
appraisal of the population, and their agricultural
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Table l. Population of Tributary Indians Residing in 












Sources: Antonelli and Quintanilla 1590; and Bonilla 1955.
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production, of a wide road region as opposed to the 
settlements located immediately on a road.
The breadth of Valverde's focus suggests that he 
conceived of the transisthmian camino real as channel of 
transport and commerce that could draw on the resources, and 
serve the population, of a surrounding tributary region. In 
practice, Valverde extended his survey to pueblos as far as 
15 leagues from the camino real (1955: 241). By painting 
with such a broad stroke he counted 2177 tribute Indians 
within the route corridor (1955: 240-242) in addition to
another 479 in the jurisdictions of San Pedro and Puerto 
Caballos (1955: 245-245). The total of Indian tributes
thus, totaled 2,656.
Having been dispatched together to execute the surveys, 
it seems unlikely that Antonelli was unaware of Valverde's 
findings or the wider corridor's population. He, thus, 
reported the Crown that the corridor's population would have 
to be augmented by the importation of 400-500 married 
farmers from Spain, with an additional 2000 African slaves 
distributed among them (1590: 26-29). Cognizant of the
costs of importing farmers from Spain and slaves from 
Guinea, Antonelli listed the corridor's lack of population 
among its primary drawbacks (1590: 27).
Honduras simply did not possess the manpower necessary 
to open and maintain new roads and bridges. Neither was 
there an indigenous population sufficient to serve as beasts
of burden until mules abounded and the roads were opened. 
Much less could the sparsely populated corridor provide the 







In addition to financial support and Indian labor, 
colonial road construction during the sixteenth century 
depended on the availability of building materials like 
lime, wood and stone. Once Indian and African labor had 
transformed these materials into roads and bridges, and 
tamemes had begun to transport cargo upon their backs upon 
the roads, other transport matters commanded consideration. 
Whether in obedience to the Crown or according to the 
demands of commerce, colonial commerce demanded a population 
of hoofed beasts of burden. Pilgrims, muleteers and their 
beasts required a system of road settlements that would 
provide them,- and their beasts, food and shelter. This 
chapter considers transportation resources of both an 
inanimate -lime, wood and stone - and animate - mules, 
horses and oxen - nature. The chapter also examines how the 
distribution of these resources influenced colonial road 
construction and settlement, and note the importance of the 
network of road settlements, regional resource dispensaries, 
to colonial transport.
Sticks and Stones
Among the essential materials required for colonial 
road construction were stones, timber, sand, and lime. 
Stones were used for paving and building up roadbeds. 
Timber was used for bridgebuilding. Sand and lime were used 
for making mortar. Of these materials, Kubler (1948: 167)
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found that lime was most expensive, in some cases more so 
than labor and stone together. The great demand for lime 
explains the frequency with which reports of Indian labor 
being reparted to lime kilns appear in Zavala and Castelo's 
collection of labor documents. From this collection one 
learns that labor in the lime kilns and stone-cutting were 
classified as "obra[s] publica[s]" (Mendoza 1606: 9). To 
underline the importance of this natural bonding agent, it 
is worthwhile to repeat that in his instructions to 
Antonelli and Valverde, King Philip directed them to 
determine the availability of lime or gypsum.
Kubler suggested that the dependence of early colonial 
Latin America on substances like lime influenced the 
placement of early colonial settlements. Outside of Mexico 
City, which was served by water traffic, colonists were 
served by a "backward and overburdened system of 
transportation" (1948: 163). There were few cart roads, and 
mule teams had not yet become plentiful. These deficiencies 
meant that transporting large loads of lime, stone and 
timbers was particularly difficult and time-consuming. 
These essential building materials were, thus, expensive. 
So expensive, according to Kubler, that colonists were 
drawn, or directed, to establish settlements as close as 
possible to resource sites like "sand-pits, quarries" and 
stands of timber (1948: 162). Such a location strategy
ensured materials for initial settlement construction and
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supplied settlements local resource(s) with which to trade 
once a road had connected it to the emerging colonial 
network. In contrast, valuable deposits of construction 
materials that lacked nearby settlements remained 
economically out of reach and, therefore, useless.
Barber (1932) cited a decree from the Recopilacion that 
demonstrated the Crown's endorsement of resource-based 
settlements. In 1601, King Philip ordered that settlements 
be established near quicksilver mines (Barber 1932: 97).
Amalgamation of silver with mercury was introduced in 
Pachuca, Mexico in 1556 (Barber 1932: 91). Hence, in this 
case King Philip promoted settlement to advance royal 
authority over colonial mining operations.
In contrast to settlement promoted by the availability 
construction materials, the lack thereof occasionally 
diminished the acceptability of a particular location for 
settlement. In 1598, one Jorge de Alvarado complained to 
the Crown that Puerto Caballos was an inappropriate site for 
a major Caribbean port because of its lack of lime for 
mortar and wood for lining trenches (Alvarado: 1598).
Similarly, Kubler claimed that even near settlements with 
large populations colonial construction was limited by the 
availability of local building materials (1948: 164).
As mentioned previously, King Philip instructed his 
surveyors to investigate the availability of building 
materials near the Honduran corridor's port sites.
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Antonelli and Valverde extended this investigation 
throughout the length of their survey. Map 9 and 10 show 
the distribution of the materials reported by the surveyors. 
These materials can be grouped into several categories. In 
addition to building materials like stone, lime and wood, 
the surveyors, mindful of transport's eventual reliance on 
animal transport, appraised the distribution and quality of 
pasture and drinking water. They also noted the present and 
potential production of foodstuffs and livestock along the 
route. Cognizant of the power of precious metals to develop 
regions, they reported the mine locations.
Lime and stone deposits primarily were mentioned in 
association with bridge sites, some of which were discussed 
previously. These materials, Jorge Alvarado's despair 
notwithstanding, were available throughout most of the 
corridor. While addressing the fortification of the north 
coast, Antonelli reported that less than a quarter league 
from the Laguna de Alvarado, there was land good for 
"canteria [stone-cutting] y mamposteria y la piedra para 
cal" (1590: 9). These resources were also available at
nearby Omoa and Utlla. Beyond construction, stone was also 
sought for use as ballast on visiting ships (Antonelli and 
Quintanilla 1590: 6, 21).
Adequate supplies of stone and lime were reported for 
both Puerto Caballos and Golfo Fonseca and throughout most 
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road construction, is not surprising. As maps 9 and 10 
show, the transisthmian route closely parallels the paths of 
two streams, the Rio Goascoran and Rio Humuya. Both streams 
have deposited smooth, rounded stones along much of their 
respective courses. Because the few sections of stone 
pavement that remain throughout the corridor contain stones 
identical to those in the streams, it is likely that the 
stream beds provided cobbles for the road. The close 
proximity of the road to those stream channels provided for 
a cheaply transported essential material.
As already mentioned, transport of lime and stones was 
expensive. Therefore road locations that lacked those 
materials were a liability. However, in the few instances 
where lime or stones were not readily available along the 
corridor, the surveyors reported that ample wood stores 
could be substituted for construction. In the case of the 
bridge over the Rio Blanco, Valverde listed "madera de 
cacao, robles y encino” (1590: 5). In a more general
manner, Antonelli described the composition of the forested 
slopes that lined corridor. Between Comayagua and Meambar 
he saw both mixed pine and oak forests ["pinos y robles 
revueltos" ], and pine forests ['‘pinares claros"] (1590: 14). 
The slopes that surround the Comayagua valley contained 
"pinos, robles, cedros y arbole que dan balsamo y aceite de 
liquidambar [Liquidambar styraciflua]" (Antonelli and 
Quintanilla 1590: 15). Wood from these forests served a
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number of purposes. As already noted, they were used for 
construction of structures like bridges. They were also 
used for houses and cart construction. Beyond use as a 
building material, wood also provided fuel for lime kilns 
and for smelting.
Another use of wood that was more directly related to 
transisthmian transport, was the production of naval 
supplies. While describing the potential of Golfo Fonseca 
as a major Pacific port, Antonelli listed among its 
advantages the presence of forests on the "serranias 
[ridges] de Teculicelo" where "se hace cantidad de brea y 
alquitran" [one could secure a quantity of pitch and tar] 
(1590: 24). Brea and alquitran stores were necessary for 
sealing the hulls of ship. Choluteca, one day's journey to 
the east from the route's Fonseca terminus, also possessed 
a source of pitch, in addition to masts. Brea and alquitran 
were commonly collected from pine trees by tapping them or 
by burning them. The naval resources found in the abundant 
pine forests near Choluteca and extending southward 
contributed to the early emergence of Realejo as a Pacific 
port.
Sustenance
As map 12 shows, non-woody vegetation was also of 
interest to the surveyors, especially Antonelli. From San 
Pedro south to Fonseca, he noted the presence of "pasto y 
agua” (1590: 11-18). North of San Pedro the route crossed
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densely vegetated, low swampy areas that supported no 
pasture grasses. Because recuas of mules and teams of oxen 
required pasture as did cattle, the lack of pasture in the 
region surrounding Puerto Caballos was among its more 
troubling disadvantages. Nevertheless, the remainder of the 
route was favored by available forage. Animal-powered 
transport across the corridor was further supported by the 
Spaniards' distinctive use of pastures, untilled lands and 
field stubble. A Castilian tradition that was transported 
to Latin America held that grass being "a gift of nature” 
was free and available to all (Chevalier 1970: 86). Thus, 
the simple presence of pasture along the route ensured that 
transisthmian travelers's beasts would have some food.
Map 12 also demonstrates the surveyors' attention to the 
route corridor's present production of foodstuffs and 
cattle. This information was necessary to determine the 
corridor's capacity to support transisthmian transport and 
contribute to such trade. Similar to the distribution of 
pasture, production of foodstuffs was limited to the portion 
of the corridor that stretched south from near San Pedro to 
Fonseca. Indians, distributed throughout a series of 
pueblos from Aramani to Fonseca, represented the primary 
producers of the maiz, legumes, wheat and other crops that 
Antonelli and Valverde observed. Spanish vecinos and some 
Indian caciques raised the corridor's livestock, including
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ganado mayor [cattle, horses and mules], ganado menor 
[sheep, goats and pigs].
The surveyors' description of the Comayagua valley is 
worth considering in some detail because this large 
relatively well-watered upland near the corridor's center 
was viewed as a primary source of essentials such as food, 
cattle and mules among other items. Antonelli believed that 
were this valley populated with Spanish farmers it "podrla 
proveer a doce y catorce leguas de ambas partes del camino" 
(1590: 16). Hence, up to 28 leagues of an approximately 67 
league transisthmian passage could be provisioned by this 
central valley.
The Valle de Comayagua enjoyed all the advantages of 
the route segments that linked it to the north and south 
coasts. It was distinguished, however, from those portions 
of the corridor by its exclusive possession of other 
important features. Construction materials abounded. 
Within one league of ciudad de Valladolid de Comayagua, the 
valley's primary Spanish settlement, there was a stone 
quarry and lime kiln with a source of ample firewood nearby 
(Antonelli and Quintanilla 1590: 15). Valverde reported
that bridging the Rio Humuya would be relatively easy 
because there was "piedra y cal al pie de la obra, y la 
piedras muy cerca" [stone and lime on site and other stones 
nearby] (1590: 6). In addition, a plentiful supply of
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timber was available from the forests that cloaked the 
slopes that surrounded the broad upland plain.
In addition to the wealth of building materials, the 
valley was favored by the presence of productive mines. 
Antonelli reported that just one half league from Valladolid 
a mine yielded copper, silver, gold and lead (1590: 17-18). 
A mercury deposit 12 leagues away along the route 
contributed to the mine's productivity, as did the salt pans 
on the Golfo Fonseca (West 1958: 774). Antonelli reasoned 
that an effective use of the copper deposits would be the 
production of artillery. He, thus, suggested that an armory 
should be constructed at Comayagua. Its wares would supply 
the fortifications at Puerto Caballos and Golfo Fonseca, 
thereby reducing their dependence on expensive artillery 
from Spain. This plan was further supported by the fact 
that deposits of two ingredients of gunpowder, saltpeter 
(salitre] and sulfur [azufre], were also located near the 
settlement (1590: 17).
Valle de Comayagua was further favored and 
distinguished from the rest of the route by its production 
of foodstuffs and livestock. Antonelli reported that "todas 
las frutas de Castilla" [all the fruits of Castile] that 
were planted had flourished (1590: 15-16). In the cool
canadas [ravines] interspersed throughout the surrounding 
slopes wheat [trigo] was sown and produced 18 measures for 
each measure of seed. The fertility and climate of the
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valley itself supposedly allowed four harvests of corn 
annually. Other crops included numerous varieties of 
legumes, lettuce, onions, grapes and quinces (Valverde 1590:
6). According to both survey parties, the valley's 
agricultural productivity promised to increase in the future 
should the water in its numerous arroyos be channeled into 
crop irrigation.
Despite the glowing reports of the suitability of the 
valley for raising crops, at the time of the surveys cattle 
ranching dominated land use. Antonelli reported that the 
Comayagua valley and other valleys in the region supported
30,000 head of ganado mayor and somewhat fewer ganado menor 
(1590: 18). Valverde reported that 44 estancias [livestock 
ranches] located near Valladolid raised more than 12,000 
ganado mayor and 5,000 ganado menor (1590: 12-13). Ranchers 
benefitted from the valley's extensive tracts savanna 
grasses and numerous surface salt deposits (Antonelli and 
Quintanilla 1590: 15). Important for transisthmian
transport, 460 mulas [mules] were included among the ganado 
mayor. Antonelli reported that the valle de Comayagua 
presently could produce 600 pack mules annually and increase 
this total to 1,000 within three years. The engineer, 
however, believed that for transisthmian transport the 
valley should be used for raising foodstuffs (1590: 16). 
The livestock would, thus, need to be moved to other nearby 
valleys. As was the case in the early colonial period
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throughout Latin America, cattle destroyed primarily Indian- 
sewn food crops at will (Chevalier 1970: 96). This,
understandably, prevented thorough cultivation of the 
valley.
As was the case throughout the corridor, valle de 
Comayagua's productivity and capacity for provisioning 
transisthmian transport also depended upon an increase in 
the valley's population. According to Antonelli, all that 
the valley lacked was for "Vuestra Majestad les socorriese 
con negros" [Your Majesty to aid the region with a supply of 
African slaves] (1590: 16). The Africans, in this case, 
were intended to replace Indian labor in the mines so that 
the Indians could work in the fields. Beyond African slaves 
and Indian agriculturalists, Appendix D shows that Antonelli 
also felt that 400 to 500 married Castillian farmers were 
necessary to support transisthmian transport.
The surveys by Antonelli and Valverde portray a route 
corridor that was relatively well endowed with the materials 
necessary for road and bridge construction. Stone, forests 
and lime could be found throughout the corridor. The 
transisthmian passage also possessed the potential to 
adequately provision transisthmian traffic with foodstuffs. 
Pasture lined much of the route. In many stretches the land 
was shown to be fertile. However, these areas generally 
were under-populated and, thereby, under-productive. Apart 
from resources related to transport, the corridor also
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possessed wealth-producing resources like mines. 
Realization of the corridor's potential required an increase 
in its population.
Mulas
Beyond infrastructure and sustenance, transisthmian 
transport required a means of conveyance. As mentioned 
earlier, the indigenous population of Latin America provided 
this means for much of the early colonial period. With the 
drastic decline in this population and the recurring 
regulation of Indian labor on the part of the Crown, 
widespread use tamemes gradually faded. Concurrent with 
this attenuation was the rise of animal-powered means of 
transport.
Aside from horses, which were used primarily for 
bearing Spanish riders, oxen and mules were the most 
prevalent beasts of burden. Teams of oxen or mules pulled 
carts of various sizes, with cart sizes depending on the 
cargo to be carried and the terrain to be traversed. 
Throughout much of colonial Latin America carts were small, 
primitive, low-cost vehicles operated by the farmers and 
miners who had built them (Ringrose 1970: 33). In contrast, 
valuable cargo, like silver from Zacatecas afforded large 
carts, like the large spoke-wheeled carreta [wagon], and a 
specialized class of laborers, arrieros [muleteers], to 
operate them as early as the 1550s (Ringrose 1970: 38).
This mining boom allowed the Spaniards to build an expensive
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cart road that led from the mines, across the grasslands of 
the Mexican plateau and on to Mexico City, and another much 
more difficult and costly road from the capital to Veracruz. 
The boom also supported the use of the more expensive, and 
swifter, of the two beasts of burden, the mule. Momsen 
(1963: 37) reported that a team of 12 oxen covered about two 
leagues per day, while mules could cover three to four.
Mule pack trains also transported cargo, particularly 
in regions that possessed tortuous mountain topography. 
Colonial Central America was included among those regions. 
Throughout its extent travelers in the cool uplands were 
plagued by, as Bishop Pedraza described it, "ascents to the 
heavens and descents to the abyss," while the tropical 
lowlands offered "mud up to a horse's belly" (1547: 7).
Faced with such difficult topography, not to mention 
climate, not even the riches from the mines of Peru could 
support a cart road across Panama. Instead, this passage 
and the rest of colonial Central America primarily depended 
on the sturdy, sure-footed hybrid of a donkey and a horse, 
the mula.
Prominent among the questions that Antonelli and 
Valverde sought to answer about Honduras' transisthmian 
passage was whether cart or mule pack train was most 
appropriate for transport. The surveyors' journey to 
Honduras provided them ample opportunities for making this 
decision. The tour that brought Antonelli, Valverde and
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other members of the surveying expeditions to the Honduran 
corridor led them from Havana to Veracruz where they planned 
improvements to the fortifications at San Juan de Ulua. 
Upon completing their work, they traveled to Mexico City by 
way of the previously mentioned cart road. It is possible 
that by that time, 1590, the road had degenerated to a 
simple mule path because mining in northern Mexico had begun 
to decline (Ringrose 1970: 48). Nevertheless, the surveyors 
gained the valuable experience of not only traveling but 
also mapping one of the period's and region's best roads 
(Iniguez 1942: 41). They continued from Mexico City, by way 
of Oaxaca, to San Miguel. This long, completely overland, 
journey necessarily exposed them to the region's lower 
caliber roads. Thus, before examining the Honduran 
corridor, the surveyors understood the region's modes of 
transport - cart, mule and tameme - and its paths for 
transport - cart road, mule trail and Indian track.
With this knowledge and that gained from their 
subsequent survey, Antonelli and Valverde agreed that a road 
for recuas was the best means of conducting transisthmian 
transport through the Honduran corridor. Mules, thus 
represented yet another essential transport resource. With 
uncanny detail Valverde and Antonelli itemized the amounts 
of this resource that were available and that would be 
required. A look at these projections and other information 
about colonial mule transport fleshes out an image of the
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dominant means of colonial transport in colonial Central 
America.
The first mention of pack mules in relation to the 
Honduran corridor came from the pen of Don Pedro de 
Alvarado. As mentioned in an earlier chapter, in 1539 
Alvarado sailed from Santo Domingo to Puerto Caballos. Two 
hundred of Alvarado's men opened a ten league long path in 
ten days that led from Puerto Caballos to Villa de San 
Pedro. Alvarado reported that the passage road was wide 
enough so that "podia ir una requa y venir otra" [two requas 
traveling in opposite directions could pass] (1539: 312- 
313). Alvarado's recua contained 24 mules.
For a number of reasons, it is doubtful that Alvarado's 
recua represented the standard size. Transporting these 
mules by ship probably limited the number that Alvarado 
could carry. The number was further limited by the fact 
that Central America did not yet possess a large mule 
population. In 1535, Fray Tomas de Berlanga, Obispo de 
Panama, reported that even the crucial Panama crossing 
suffered from a scarcity of beasts of burden [cabalgaduras] 
(1535a: 533). Four years later, Juan de Lerma (1539)
complained to the King that in contrast to Honduras' lack of 
recuas, Nueva Espana possessed a surplus of recuas and roads 
for them, recuas and roads that Honduras desperately needed.
In 1545, a letter by Don Francisco de Marroquin, Obispo 
de Guatemala, suggested that the region had sufficiently
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increased its population of beasts of burden. The bishop, 
advised the King that in light of a recent royal prohibition 
on the use of Indian bearers, and because the region 
possessed
mucha superabundances ... de cavallos y yeguas y bueyes 
y carretas con que se podra sustenar la contracion
[an abundance of horses, mares, oxen and wagons to 
support trade] (1545: 438)
he should mandate that roads be opened and maintained. The
bishop appears to have been either overly optimistic or
completely ignored, or both. Two years later, treasury
officials reported that no roads had been opened and that
travel was difficult (MacLeod 1973: 120). Nevertheless, in
1549, a colonial inspector in Honduras reported to the Crown
that in that province trade depended upon mule pack trains,
and that more roads were needed (1549: 120). Thus, it
appears that, at this time, the region had sufficient
animals to support pack train transport, not cart traffic.
Once a mainland supply of mules had developed, recuas 
seem to have numbered between 40 and 60 mules apiece. 
Thomas Gage (1958: 198, 200 and 309), the English friar who 
travelled throughout Mexico and Central America between 1625 
and 1637, reported in a couple of instances that in the 
1630s mules were divided into droves of 50 or 60. However, 
statements of his like "twenty recuas contain above a 
thousand mules" confuse the matter. A report from Momsen 
(1963: 37) that mule trains in colonial Brazil consisted of
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seven to eleven mules further fluster attempts at 
generalization. Nevertheless, Antonelli (1590: 28) in his 
projections of the needs for transisthmian transport, 
Appendix D, assigned one foreman [capataz espanol] to every 
40 mules.
The question about recua size notwithstanding, as trade 
and the mule population of Central America grew, certain 
regions emerged which specialized in the raising of mules 
and the leading of recuas. Gage's statement quoted in the 
paragraph above referred to one such region. At the time of 
Gage's visit to the Valley of Mixco and Pinola, located near 
the present site of Guatemala City, mules from this area 
were used to carry cargo all over the region; including to 
and from Santiago de Guatemala and the port at Santo Tomas. 
Owners of recuas kept African slaves, "Blackamoors" in the 
language of Gage, to work their mules. Gage (1958: 198) 
noted one Spaniard who owned six recuas of 60 mules and 100 
slaves to work them. Indians were also allowed to be 
reparted for recua labor (Felipe II 1609: 300). Some
Indians also appear to have enriched themselves in mule 
trade and transport. According to Gage (1958: 200),
included among the inhabitants of the town of Mixco where 
"some rich Indians, who have learned of the Spaniards ... to
traffic with mules unto the gulf," and that "the constant
passage through [the town of Mixco] of these recuas, of rich 
merchants, of all passengers that go and come from Spain,
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hath made it very rich". West and Augelli (1976: 289) noted 
other mule-raising areas in Central America. They include: 
Comitan in the highlands of Chiapas, which furnished mules 
for transport between Mexico and Guatemala; and Choluteca in 
southeastern Honduras, which provided mules for Panama's 
transisthmian passage.
Aware of the importance of beasts of burden, King 
Philip instructed his surveyors to determine their 
availability throughout the corridor, their price and the 
status of pasture and grain for their sustenance (Bonilla 
1955: 225). Table 2 shows the results of Valverde's mule 
count. Table 3 shows the grain tally.
As stated earlier, the surveyors, especially Antonelli, 
provided highly detailed projections of the corridor's 
transport needs. Antonelli's projections are summarized in 
Appendix D. A glance at the projections immediately reveals 
that the region's 2600 mules fell far short of the 16,660 
that Antonelli believed transisthmian transport required. 
Antonelli's number was based on the approximate weight of 
merchandise that one fleet ["flota de tierra firmeM] would 
carry to Puerto Caballos annually, and on the distance the 
merchandise would need to be carried. That weight was
11,000 toneladas [tons]. The distance was 67 leagues.
Antonelli figured that each ton of cargo would be 
divided into eight approximately 255 pound units called 
cargas. Thus, each year the fleet would bring 88,000 cargas
235
Table 2. Mule Population 1590
Location________________ Mule Population 1590
Ciudad de Guatemala 400
Ciudad de San Salvador 250
Ciudad de San Miguel 240
Ciudad de Gracias a Dios 240
Ciudad de Comayagua 460
Villa de Choluteca 600
Ciudad de San Jorge 180
Ciudad de Segovia 150
Ciudad de San Pedro 80
Ciudad de Chiapas 300
2600
Source: Bonilla 1955: 238-245.
Table 3. Grain Production 1590
Location Mai 2 Triao
(fanegas) (fanegas)
Ciudad de Guatemala 
Ciudad de San Salvador 
Ciudad de San Miguel 
Ciudad de Gracias a Dios 
Ciudad de Comayagua 
Villa de Choluteca 
Ciudad de San Jorge 
Ciudad de Segovia 
Ciudad de San Pedro 
Provincia de Verapaz 














Source: Bonilla 1955: 238-245.
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to be carried across the isthmus. Antonelli suggested the 
enterprise would require 14,660 mules. Each mule would 
carry one carga and would make six transisthmian trips. In 
addition there was a need for 2000 mules in reserve.
The 255 pound carga exceeded the 8.5 arrobas, or 212 
pound, load limit that the Crown later mandated for mules 
loading at Venta de Cruces on the Panama crossing (Felipe II 
1614: 57). However, the carga represented far less of a 
burden than the 400 pound loads that Gage commonly saw in 
Guatemala (Gage 1958: 195). As mentioned in Chapter Six, 
tameme, the beasts of burden that mules only gradually 
.replaced, were not to be required to bear a load weighing 
more than two arrobas (Carlos 1538: 288-289).
The 67 league crossing Honduras would have required 
approximately 25 days. This conservative estimate is based 
upon Momsen's (1963: 37) previously mentioned estimate that 
fully packed mules could travel three to four leagues daily. 
Assuming that the galleons arrived in the Spring at Puerto 
Caballos instead of Cartagena and Porto Bello, and that the 
Honduran recuas departed from the port on the first of April 
with the first of their six cargas, they would not have 
completed their toil until the first of the next year's 
February. During those ten months, the recuas and reserve 
mules and the arrieros' horses would have consumed more than
100,000 fanegas [Spanish bushel] of corn daily, not to 
mention the food and required by 366 arrieros and their
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2,993 slaves. A comparison of Antonelli's projections with 
Valverde/s survey of mules and grain demonstrates how ill- 
equipped the Honduran corridor was to accommodate animal- 
powered transisthmian transport in 1590.
Assuming that the Crown had allowed transport 
exclusively by tamemes, and that each Indian carried a carga 
of two arrobas for three leagues per day, Antonelli's model 
of transisthmian transport would have required almost 75,000 
Indians. The previous discussion of the corridor's 
population distribution immediately precludes any rational 
consideration of this means of transport. Thus, corridor's 
general lack of population, grain and mules explain why 
Antonelli emphasized the need to settle the corridor with 
farmers, stockmen and African slaves.
This calculation of the time of transisthmian transport 
demonstrates one of the important differences between travel 
across Honduras and Panama. As noted in Chapter Two, a 
completely overland crossing of Panama required less than 
five days. Thus, with the same number of mules, only two 
months were required for transporting all of the merchandise 
from Porto Bello to Panama. In Honduras it required ten 
months. The complete Spain - America - Spain cycle normally 
required ten months. This difference in the time of travel 
mitigated the importance of Hermosilla's claim that mules 
were three times more expensive in Panama than in Honduras 
(Bonilla 1955: 224). Thus, regardless of the foul nature of
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the crossing, the Panama passage required shorter work 
periods for recuas, arrieros and slaves. Hence, less food 
was required, less port warehouse time, too. This all 
contributed to drastically less expensive transisthmian 
transport.
Thus, although favored by a well-watered route with 
ample "buen pasto" from the region's savannas and the 
potential to increase its mule supply, the Honduran corridor 
was too long to compete with the efficiency of the Panama 
passage. Nevertheless, mule-raising areas emerged or 
persisted around Gracias a Dios, Choluteca, San Miguel and 
Golfo Fonseca. The mules supplied mines at Tegucigalpa and 
Guascaran, transport needs within Honduras, and 
transisthmian transport across Panama (MacLeod 1973: 126). 
Thomas Gage (1958: 309) reported seeing "six recuas from San 
Salvador and Comayagua only, laden with silver, which was 
the King's tribute from that country" in 1637.
Ventas
Beyond roads, mules and pastures, colonial pilgrims 
needed places to rest and succor themselves and their 
beasts. A system of ventas, posadas and mesones [roadside 
inns] filled this need. Understanding these roadhouses 
benefits from a look to the Old World.
In fifteenth century Spain, la santa hermandad [Holy 
Brotherhood] was a royal police force that tried and 
punished, without appeal, people who were accused of
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committing crimes in rural areas in general, and along roads
in particular (Lunenfeld 1970: 9). The ventas that were
interspersed along the roads also fell within the
hermandad's jurisdiction. Ventas were inns that were
supposed to provide travelers the opportunity to purchase
food and shelter. However, they were notoriously hostile
hostels. Proprietors, venteros, commonly charged exorbitant
prices for their wares and services (Pidal 1951: 73). To
rectify the situation the hermandad decreed that
los viandantes sean dados en cada lugar que llegaren, si 
quisieren comer y beber y dar de comer a sus bestias, 
pan y vino y cebada y las otra cosas que quisieren 
comprar y hubiere en el lugar para vender
[pilgrims who want food and drink for themselves and 
their beasts should be sold bread, wine and barley etc. 
in every place they visit] (Ldpez Martinez 1921: 32).
Beyond providing sustenance for viandantes and their beasts,
the ordinance required reasonable prices.
La santa hermandad notwithstanding, at the end of the 
fifteenth century the ventas were in such a poor state and 
posed such impediments to travelers that the Crown attempted 
a solution. In response to the venteros' claims that the 
tax imposed on their sales prevented them from offering 
adequate service, the Crown exempted them from the sales 
tax. King Ferdinand later went so far as to offer 
prospective venteros free land for constructing ventas and 
raising crops, especially in the lands recently reconquered 
from the Moors (Pidal 1951: 74).
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Despite these inducements, roguish venteros remained
the rule in the sixteenth and seventeenth century. In 1560
Philip II repeated la santa hermandad's earlier decree
(Pidal 1951: 87). And in 1616 the count of Gondomar wrote
that all classes and nationalities of traveling merchants
were robbed and maltreated because of the lack of safe inns.
The count, therefore, claimed that
es menester caminar en Espana con bota y alforja y 
dormir en el suelo como por los desiertos de Armenia
[it is necessary to travel in Spain with wine flasks and 
knapsacks and sleep on the ground like in the deserts of 
Armenia] (Pidal 1951: 88).
The count also regionalized the qualities of ventas. The
ventas of the north practiced policies of gratification and
abundance in direct opposition to craven corruption of those
of the south.
Despite their spotty service, ventas were unavoidable 
elements of travel in Spain. Pidal noted that the necessity 
of their function, and the travails and the occasional 
support that they provided travelers caused ventas to be 
immortalized in Spanish literature (1951: 88). Some of the 
more celebrated ventas owed their notoriety to their 
strategic positions. For example, the road between Toledo 
and Cordoba crossed extensive unpopulated stretches. 
Conveniently located in its path over the sierra Calderina, 
were two ventas, Darazutan and la Zarzuela. These inns had 
been constructed on the sierra's opposite slopes and, thus, 
provided resting places for travelers preparing to climb or
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having descended the sierra's summit. A traveler described 
a typical venta as a humble house that offered weary 
travelers
dos miseras estancias arriba, abajo una y un pa jar 
[bar] tiene una chimenea en la sala baja, que sirve de 
cocina, y alii hubimos de pasar la noche bestias y 
personas juntamente
[two miserable upstairs rooms, one downstairs room and 
a stable. A hearth in the downstairs room serves as 
the kitchen. In this place we spent the night, people 
and beasts under one roof] (Pidal 1951: 89).
Similar to the repeated references to ventas in Spanish 
literature, mentions of ventas appear frequently in colonial 
documents and the Recopilacion. This is not surprising. As 
we saw in chapter four, settlements that fulfilled similar 
functions existed in the New World prior to the arrival of 
the Spaniards. And, as has been demonstrated throughout, 
colonial pilgrims in Latin America also traveled great 
distances, often through depopulated or unpopulated regions. 
These pilgrims also required sustenance.
As mentioned in chapter one, Rees (1975) employed a 
series of nine regularly-spaced ventas to reconstruct the 
camino real that led from Veracruz to Mexico City. These 
settlements were established between 1525 and 1527, 
relatively early in the history of Nueva Espana. The early 
start to the work reflects the importance of the ventas to 
travel. Rees (1975: 330) envisioned the ventas as "fixed 
points" that anchored an anastomosing network of wet and dry 
season trails, shortcuts and mulepaths.
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Barber (1932) noted that during the early stages of 
conquest and settlement in the New World the Spanish 
substituted Indian pueblos for ventas. The numerous laws 
regulating Spanish use of these pueblo-ventas indicate that 
this substitution obtained, at least, throughout the 
sixteenth century. Travelling Spaniards merchants were 
limited to a stay of three days in the pueblos (Felipe III 
1600: 212). During their stay in the pueblos, the
caminantes [travellers] were prohibited from taking anything 
from the Indians by force and required to pay for everything 
that they required (Carlos 1528: 213). In an apparent
attempt at preventing abuse of the pueblo-ventas, local 
encomenderos and were not allowed to own houses in, or to 
lodge in pueblos (Felipe III 1618: 266). Likewise their 
family, guests and servants were prohibited from staying the 
night in a pueblo-venta (Carlos 1550: 266-267).
As demonstrated previously, the pre-Columbian networks 
of roads and paths did not completely satisfy colonial trade 
flows. And so colonial roads were constructed. These roads 
did not always pass near Indian pueblos. Ventas, thus, 
emerged to serve travelers on these roads. These new ventas 
were manned by Indians and Spaniards. Repartimiento labor 
was made available for maintenance of ventas (Felipe III 
1609: 300). The labor included provision, but not the
service, of bread, wine and meat to travelers, and grain to 
their beasts (Felipe II 1595: 300). Similar to the pueblo-
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ventas, travelers were required to pay the Indians for their 
wares (Felipe II 1563c: 300). In the absence of a venta, 
travelers were permitted to lodge in the house of an Indian, 
with payment required of course (Felipe II 1563a: 213).
Spanish ownership of ventas can be implied on the basis 
of decrees in the Recopilacion intended to correct abuses on 
the part of ventero. It seems unlikely that Indians 
reparted to ventas had the power to exploit wayfaring 
Spaniards.
Apparently the similarities of travel in Spain and her
New World colonies extended to the roguish management of
ventas. The following decree from the Recopilacion contains
language almost identical to that of the decrees directed to
venteros in Spain.
Mandamos a los Vireyes, Presidentes, Gobernadores, y 
Justicias, que den las ordenes convenientes, para que en 
las posadas, mesones y ventas, se den a los caminantes 
bastimentos, y recaudo necesario, pagandolo por su justo 
precio, y que no se les hagan extorsiones, ni malos 
tratamientos, y todos tengan arancel de los precios 
justos, y acomados al tragin, y comercio
[We mandate to the Viceroys, Presidents, Governors and 
Justices that they legislate that inns must provide 
travellers provisions at reasonable prices, without 
maltreatment and with a proper tariff, and accommodate 
trade and commerce] (Carlos 1538b: 56).
Beyond extortion and maltreatment Spanish venteros also
occasionally terrorized pilgrims who, ever seeking more
direct passages, rejected established lines of movement for
newer, shorter routes. Such a situation reduced the
original ventas to river ports whose channel had wantonly
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meandered away from them; thus, leaving them high and dry,
obsolete. In response to traveling merchants' complaints
about the barrier that such vengeful acts posed for trade,
the Crown decreed that innkeepers must
provean lo que convenga, para que cad a uno pueda caminar 
con libertad por donde quisiere
[provide for those who come, so that every one may 
travel freely wherever they wish] (Felipe II 1568: 56- 
57) .
This portrayal of ventas in colonial Latin America 
leans heavily on decrees found in the Recopilacion. Sherman 
(1979: xi) has expressed his skepticism about conclusions, 
drawn from such a body of literature because it records the 
"royal putative intent" rather than what actually happened. 
Such a caution is well-founded. However, the "royal 
putative intent" offers an image, admittedly idealized, of 
the workings of colonial society. Because these decrees 
were corrective in nature, one also can employ them to 
construct an implied negative image, one that highlights the 
abuses of colonial society. These two images, taken 
together, the one tempering the other, possibly approximate 
'what actually happened'.
Beyond the source and nature of labor, and the abuses 
associated with colonial ventas, another important and 
particularly perplexing guestion is: what determined the 
distribution of ventas along individual roads? As mentioned 
above, Indian pueblos were the earliest ventas. Hence, in 
the early colonial period the distribution of pueblos
245
matched the distribution of ventas. But did the dominance 
of the demands of colonial travel produce an alternate 
standard of venta distribution? Was there a standard 
spacing, according to the amount of time or distance 
traveled, between individual ventas? Could a pilgrim depart 
from a venta at dawn and arrive at the next one at dusk? Or 
would he have to travel two days and spend one night without 
shelter between ventas? I have found no document that 
referred to or legislated the distribution of ventas in 
Spain or her colonies. Nevertheless, an examination of the 
route across the Honduran corridor offers some insight into 
this matter.
As previously cited, Pedraza created an image of the
state of travel of Honduras in the 1540s. Travel between
San Pedro and Puerto Caballos was characterized as
el lod [mud], hasta las barrigas [bellies] de los 
caballos, y subiendo [climbing] muchas veces hasta el 
cielo [heavens] y descendiendo hasta los abismos (1547:
7).
The prelate complained, moreover, that these conditions were
aggravated by the lack of sufficiently populated Indian
pueblos and ventas along the journey:
porque como no hay mesones ni ventas como en Castilla, 
a cada paso cierto padecia muy gran trabajo
[because there are no inns like in Castile, at every 
pass one is certain to endure difficulty] (1547: 6).
More than forty years later Antonelli and Valverde 
discovered that those conditions obtained. Though rarely in 
explicit terms, the surveys of Antonelli and Valverde
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suggest that while examining the character of the Honduran 
corridor they had the matter of ventas in mind. The word 
venta appears but once in each survey. Antonelli suggested 
that for transisthmian commerce the corridor would require 
"caminos proveidos de bastimentos en las partes a donde se 
han de hacer ventas" [roads that would provide sustenance in 
those areas where there were inns] (1590: 16). Valverde 
indicated that the vicinities of the pueblos Lauterique, 
Apazapo and Goascoran were appropriate sites for ventas 
(1590: 7). In agreement with Barber's generalization for 
colonial Latin America, Valverde thought that those pueblos 
would help to provision the ventas during the early stages 
of their development.
The surveys contained additional information that was 
useful for planning the establishment of ventas. Cognizant 
that ventas, as well as roads, required labor to service and 
provision them, surveyors administered the previously 
mentioned census of pueblos that were located along the 
proposed route (see Table 1). Beyond Indian populations, 
the surveyors also noted the crops grown in each pueblo and 
the availability of pasture. More importantly, concerning 
venta distribution, the surveyors noted the distances 
between the route settlements. Table 4 is a compilation of 
these distances. Also included are travel times of other 
more recent foot and hoof travelers along Honduras' 
transisthmian corridor and distances measured from maps of
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Table 4. Distances Recorded by Travelers on Camino Real
Camino Real Seqaents Antonelli Valverde Munro Brady Map













San Pedro to Rio Chamelicon 1.5 L 2 L 8.5 km
Rio chanelicon to Rio Ulua 3 L 4 L 20 km
Rio Olua to Rio Blanco 4 L 5 L 18.5 km
Rio Blanco to Estancia de 
Armento
2 L 2 L —
Estancia de Arnento to 
Estancia de Medina
3 L —
Estancia de Medina to Aramani 1.5 L 4 L# 8 hrs.rf 19 km
Aranani to Miambar 4 L 4 L IO hrs. 9 hrs. 36.5 km
Miambar to Los Ranchos 3.5 L 4 L 5 hrs. 4 hrs. 15 km
Los Ranchos to Maniani 4 L 3 L 4 h r s . 14.5 km
Maniani t o  Comayagua 3 L* 3.5 L 1 day 26.5 km
Comayagua to Alauani 5 L 5 L 30.5 km
Alamani t o  Rancho del Obispo 5 L 4 L 3.5 h r s . 19.5 km
Rancho del Obispo to 
Aguangueterigue
3 L+ 3 L 3.5 hrs. 14.5 km
Aguangueterigue to Lauterigue 3 L 3 L 4.5 hrs. 16 km
Lauterigue to Aramecina 3 L 3 L 3.5 hrs. 16 km
Aramecina to Goascoran 3 L 3 L 3 hrs. 16 km
Goascoran to Estancia de 
Batres
3 L+ 4 L
Estancia de Batres to Rio de 
las Guacamayas
2.5 L+ 2.5 L
+ « "leguas largos* * = "leguas grandes" t = used when intermediate location was omitted
Sources: Antonelli and Quintanilla 1590; Bonilla 1955; Munro 
1983.
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the road that currently spans the corridor. The travelers 
include Dana Munro and the author.
This table shows that the surveyors organized their 
reports into segments of three to five leagues in length. 
These segments correspond roughly with the four to eight 
league intervals that Cobb (1949: 25) reported for the
spacing between Incan tambos. They agree more closely with 
Momsen's (1963: 37) previously mentioned three to four
league estimate day's travel on a loaded horse on the mule 
paths of colonial Brazil. Unfortunately, the league in 
these cases can not be readily converted to a measure of 
linear distance, and, thus compared. This is because the 
league was a measure that depended on a variety of factors, 
most importantly, mode of transport and the nature of the 
terrain. These factors varied in the preceding examples. 
Hence, one should hesitate from drawing conclusions about 
venta distribution on the basis these apparent similarities.
However, Valverde did designate Lauterique, Apazapo and 
Goascoran, three pueblos separated by three leagues, as 
venta locations. The organization of the surveys and 
Momsen's research suggest that three leagues represented one 
day's journey. Therefore, the route across Honduras 
apparently benefitted from a spacing of pueblos that 
mirrored the need for ventas.
There was, however, a large section of the route devoid 
of Indian pueblos. Valverde reported that in the 25 leagues
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between Aramani and Puerto Caballos:
no hay pueblos de indios y esta todo despoblado, salvo 
las estancias que hay en el camino que en la que mas 
gente hay/ hay un negro y tres o cuatro indios
[There are no Indian pueblos. The region is totally 
depopulated. With the exception of some ranches on the 
road which possess most of the people that there are, 
only one African and three or four Indians remain] 
(1590: 6).
Thus, instead of regularly-spaced Indian pueblos that 
existed south of Aramani, this section the route is 
punctuated by irregularly-spaced stream crossings and 
estancias, or hatos.
According to Chevalier (1970: 88), "estancia" was
coined in West Indies "to designate the point where 
wanderers and their flocks finally came to rest." It, thus, 
represented a grazing site. By 1530, use of the word 
evolved near Mexico City to mean a fixed grazing location 
for formerly free grazing droves, or hatos (1970: 88). As 
cattle barons increased the reach of their permanent 
squatting rights near Mexico City, hato faded from use. But 
in regions of the Latin America, like Honduras, where 
nomadic herding persisted hato and the early meaning of 
estancia persisted (1970: 88). Valverde used the two words 
interchangeably when discussing the Hato del Fraile (1590: 
5). Hence, it seems that "hato" was also used to designate 
a grazing spot. The names and presence of slaves at these 
sites suggest that Spaniards had been granted exclusive
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rights to these spots. Nevertheless, as sites for forage, 
hatos and estancias made logical venta sites.
Examination of a 1: 50000 scale topographical map of 
the Rio Ulua (Honduras, Carta Topografia: Villanueva, 1987) 
suggests that the Spaniards also chose river crossings for 
establishment of ventas. At the intersection of the Ulua 
and the path of the transisthmian road there exists a 
settlement called La Venta. As mentioned earlier, both 
surveyors felt that bridging this stream was impracticable. 
They suggested, instead, that a ferry be established. Such 
an enterprise, doubtlessly reguired permanent occupation of 
the site. It, therefore, is not inconceivable that La Venta 
emerged as a ferry settlement.
This inventory of the Honduran corridor's transport 
resources demonstrated the nature of early colonial 
transport in Central America, and informed an assessment of 
the corridor's capacity to support road construction and 
transisthmian trade. As has been mentioned, the corridor, 
although blessed with an abundance of inanimate resources 
like, wood, lime and stone, suffered from an underpopulation 
of productive farmers and mules to sustain transport. 
Moreover, the simple length of corridor undermined hopes for 
efficient transisthmian conveyance.
Nevertheless, however slowly, Honduras was settled in 
the early colonial period. Its inhabitants mined precious 
metals, raised subsistence and cash crops, raised livestock
and paid tribute to the Crown. Thus, people and products 
circulated throughout the province. Honduras' transisthmian 
corridor was vital to this circulation. The next chapter 






Although hopes for attracting the bulk of colonial 
Latin America's transisthmian trade to the Honduran corridor 
never materialized, early flows of labor, resources and 
wealth converged on and diverged from this passage. Puerto 
Caballos at the corridor's northern terminus accounted for 
much of this movement. The bulk of colonial Central 
America's population resided in the tierra templada 
[temperate land] of the isthmus' interior. Puerto Caballos, 
despite its significant deficiencies, provided those 
colonists one of the few Caribbean outlets to Spain (MacLeod 
1973:.26). Comayagua, a colonial capital, mining center and 
agricultural heartland located in the broad upland plain at 
the corridor's center spawned connections linking it to 
locations scattered throughout the mountainous interior. 
The corridor's southern one-third linked it to the Pacific 
coastal camino real, a route that anticipated that of the 
present Pan-American Highway. Muleteers and their recuas, 
loaded down with precious metals or reporting for service in 
Panama, followed this trail south through ports such as 
Iztapa, Acajutla and Realejo as well population centers like 
Leon, Granada and Cartago. Thus, although it rarely 
supported the flows that Montejo had intended, the 
transisthmian corridor, was incorporated into the colonial 
trade network. Moreover, it served as a trunkline for 
movement within Honduras. In this chapter we will track the
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development of Honduras' colonial circulatory system, noting 
its connections to the larger Central American network (Map 
11) and the tributary routes that emerged linking the 
transisthmian camino real to resource deposits located 
throughout Honduras.
Macleod (1973: 33) has written that a comparison of 
Central America's pre-Columbian patterns of transport with 
those of the colonial period demonstrates "amazing 
continuities in these patterns and routes." Among the route 
continuities are the series of trails that Cortes followed 
from Coatzocoalcos through coastal Tabasco, across the base 
of Yucatan and on to Honduras. Similar to the traces of the 
region's aboriginal maritime traders, Spanish shipping 
lanes, and those of predatory corsairs, also skirted the 
north coast of Honduras and led to the east coast of 
Yucatan. Antonelli (1590: 5) reported that Puerto Caballos 
still received corn, honey, wax and salt from the Yucatan. 
Both the aboriginal and colonial trade also depended on 
trails, roughly perpendicular to these east-west routes, 
that led from the relatively densely populated highlands to 
the Caribbean lowlands. Honduras' transisthmian camino real 
numbers among these. The journey of Fray Alonso Ponce 
(1873) in the 1580s demonstrated that on the isthmus' 
Pacific side a similar continuity persisted. Ponce's 26- 
day, 150-league trek from Guatemala City to Granada followed 
a coastal camino real that linked up an interrupted series
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Map 11. Primary Colonial Routes in Central America
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of Nahua-speaking settlements (1873: 357); thereby
suggesting that it was an aboriginal trace.
As mentioned in the introductory chapter, in his study 
of the established aboriginal routes and the initial Spanish 
passages that led from Veracruz to the Valley of Mdxico Rees 
(1975: 334) warned against uncritically accepting that
colonial routes were simply superimposed over aboriginal 
routes. Colonial routes served external trade and, thus, 
followed direct paths from raw material deposits to ports. 
Aboriginal routes served internal trade in a web-like 
arrangement of trails linking interior markets. These 
differences notwithstanding, within the Honduran corridor 
aboriginal and colonial aims appear to have indeed coincided 
to a significant degree. Aboriginal flows in the corridor 
were drawn to the north coast as were those of the Spanish. 
However, the indigenous folk of Honduras had new economic 
masters. With them came a divergence in flows with regard 
to the ultimate destination: from Chichen Itza or
Tenochtitlan to Seville.
A more appropriate discussion of colonial routes with 
respect to the Honduran corridor came from the previously 
mentioned Taafe, Morrill and Gould (1963) study of transport 
expansion in underdeveloped countries. These authors placed 
primary importance on the opening of the first penetration 
line from a port to the interior. This route would then 
serve as a trunkline from which farther expansion of the
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route network would extend. The authors identified three 
motives that have driven the opening of penetration lines in 
the past. Each of the three, to varying degrees, drove the 
colonial interest in the Honduran corridor. The motives 
included:
(1) the desire to connect an administration center on 
the seacoast with an interior area for political and 
military control; (2) the desire to reach areas of 
mineral exploitation; (3) the desire to reach areas of 
potential agricultural export production (1963: 506).
The insalubrity of Puerto Caballos7 environs defaulted its
claim to administrative importance. However, as we have
seen, the balance of the early Spanish military campaigns
into the Honduran interior repeatedly departed from this
poorly protected port. The remainder of this chapter will
demonstrate viability of the latter two motives.
Montejo Reconsidered
Adelantado Francisco Montejo demonstrated an early
understanding of the importance of the development of a
colonial land transport infrastructure in Honduras. Montejo
grasped that a system of roads would promote his province's
development by drastically reducing transport costs, by
alleviating the suffering and high mortality of Indians
bearers, and by opening the region up for settlement. In
letters to the Crown in 1539 he described some of the lines
of communication that would dominate movement during the
colonial period (Map 12). Transport on these connections
depended on trails. Montejo, thus, sought royal funds for
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road construction. Despite repeated pleas on the part of 
Montejo, other colonists and later colonial officials, these 
linkages remained, at best, mule paths into the seventeenth 
century and beyond. Map 12 is, therefore, an infrastructure 
road wish list and a trail map.
Montejo's plan included two north-south penetration 
lines. One line led from Puerto Caballos to the Gulf of 
Fonseca and linked three of the province's primary centers 
of population: Puerto Caballos, San Pedro and Comayagua. 
The other led from Trujillo to the mineral-rich Olancho 
Valley. Augmenting the Honduran corridor's trunk-line were 
several east-west lines that connected Gracias a Dios with 
Comayagua, and Guatemala City with Puerto Caballos (Montejo 
1539b: 251). Additional insights into transport flows
emerge when mining and agriculture are considered.
Mining
Relatively soon after Montejo's initial pleas, other 
colonists further sketched the region's network. In 1543 
Alonso Maldonado identified two new lines that needed to be 
opened: one from Gracias a Dios to Puerto Caballos and
another from Olancho to Puerto Caballos. The need for these 
roads was especially urgent because of the high mortality of 
Indian bearers that were forced carry loads of gold and 
silver from these mining locations in the temperate interior 
to the sultry vapors of the lowland coast (Maldonado 1543).
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Transport in sixteenth-century colonial Honduras was
dominated by mining, the region's most important colonial
economy. West (1958: 767) has noted that
during the colonial period mining set the pattern for 
much of the settlement of central Honduras: it 
encouraged associated industries, such as agriculture, 
stock raising, salt production, and trade.
The establishment of mining in Honduras progressed
chronologically and spatially from the early gold placering
in streams that flowed to the north coast, to the lode
mining of vein deposits in the mountainous interior.
Spanish placering on the Rio Aguan began as early as 1527
(1958: 768). Northern tributaries of the Chamelecon, in the
Quimistan valley, were producing by 1534 (Chamberlain 1953:
112). Placering also extended to the interior reaches of
streams. By 1531, for example, placers were established
around Gracias a Dios. More important than all of these,
were the gold strikes in 1539 on the Rio Guayape in the
Olancho valley. These were the richest gold placers in all
of Honduras (West 1958: 767). The gold washed from the
sands and gravels of this river spurred the region's period
of greatest mineral exports, 1539-1542 (MacLeod 1973: 58).
It was this peak in production that motivated Montejo's
plans for a road from Olancho to Trujillo. Indian transport
of this mineral bounty, despite the lack of such a road,
prompted Maldonado's earlier-mentioned request to the Crown.
Following a brief abandonment in the early 1540s, the
Guayape mines were reopened. These mines persisted as one
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of the Audiencia's largest producers of gold until chronic 
labor shortages brought about their decline by 1560, despite 
imports of African slaves, as many as 1500 in 1543 (MacLeod 
1973: 58). Thus, the chronic dearth of labor, even in
Honduras7 most productive areas, thwarted colonial efforts 
to establish an economy, much less an infrastructure.
With the exception of supply centers near the mines in 
Quimistan and Olancho, the wealth generated by placer mining 
did not translate into the establishment of permanent mining 
settlements. Regarding roads, the scattered distribution of 
placer mines and their short life spans precluded the 
expensive, labor-intensive, time-consuming construction of 
trunklines leading to the mines. Of the placer-mining 
areas, only the mines in Olancho would have warranted such 
a road, leading either to Trujillo or Comayagua. However, 
with no labor for the mines there was even less for road 
crews.
Because road construction linking the scatter of placer
mines was virtually impossible, the difficult nature of
ground transport required that a scatter of fundiciones
[smelting centers] be established. And it was only in
smelting settlements like Trujillo, San Pedro, Gracias a
Dios and later, Comayagua that mining-related activities of
a more lasting character occurred. At these places,
the gold was officially registered, the royal severance 
tax assessed, and the gold refined and smelted into bars 
(West 1958: 769).
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The focus of mining activities shifted from the placers 
of the Caribbean slope to the silver vein deposits of 
mountainous interior soon after the Guazucaran strike in 
1569 (MacLeod 1973: 148). The wealth of these veins and the 
difficult extraction of their silver fixed the focus of the 
Spaniards' economic endeavors on this region southwest of 
Tegucigalpa until almost the end of the colonial period. 
Officials previously had reported the presence of silver 
vein deposits near interior locations like Gracias a Dios 
and Comayagua as early as 1537. However at this early date 
the Spaniards possessed neither adequate knowledge of silver 
metallurgy and vein mining, nor absolute control of those 
regions (West 1958: 769).
In the eleven years after the discovery at Guazucaran 
the Spaniards discovered, or were led to, numerous lodes 
and, subsequently established at least 30 silver mines to 
the southeast of Comayagua (MacLeod 1973: 148). The supply 
center, and later administrative center, Tegucigalpa emerged 
within this region. The mines that surrounded Tegucigalpa 
"dominated mineral production throughout the colonial 
period" (Newson 1986: 151). The region's production quickly 
peaked in 1584 and declined gradually thereafter. As with 
placer mining the "most important cause of decline, however, 
was the lack of sufficient cheap labor in the mining areas" 
(West 1958: 771).
Mining silver vein deposits, by virtue of its longevity 
and productivity, established the earliest and most lasting 
pattern of settlement and colonial transport in Honduras's 
mountain interior. Similar to placer mining, interior 
mining settlements themselves were small and temporary. The 
asientos de minas [mining centers], administrative towns and 
the royal fundicion at Comayagua provided permanence and 
prominence in the colonial cultural landscape. Miners from 
a collection of dispersed mining settlements carried their 
ore to the nearest asientos de minas for smelting or 
amalgamation. Because of the interior's difficult terrain 
and the dispersed distribution of mines, miners used tamemes 
or mules for transport to asientos (Valverde 1590: 16). The 
refining of ore spurred additional lines of transport. 
Lead-free ores were amalgamated by adding lead (Newson 1986: 
155). Routes that led from lead mines at Agalteca to the 
north of Tegucigalpa and Chiquimula in eastern Guatemala 
thus were established (West 1958: 774). Another method of 
amalgamation involved the use of mercury and salt. The 
miners who could afford it secured mercury from 
administrative centers (Newson 1986: 156). Salt was
transported from salt pans situated just inland from the 
Gulf of Fonseca's coastal fringe (Bonilla 1951: 240), where 
the activity persists until today.
After amalgamation the silver was carried to the royal 
fundicion at Comayagua to be assayed for the purpose of
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assessing taxes. The silver was then melted into bars, and 
carried to Puerto Caballos (West 1958: 772).
Honduras7 colonial mining economy created numerous 
lines of transport. However, like the majority of mining 
settlements, especially during the period of gold placer 
mining, many of these lines were temporary. Interior shaft 
mining created more lasting routes. Mule trails connected 
asientos de minas with administrative and supply centers, 
which were connected to Comayagua and to the transisthmian 
camino real. Also, routes led to sources of materials used 
in the ore refining process.
Thus, similar to Taafe, Morrill and Gould7s model, one 
can summarize the Honduras7 colonial mining route network as 
a trunk-line, a portion of the transisthmian camino real, 
which led to the region7s interior. Mining expeditions 
departed from this corridor in search of vein deposits in 
the rugged, interior uplands. Successful mining ventures 
spurred the establishment of multiple secondary routes that 
led from mines, to asientos de minas, to administrative 
centers, and finally to Comayagua and the transisthmian 
corridor. The concentration of productive mines near 
Tegucigalpa impelled the trunkline to diverge from 
transisthmian corridor at the southern rim of the Comayagua 
Valley. From this location the camino real led to 
Tegucigalpa (West 1958: 773). Trails from nearby mines, 
lead sources, salt pans converged on the Tegucigalpa area.
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Similarly, Comayagua, site of the royal fundicion, attracted 
a collection of secondary routes that originated near mines 
remote from the Comayagua-Tegucigalpa link. In addition to 
secondary trails, colonial mining stimulated the development 
of other economic activities, livestock raising and 
agriculture (West 1951: 774), that further contributed to 
the colonial transport network.
Presently, Honduras7 primary north-south traffic 
artery, La Carretera del Norte, follows a path from the 
north coast to Tegucigalpa that is similar to the mining 
camino real. This coincidence is a testament to the 
importance of mining to the colonial economy. Considering 
the route inertia generated by the silver strikes around 
Tegucigalpa, it is tempting to move hypothetically those 
rich silver veins closer to the transisthmian corridor, 
between the Pacific Coast and the southern rim of the 
Comayagua Valley, and to wonder if Montejo's dream of 
transisthmian trade would have materialized. Because long­
term mining operations stimulated the development of 
agriculture and stock-raising, the concentration of mining 
activities along the corridor would have helped to meet the 
needs of transisthmian transport.
Cattle
The hypothetical shift notwithstanding, Honduras' 
colonial route network incorporated routes that linked the 
mines with cattle source areas. Stock-raising and
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agriculture developed in upland valleys, like Comayagua,
Liquitimaya, Talanga, Yeguare and others, that are
interspersed throughout the highland interior. Maize and
wheat were grown to feed miners and slaves. Cattle ranches
in these valleys provided
dried and fresh meat for food, hides for ore sacks, and 
tallow for candles used as illumination in the mines 
(West 1958: 774).
As discussed in Chapter Seven, the colonial economy depended
on mules for transport. Thus, ranches, especially those in
Choluteca, raised mules to supply recuas. The beasts also
powered stamp mills.
Stock-raising in Honduras began before the silver 
strikes around Tegucigalpa in the 1580s. Already in the 
1570s a cattle trade network served interior settlements 
like Comayagua and Gracias a Dios and the audiencia7s 
capital in Guatemala. The subsequent silver discoveries 
increased the demand on cattle in Honduras7 interior. At 
the same time Guatemala maintained its demand for Honduran 
cattle and offered higher prices than Honduran miners. 
Colonial officials in Tegucigalpa attempted to force cattle 
herders to fill Honduras7 needs before exporting their 
cattle. Nevertheless, this interregional competition 
instituted a semi-regular round of cattle drives from 
Honduras7 upland valleys west to Guatemala in the colonial 
route network (MacLeod 1973: 214).
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Antonelli and Valverde identified the Comayagua valley
as a ranching area with the potential to produce large
biannual mule herds. However, at the time of their surveys,
Choluteca was the region's dominant mule-producing area.
Choluteca's haciendas' produced 600 mules annually, the
balance of which were sent to Panama. Demand from interior
silver mining operations in Honduras also created a regular
flow of mules from Choluteca. The region's pastures also
supported cattle and by the seventeenth century the region
possessed 30,000 head of cattle (Antonelli and Quintanilla
1590: 25). Because there were no local markets for meat,
hides were their principal products of value (MacLeod 1973:
304). Despite the size of its herds, Choluteca was
marginalized because it was located
on the "wrong" side of Central America for this trade, 
and the transportation of hides across the isthmus added 
to the cost and cuts into profits. Moreover, the owners 
could not be sure when the fleets would arrive, or how 
many hides had been collected in any given year in 
Hispaniola, Cuba, and Jamaica (MacLeod 1973: 304-305).
Hence, cattle-ranching in the early colonial period appears
not to have been particularly dependent on Honduras'
transisthmian corridor and its trunk-line. Neither did it
create a regular flow of traffic from coast to coast.
Indigo
Aside from subsistence crop production and cattle 
ranching for domestic use, Honduran colonists also 
experimented with indigo production for export during the 
early colonial period. Production and trade of this low
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bulk, high value dye persisted throughout the colonial 
period. Trade in this plant product, however, peaked in 
Central America between 1580 and 1620 and thus represented 
the region's last great major export industry before the 
Honduran fleet was discontinued (MacLeod 1973: 176). In the 
seventeenth century and throughout the colonial period 
Guatemala financed much of its import trade by exporting 
indigo (Rubio Sanchez 1952: 325). Indigo, anil or
xiquilite, thus is counted among the early colonial trade 
flows.
Similar to silver vein mining and livestock ranching, 
indigo production in Honduras was concentrated on the 
Pacific side of the isthmus, specifically the tierra 
caliente [hot land] of the gentle Pacific slope. Nicaragua 
was an early center of indigo production and export. During 
the 1570s, Spaniards seized former cacao-producing lands on 
the well-drained soils of Pacific coastal plain for indigo 
cultivation and established obrajes [workshops] for dye 
extraction (MacLeod 1973: 178). In this manner the
colonists appropriated an indigenous industry in their 
search for a stable, valuable export product. Spanish 
indigo plantations extended from the northwestern corner of 
Guatemala to Lake Nicaragua (Smith 1959: 182). By 1575 San 
Miguel was exporting the blue dye. Indigo production 
eventually extended at least as far north as Aguanqueterique 
within the transisthmian corridor (Anonymous 1670: 324-12)
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and was produced on a smaller scale near Comayagua, 
Tegucigalpa, Gracias a Dios and Sensenti (Rubio Sanchez 
1952: 316).
Indigo production created several flows. Obviously, 
the actual transport of the dye to ports numbered among 
these, as did the flows of native labor to obrajes and 
colonial officials regulating that labor. Puerto Caballos 
was the primary port of exportation and thus it appears 
that, on their way north, dye shipments were funneled into 
the transisthmian corridor. The dye was then shipped to 
market at Havana (MacLeod 1973: 195). Peruvian merchants
also visited the region, some traveling as far as Puerto 
Caballos, to trade wine and olive oil for indigo (Hermosillo 
1589). During the 1630s cargoes of indigo also were carried 
by recuas to Granada and shipped on to Porto Bello by way of 
the Desaguadero (Gage 1958: 198).
Indians provided the labor for indigo production. 
Alarmed by the dramatic decline in the region's native 
population and the unhealthful conditions in anil obrajes by 
1563 the Crown prohibited the use of Indian labor (Felipe II 
1563d: 307-308). However, similar to previous royal edicts 
concerning Indian labor, the prohibition went unheeded 
(MacLeod 1973: 186). The emptiness of the law
notwithstanding, its putative intent did introduce yet 
another traveler into the colonial route network. By 1592 
alcaldes in the indigo-growing areas were required to make
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annual inspections [visitas] of obrajes in Guatemala (Smith 
1959: 187). By 1607 these tours had expanded to San
Salvador, San Miguel and Choluteca. MacLeod has claimed 
that the visitas represented a sort of corrupt theater in 
which poorly paid visitadores [traveling inspectors] 
accepted bribes from obraje owners in return for overlooking 
their labor abuses (MacLeod 1973: 186). Honduras7 national 
archives contain numerous complaints filed on behalf of 
coerced Indian obraje laborers that confirm MacLeod7s claim 
(see for example, ANH, Anonymous 1670: 324-12)).
Flows
Conquest, mineral extraction and agricultural exports 
were all served by Honduras7 transisthmian corridor. These 
activities, in turn, entrenched the transport trunkline 
within the corridor as a focus of early colonial economic 
activity and settlement. From this trunk-line, secondary 
routes branched out into the interior.
The development of interior silver mining directed 
extraction to the mountainous interior and opened up flows 
between mines and service centers and mills. An important 
extension of the transisthmian route was opened to connect 
the productive mines surrounding Tegucigalpa to the 
Comayagua Valley. Mining flows were further articulated by 
the livestock ranching and foodstuff production that emerged 
to supply miners.
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Livestock ranches and indigo plantations on the Pacific 
slope extended trade flows all the way to the Gulf of 
Fonseca. However, because of their proximity to the Pacific 
coast camino real, the prohibitive expense of transisthmian 
transport and the irregularity of the Spanish fleet products 
from these endeavors often flowed to ports and markets to 
the south.
Much as the continental divide near Rancho Grande 
separates the headwaters of the Rio Goascoran and the Rio 
Humuya, flows of overland transport within Honduras' 
transisthmian corridor also were cleft. Were the Puerto 
Caballos-Golfo Fonseca corridor divided into thirds, Rancho 
Grande, south of the Comayagua Valley's southern rim, would 
lie at about the two-thirds mark. North of Rancho Grande, 
streams flow northward into the Comayagua Valley, ultimately 
emptying into the Rio Humuya, the Ulua, which enters the 
Caribbean Sea just east of Puerto Caballos. As has been 
demonstrated, much of Honduras' colonial trade followed the 
path of the Humuya-Ulua drainage to the Atlantic.
South of the divide at Rancho Grande, the Rio Goascoran 
and its tributaries drain the transisthmian corridor's 
waters to the Gulf of Fonseca. Similar to the Goascoran's 
waters, indigo and livestock from the corridor's southern 
third and, Choluteca to the east, flowed to the south and 
east. Near the gulf, traffic could diverge to the east and 
follow the Pacific coastal camino real to Nicaragua. An
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alternative was to continue to the gulf, whereupon canoe 
transport was available (Ponce 1873: 375). Both means of 
transport led to markets in Nicaragua and beyond to Panama.
The next chapter demonstrates that the continental 
divide continues to mark an interruption in current 





A Collection of Trekkers
Although Montejo's vision of a transisthmian corridor 
bustling with interoceanic traffic and blooming with 
settlement did not come to complete fruition, travelers did 
cross the isthmus by means of the Honduran corridor and the 
camino real it contained. Fortunately, a few of these 
wayfarers saw fit to record their observations of travel 
through the corridor. Beyond the details of movement, 
travelers described the landscape through which they passed. 
With these records and related travel accounts we can 
construct a transisthmian travelogue that will capture the 
experience of travel on a colonial trunkline and portray the 
depression that stretches across Central America. For 
purposes of comparison, description of current transport 
along the corridor will be interspersed throughout the 
travelogue.
Among the travelogue's sources from the early colonial 
period are Antonelli and Valverde's surveys. Appendices B 
and C summarize these accounts. Other, previously cited, 
colonial documents provide additional information.
Latter-day surveys come in the form of E. G. Squier's 
(1858) promotional efforts on behalf of an interoceanic 
railway through the corridor, and the writings of a 
particularly effusive, if occasionally imprecise, latter-day 
writer-traveler on our transisthmian camino real, Mary 
Lester. Under the pen name of Maria Soltera, Lester
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described mule trip she took across the isthmus in the 1880s 
in A Lady's Ride Across Spanish Honduras (1964).
To the company of these two nineteenth century 
travelers can be added a class of travelers that I call 
Tramp-Geographers. Early in the present century these young 
men sought adventure and self-cultivation through travel 
south of the US border. Their excursions to Latin America 
can be viewed in the same light as the Grand Tour or 
Wanderjahr taken by northern Europeans to the Mediterranean. 
In both cases, the general direction of travel was south and 
the destinations' principal attractions were the remnants of 
antiquity. In the case of the Grand Tour, Europeans went 
south to crawl about Roman and Greek ruins. North American 
tramps went south to inspect the ruins of Aztecs and Mayans 
and to see their descendants.
Paul Fussell (1980) characterized these travelers in 
his book Abroad. For them,' "travel was conceived to be like 
study ..., the travel book ... a record of an inquiry and a 
report of the effect of the inquiry on the mind and 
imagination of the traveler" (1980: 39). As travelers, they 
were by necessity concerned with, and wrote about, facts 
geographical. However, unfettered by academia's decorum, 
their observations are often humorous and, at the same time, 
right on the mark.
Three representative examples of such travel writing 
are Munro's (1983) A Student in Central America, 1914-1916;
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Cunningham/s (1922) Gypsying Through Central America; and 
Franck's (1916) Tramping Through Mexico, Guatemala, and 
Honduras. Cunningham, Franck and Munro all visited Honduras 
between 1914 and 1923; hence, their observations are of a 
landscape that lies outside this study's period of inquiry. 
Nevertheless, because of the torpid rate at which Honduras 
developed, especially concerning means and venues of 
transport, and the travelers' preferences for foot travel, 
it is appropriate to use their accounts, as well as Squier 
and Lester's, as surrogates for still undiscovered travel 
diaries from the colonial era.
All three travelers commented on the nature of camino 
reales and the land they traversed. Franck (1916: 284-285) 
found that l!the difference between a 'buen caminor and a 
'mere road' is slight in Central America" and that "the road 
... seldom represents anything better than a rocky, winding 
trail with rarely a level yard." Both of these descriptions 
could be aptly applied to numerous stretches of the trans­
isthmian camino real.
A final source for the travelogue will be field notes 
that I recorded during my own tramp on the transisthmian 
camino real.
Puerto Caballos to San Pedro
San Pedro on the western margin of the Ulua Plain was 
connected to Puerto Caballos on the Caribbean coast by land 
and stream (refer to Map 1). In 1539 Alvarado made use of
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both during his second visit to Honduras. While some of his 
men hacked out a road, others floated their provisions up 
the Rio Chamelecon. Fifty years later Antonelli and 
Valverde identified two possible land connections, one a 
high road the other a low road. At a distance of
approximately 56 kilometers (34 miles), the low road was the 
longer of the two. It skirted the base of the Sierra de 
Omoa and led inland through the swampy flats of the Ulua 
Valley's northern reaches. Valverde (1590: 5) believed that 
a road on this section would be impassable during the wet 
season and still difficult during the dry season.
Beyond the potentially boggy roadbed, both surveyors 
found this area's vegetation to be an additional barrier. 
Much of the distance between the port and San Pedro was 
covered, in some cases totally closed, by a vegetation 
association that both surveyors called arcabuco. It seems 
likely that it was through just such an arcabuco forest that 
Alvarado's company swung their picks and axes. And that was 
the surveyors' remedy for this damp, dense thicket —  open 
a wide swath so that it might be exposed to the sun and wind 
and thereby dried (Antonelli and Quintanilla 1590: 12;
Valverde 1590: 6).
San Pedro is situated at about 100 meters of elevation. 
Hence, the journey inland followed a slight incline so that 
at about two-thirds of the way to the settlement, the low, 
moist arcabuco gave way to drier monte. The roadbed became
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adequate. Ample areas of sabana [savanna] suitable for 
grazing appeared.
In contrast to the low road's gentle grade, the high 
road led over the Sierra de Omoa, a steep climb of at least 
300 meters. In 1590, mule traffic could thread through the 
range's narrow passes and cover the distance between San 
Pedro and the port in one day. Conversely, the tedium of 
travel on the low route necessitated an overnight rest near 
Rio Blanco, a spot remote from sufficient pasture. Despite 
the savings the high road provided in time of travel, 
progress along this route was not without its own obstacles. 
Numerous arroyos crossed the route. During invierno the 
water in these rocky streams rose as high as a horse's 
belly.
An additional obstacle, at least for the foot traveler, 
was the precipitous descent out of the mountains and down to 
the Ulua flats. On a hike from the north coast settlement 
of Tulian over a present route that approximates the high 
road described by Antonelli and Valverde I encountered a 
woman with the unenviable task of ascending the sierra. We 
paused on the trail, the remainder of a joint-jolting 
descent ahead of me and a taxing climb facing her. Much as 
discussions among farmers regularly turn to the topic of 
weather, pedestrians' conversations usually visit the 
subject of the road or trail. The climbing woman, barefoot 
and with six kids in tow, confirmed Antonelli and Valverde's
279
surveys with knowledge gained from experience. For this 
woman, the camino arriba [high road] was worse than a 
11camino malo," even worse than a ucamino feo," she said; 
this was a "camino triste gue triste."
Valverde presented the Rio Chamelecon as an alternative 
to the high and low road. He envisioned a road that would 
connect Puerto Caballos to the river, from which point 
barcos propelled by palancas [poles] would carry merchandise 
the ten leagues up river to Hato del Fraile. Valverde 
described this stretch of river as calm as an estuary with 
a channel one and a half brazas (nine feet) deep and 60 
paces wide. In a few places the stream was choked with 
vegetation. However, once those places were cleared, the 
river would provide an artery in which travel was less 
subject to the rains of the invierno and the damage caused 
to roadbeds by regular traffic (Valverde 1590: 6).
According to Valverde's plan, Hato del Fraile would 
serve as a break-in-bulk point. Merchandise would be 
transferred from water transport to warehouses for storage 
or directly onto the backs of pack animals. In addition to 
its proximity to the river, Hato del Fraile was favored by 
ample pasture to sustain pack animals.
The utility of the low route has persisted. Currently, 
the traveler between San Pedro (now called San Pedro Sula) 
and Puerto Caballos (now called Puerto Cortes), can travel 
this route by rail or automobile. The railroad was built by
European interests in the 1870s. Although originally 
intended to span the transisthmian corridor's length, the 
railroad only extends inland from the port about 55 (88 
kms.) miles to Potrerillos near the southern vertex of the 
triangular Ulua Plain. It first offered regular service 
between San Pedro Sula and Puerto Cortes in 1877 (Leon Gomez 
1978: 178). Between that time and the midpoint of this 
century, this line spawned numerous spurs that connected it 
to the tropical fruit plantations interspersed throughout 
the plain. The early-rising traveler can still experience 
travel on this stretch of track. The Ferrocarril Nacional 
train departs the San Pedro Sula station most mornings at 
6:30 AM en route to Puerto Cortes (Photograph 2). Progress 
is suitably slow, primarily because of the train's frequent 
stops. The Honduran tradition of hailing a bus from an 
assortment of random locations rather than at a very few 
stops extends to rail traffic. The trip north leads through 
sparsely-populated pastures and infrequent hamlets. Yet, it 
seems that not a mile is covered without several riders, 
sometimes separated by less than 100 yards, appearing on the 
tracks with hands a-waving. Without fail the train forfeits 
its momentum and eases to a halt to accommodate the would-be 
passengers. After which, it once again struggles to get up 
to speed.
A venue that provides more rapid transport between 
Puerto Cortes and San Pedro Sula is the recently constructed
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Photograph 2. Ferrocarril Nacional, 1993 (Photo by author)
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northern four-lane, expressway-like extension of the
Carretera del Norte. This stretch of the corridor presently
is the primary focus industrial development in Honduras
(Davidson 1994: 324). The Carretera del Norte is a two-lane
highway with wide shoulders that connects Puerto Cortes with
Tegucigalpa. Much of its route coincides with that of the
transisthmian camino real. In the Ulua Plain the carretera,
like the railroad, follows the colonial low road.
San Pedro Sula to Meambar
Between 1914 and 1916, a North American student named
Dana Munro took the Ferrocarril Nacional to its terminus at
Potrerillos. Upon disembarkation, Munro's progress assumed
a colonial comportment as he left the train and mounted a
mule. He carried with him a pouch filled with silver
because paper currency was of little value in the sparsely
settled, poorly developed areas through which he would pass
for most of the rest of his trip. His destination was the
Pacific coast of Honduras. Munro captured the general
pattern of colonial transport when he summarized the
Honduran infrastructure of 1914-1916. He observed:
little communication between the coast and the interior, 
or between different parts of the interior. .. . Travelers 
had to go on horse or muleback, through rugged 
mountains. ... a few stretches of road existed for 
oxcarts, but elsewhere there were more less unimproved 
bridle paths (1983: 53).
Munro's path carried him over large sections of the
transisthmian camino real. After eight leagues and 10-11
hours on the back of a mule he arrived at the pueblo Meambar
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(1983: 53). More than three centuries earlier, Antonelli 
reported the full distance from San Pedro to Meambar as 19 
leagues. Valverde thought it was 21 leagues. According to 
map measurements, this distance is 61.5 miles (102.5 kms).
The lack of past landmarks obscures the exact path of 
this section of the transisthmian camino real. Only the 
three rivers, the Chamelecon, the Ulua and the Blanco, 
remain of the features noted by the colonial surveyors noted 
in 1590. Therefore, the route measured on the map was the 
route that presently is most commonly taken by foot, mule or 
four-wheel drive travelers.
The path leads due south from San Pedro Sula. The 
Chamelecon and Ulua rivers are the primary obstacles found 
along this level, if occasionally quagmirous, path. 
Antonelli and Valverde prescribed bridges and ferries for 
these voluminous rivers because fording could be delayed for 
several days during freshets. In addition, the surveyors 
suggested that low, wet spots could be readily avoided 
because the route followed the piedmont along the western 
side of the Ulua Plain.
After the Ulua crossing, the path veered to the 
southeast, away from the drier slopes, over more low, wet 
arcabuco lowlands. These difficult conditions obtained to 
the Rio Blanco, a tributary of the Ulud that also required 
a bridge. Two leagues beyond the Blanco travel conditions 
improved as the route ascended out of the bottomlands of the
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Ulua basin. This point marks one of the few interruptions 
in the transisthmian roadway's primarily fluvial course.
In the drier uplands the royal surveyors once again 
found ample pasture and reported the first sizeable 
settlement, the Indian pueblo called Aramani, since San 
Pedro. Aramani is the only pueblo from the 1590 surveys 
that has vanished from the route corridor. Assuming that 
the transisthmian route established the sort of spatial 
inertia previously discussed, it seems likely that the 
present settlement of Santa Cruz de Yojoa is located near, 
or possibly on, Aramani's former site. No documents 
support this claim. Neither have a couple of visits to the 
town for interviews with local historians uncovered any 
recognition of this toponym. The only evidence supporting 
my claim is that at least as far back as 1853 when E.G. 
Squier mapped his proposed transisthmian railway the road 
from Meambar to San Pedro Sula has passed through Santa Cruz 
de Yojoa. Almost 50 years later, the German geographer Karl 
Sapper (1902) trekked the length of the corridor along a 
similar route. Mary Lester's path also carried her from 
Meambar to Santa Cruz (1964: 250). Moreover, Santa Cruz is 
the only significant settlement between Meambar and San 
Pedro Sula that lies approximately four leagues north of 
Meambar along this route.
Beyond possessing a vanished pueblo toponym and 
departing from its fluvial course, the section of route
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between the Rio Blanco and Meambar is noteworthy on 
additional points. Within this section travelers first 
encountered the rugged, folded terrain that distinguishes 
the Honduran interior. Concern with stream crossings and 
wet roadbeds gave way to worries about climbing out of deep 
ravines and avoiding rugged passes. Vegetation changed with 
the terrain. Arcabuco thickets gave way to the mixed oak- 
pine forests that still cloak many of the country's interior 
upland slopes. Sections like this favored mule transport 
and diminished hopes for a continuous interoceanic cart 
road. The author's experience of this stretch of trail 
confirms the pertinence of Harry Franck's following 
description:
the trails of Honduras are like spendthrift adventurers, 
struggling with might and main to gain an advantage, 
only to wantonly throw it away again a moment later. 
(Franck 1916: 292)
Currently, motorized travel through the uplands of this
route segment requires four-wheel drive vehicles.
Meambar to Comayagua
From Meambar the trail continued to the southeast
through slopes cloaked in mixed pine-oak forests similar to
the previous section (Photograph 3). Presently transport
over much of this steep, rocky land is served only mule
trails. Cunningham (1922: 201-202) aptly described one such
trail as
a mere cleared track across the country, rocky and 
choked with dust, seeming to twist out of its course to 
find a hill to climb.
*sKW




Because the paths in this region often lead over resistant 
stone, sometimes even long-term transport fails to etch a 
clear trace. Strangers to the region can easily lose the 
trail. Fortunately, a telegraph wire often persists in 
sections of the old camino real that have long since faded 
from regular use. This peculiar example of continuous use, 
thus, provides disoriented trekkers a ready line of 
reference.
After approximately seven leagues of travel, the trail 
descends onto the savannas of the north-south trending 
Espino Plain. Accompanying the return to relatively flat 
land is the route's return to a major stream course, the Rio 
Humuya or Comayagua. This river is a tributary of the Rio 
Ulua. Thus, after quite a few leagues of steep climbs and 
precipitous pitches the transisthmian camino real returns 
travelers to a familiar stream. There are several possible 
reasons that explain why the Spaniards previously directed 
the route away from the Rio Humuya. First of all, the 
mountainous route, despite its difficult relief, appears to 
be more direct than a route that simply would have followed 
the Rio Humuya. A second possibility is that the 
mountainous route was favored because it allowed travelers 
to avoid the muddy lowlands that bracketed the Humuya's 
course and the stretches where the encised river lacked 
places along its banks to walk. Previous experience north 
of this section must have demonstrated the merits of
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progress over arduous, moist advance. The third explanation 
is simply that the Spaniards let the indigenous folk solve 
this matter long before they arrived. This course of action 
provided them with a somewhat entrenched trail and 
population of Indians along it.
The path of the camino real returns to the Humuya where 
it runs through the Espino Plain. From there, it continues 
south along the Humuya to the vast Valle de Comayagua. 
Comayagua to the Isthmian Divide
The Comayagua Valley is a north-south trending upland 
basin that occupies the transisthmian corridor's center. As 
a large, flat, sufficiently-watered interruption in the 
surrounding region's tortured topography, the valley was an 
obvious early focus of Spanish development. Early during 
colonization, Honduran interests promoted the Comayagua 
Valley as the greater region's capital, the central hub 
linked to population centers and resource deposits by a 
collection of spoke-like caminos reales. Beyond the 
valley's regional potential, the transfer of Spain's 
transisthmian traffic from Panama to the Honduran corridor 
would have catapulted the basin into prominence among New 
World urban centers. These plans, hastily sketched on 
parchment, must have tantalized men such as Monte jo and 
Cerezeda who were intent on developing their New World 
territorial allotments.
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Present travelers must experience a sense of relief 
upon entering the valley's northern reaches. After days, or 
hours, of climbing and descending and pausing at vistas that 
offered only disorienting views of scrambled cuestas and 
barrancas, the mostly treeless valley soothes the eyes. The 
foothills of the pine-oak forested Sierra de Montecillos to 
the west and the pine-oak forested Sierra de Comayagua to 
the east, though separated by 10 miles (16 kms.), seem 
immediately accessible. Even the 25 miles (40 kms.) of open 
country that separate Comayagua in the valley's northeast 
corner from the valley's southern rim appear to be easily 
spanned afoot or mounted. Elevated on the valley's border 
slopes, one views the valley as a map spread out before him. 
Where settlement often had been hidden in the tangle of 
slopes up corridor, in the valley the collection of grid- 
pattern communities nestled on the valley margins are 
readily perceived and the roads linking them traced.
Reflection on Montejo and Cerezeda's plans for the 
Valle de Comayagua as a bustling center of commerce, 
transport and government presents a stark contrast to the 
present situation. With its abundance of savanna grasses 
for pasture, the region developed into an early livestock 
center. However, in 1959 Carl Johannessen interviewed local 
cattlemen and learned that the valley's once lush savannas 
had experienced significant alteration in the recent past. 
The grasses that once had covered the valley had been
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intruded upon by dense thickets of carbon (Mimosa 
tenuiflora) and jicaro (Crescentia alata). Johannessen came 
away with the impression that in the Comayagua Valley he 
"looking on the last chapter of a long history of excessive 
grazing pressure" (Johannessen 1959: 113). Twenty-five
years later, thorntree thickets persist as prominent 
lifeforms in the valley.
Although the valley certainly remains an important 
agricultural region in Honduras, from atop a foothill or 
footloose on the camino real, it is distinguished by calm 
vacancy rather than bustling congregation. In contrast, the 
population of Honduras/ ill-sited present capital, 
Tegucigalpa, continues to swell. In response, the capital's 
central business district is increasingly paralyzed by 
congestion and asphyxiated by exhaust fumes while shanty- 
settlements climb up the surrounding slopes. The divergent 
development of these two colonial centers accentuate the 
untapped settlement potential of the original capital, 
Comayagua. Considering Tegucigalpa's overcrowding and 
Comayagua's vast spaces,, Honduras appears to be ripe for a 
capitol transfer.
Travel across the valley was easy. There were no 
slopes to climb, few streams to cross and an adequate water 
supply. The camino real generally followed the course of 
the Rio Humuya to the valley's southern rim. However, in 
the valley travelers were less dependent on the flat
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surfaces provided by the river than in the mountainous 
stretches of the corridor.
Present travelers can cruise the valley in the comfort 
of passenger or second-hand yellow school buses motoring on 
the Carretera del Norte. This highway rejoins the 
transisthmian route at northern end of the valley and 
follows a north-south path on the valley's eastern margin. 
The carretera is the primary line of attraction in the 
valley. Much of its length is occupied by latter-day 
incarnations of the economic actors Montejo had hoped to 
attract to the corridor 450 years earlier.
Regular bus connections to locations within the valley 
and beyond are available at freguent intervals along La 
Carretera. Produce vendors, pulperias [rural Honduran 
convenience stores] and brightly painted wooden roadside 
comedores [down-scale eateries] offer travelers sustenance 
while they wait for the bus to Ajuterique or Yarumela. 
Another group of food vendors specializes in serving 
passengers already on-board. In a manner similar to the 
tray girls of the early A&W drive-in restaurants, these 
vendors greet arriving bus passengers with food and drink 
hoisted up to their windows on a stick (Photograph 4). 
Other vendors, often children, steer a more direct course 
and simply board the bus with their wares (Photograph 5). 
To service automobile travelers, a series of modern chain 
service stations, complete with uniformly uniformed
Photograph 4. Food vendors along La Carretera del Norte, 1993 (Photo by author)
Photograph 5
°"-b°= J, U M  lWloto 293
294
attendants, have emerged along La Carretera. Such travelers 
not afflicted with "destination fixation" (Siddall 1987: 
314) can pass the night at one of several motels.
La Carretera departs the transisthmian corridor for 
good at the Comayagua Valley's southern end as the dominant 
flow of traffic veers to Tegucigalpa to the southeast.
The pueblo Lamani, at the Comayagua Valley's southern 
border, marks the point at which present transport along the 
transisthmian corridor departs dramatically from that 
enjoyed on the Carretera del Norte. From this settlement, 
the transisthmian route leads up into the pine-oak forested 
slopes that ring the Comayagua Valley. The terrain resumes 
its tortured character. South of Lamani, the corridor's 
inhabitants still are served by public transport. However, 
the buses are of a poorer guality, their trips less 
frequent. Annual grading, filling and resurfacing over the 
past five years have improved the road. However, erosion 
caused by the rains of invierno seasonally reduces the 
thoroughfare to a rocky, rutted and uneven road that offers 
only slow progress to travelers and accelerated wear to 
their vehicles.
Five leagues in 1590 and three and a half hours in 1993 
brought travelers from Lamani to the isthmian divide at 
approximately 740 meters above sea level. These five 
leagues tempered any hopes for a cart road that the flatness 
of the Comayagua Valley might have encouraged. The
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unevenness of the roadbed was further aggravated by the
torrents that coursed down the quebradas and over the roads
between June and December. These difficulties
notwithstanding, Squier, in his role as railroad promoter,
described the isthmian divide as a "beautiful valley, a
savanna, or natural meadow with cattle grazing" (1858: 688).
Presently little traffic passes over this difficult but
picturesque stretch of the transisthmian corridor.
Isthmian Divide to Goascoran
Except in size, as I have remarked before, the average 
Central American pueblo might have been poured out of 
the same mould as its neighbors up and down the road. 
The difference is usually in the size. Unless some 
peculiarity in the nature of the country has caused a 
change in the customary plan of town-building- 
development, rather, there will be the same rows of one- 
storied whitewashed adobe or stone houses and shops 
converging upon a central plaza, with the pole-walled, 
palm-thatched huts of the poor on the ragged outskirts 
of the pueblo. The spires of the churches frown down 
upon the plazas in every town I have seen, and it seems 
fitting that the pleasuring of these people, whose lives 
are so overshadowed by the padres, should be done 
beneath the shadow of the church-tower. (Cunningham 
1922: 203-204).
In this passage, Cunningham neither identified nor precisely
located these pueblos but a Latin Americanist field
geographer can recognize immediately the kind of places he
means. Within the transisthmian corridor, between the
isthmian divide and the Gulf of Fonseca, there are four
surprisingly uniformly-spaced pueblos that fit this model:
Aguanqueterique, Lauterique, Apazapo and Goascoran. Spaced
at four league, or ten-mile intervals, these towns occupy a
stretch of road that Antonelli described as "the worst ...
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there is from Comayagua to Fonseca" (1590: 10). The
consistent spacing of the pueblos surprises because it was 
achieved not in a vast plain like Comayagua, but on rugged, 
uneven slopes.
This stretch of the road follows the Rio Goascoran 
(called the Rio Rancho Grande near its headwaters) as it 
flows south to the Pacific. Bordering the Goascoran on both 
sides are slopes that reach some 1500 feet above the river's 
level in a matter of five to six kilometers. The 
aforementioned pueblos lay on the east side of the Goascoran 
nestled along tributary quebradas within three to four 
kilometers of the river.
The primary flow of traffic at the time of Antonelli 
and Valverde's surveys followed a series of senderos [foot 
paths] that connected the pueblos. However, because of the 
rugged nature of the terrain traversed by these paths, both 
surveyors agreed that construction of a cart road over this 
section would require considerable earthwork and prohibitive 
expense. They, therefore, scouted out and recommended an 
alternative route on the unpopulated right bank of the 
river. Remnants of this alternative, or some later 
incarnation, persist in the region's route network. 
Presently a gravel road leads west from Aguanqueterique to 
a sturdy automobile bridge that crosses the Goascoran. The 
road continues on to a pueblo called San Juan. From San 
Juan an extremely difficult road leads south, roughly
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paralleling another road on the river's east bank. This 
westbank road leads to this small region's largest 
settlement, San Antonio del Norte. The only other gravel 
road that departs, or enters, this San Antonio del Norte 
leads to the east across another bridge over the Goascoran. 
Just four kilometers past the bridge, this road intersects 
the route between Aguanqueterique and Lauterique. Thus, at 
some time, Antonelli and Valverde's suggestion was acted 
upon, if incompletely.
Despite Antonelli's dire description of the Goascoran's
eastbank's infrastructure and the surveyors' attempts to
avoid it, a few, albeit later, travelers discovered
desirable qualities on this stretch of road. Lester, while
on her leisurely mule ride through the corridor, judged the
area to possess
rock, wood, tree, shrub and water ... on a grand scale - 
all so to speak, the best of their kind; and the humble 
wild flowers, adorning the far-stretching fertile 
valleys which slope between the clefts, are rich in 
colour, and far from wanting in perfume. (1964: 164).
Several hikes in the hoofprints of Lester's mules in recent
years have demonstrated to this author the validity of
Lester's assessment.
Two hundred and seventy years after the royal surveys, 
another surveyor with a similar purpose visited this stretch 
of the corridor and arrived at a different conclusion. E.G. 
Squier, ever the promoter, raved about the resources that 
this stretch of the corridor had to offer for the
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construction of the transisthmian railway. Rather than 
emphasizing the route's difficult grade, Squier stressed 
trees.
At Aramacina the yellow pine appears on the hills, and 
at San Juan and Aquanqueterique it is to be found of 
good size and in inexhaustible quantities in the 
immediate vicinity of the road. The pine attains a 
size of thirty inches, and from 50 to 75 feet of 
altitude, differing in no respect from the best of North 
Carolina. The oak is also to be found in considerable 
quantities, as well as many other useful and valuable 
woods in any desirable abundance (1858: 689-690).
In addition to cross-ties, wood was necessary for the
numerous bridges that would be required to cross quebradas
and the barrancas they had cut. Squier envisioned the
Goascoran's tributaries as sawmill streams. Presently, the
southern pine line has been moved farther inland from
Aramecina almost to Aguanqueterique. The formerly forested
slopes now are crisscrossed by cattle terraces.
Interviews with elderly residents of Aguanqueterique 
revealed the changing nature of the area's roads. 
Presently, Aguanqueterique is linked to the Comayagua Valley 
to the north and pueblos to the south by a gravel road that 
residents call the "carretera." Although Honduras' highway 
department has regularly improved the carretera during the 
past five years, automobile travel on this road is still 
difficult during the dry season and occasionally impossible 
when quebradas wash out fords during the wet season 
(Photograph 6). According to interview subjects, the 
carretera is approximately 15 years old. Previously, pueblo
otograph 6. Automobile ford washed out during invierno, 1994 (Photo by author) 299
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residents used what they alternately called "el camino real" 
or, more recently, "el camino de las bestias" [road for pack 
animals]. Photograph 7 shows a representative remnant of 
this road's cobbled stonework. The roadway is approximately 
15 feet wide and often bordered by stone walls. Photograph 
8 shows a particularly incised stretch of this road. The 
incision provides evidence of the road's antiquity and that 
its path has become part of the region's drainage network.
In addition to its width and surface, the camino real 
differs from the carretera in the character of its path. 
Where the carretera attempts to follow the gentlest grade, 
the camino real follows a steeper but more direct path. 
This difference relates directly to the differing means of 
conveyance.
Between Aguanqueterique and Goascoran the carretera is 
paralleled by similar caminos de las bestias. Some possess 
intact stonework, others only traces. Occasionally, past 
routes coincide with the carretera. In such cases sunken 
traces intersect the carretera and, in places, its surface 
is interrupted by stone cobbles.
Apazapo marks the transition between the region's 
mountainous interior and its is narrow Pacific coastal 
plain. Near Apazapo the Goascoran's valley broadens 
significantly and the surrounding slopes fall farther away 
from the stream's channel. At this point the route improved 
as the land became more level. The path led south down a
Photograph 7. Stone-cobbled "camino real" north of Aguanqueterique, 1992 (Photo by 
author)
Photograph 8. Incised "camino real" north of Aguanqueterique, 1992 (Photo by author)
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gentle grade to pueblo Goascoran located directly on the 
east bank of the Rio Goascoran. South of this settlement 
the camino real led to the Gulf of Fonseca, its ultimate 
destination.
Goascoran to the Gulf of Fonseca
Just two kilometers south of Goascoran the Pan-American 
Highway, the present-day rendition of Fray Ponce's route on 
the old colonial coastal camino real, intersects the path of 
the transisthmian camino real. Ten kilometers to the west 
of this intersection, across the El Salvador-Honduras 
border, the Pan-American Highway encounters another north- 
south trending road. This road leads to La Union, El 
Salvador, the major port on the Gulf of Fonseca. La Union 
is Puerto Cortes' transisthmian twin. However, the El 
Salvador-Honduras border and recent hostilities between 
these two states preclude any significant and direct 
transisthmian flow between-these two ports.
At the time of Antonelli and Valverde's surveys 
apparently no major settlement existed on the Gulf of 
Fonseca. Accordingly, the Spaniards charted a route from 
Goascoran to the site they felt was most appropriate for a 
Pacific port. Unfortunately, the names of reference points 
that they used to locate this site largely have vanished 
from the current landscape and the map. Information from 
the surveys and contained on the map that resulted from
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Antonelli's survey (Map 13), however, does provide some 
general information about that site's location.
According to the surveys, both parties thought that the 
Pacific port settlement should be established to the west of 
the Rio Goascoran, approximately six leagues from the pueblo 
Goascoran and two leagues south of the Rio Cirama. High 
land was at this location in distinct contrast to the low, 
occasionally swampy, land that was traversed en route from 
Goascoran. The surveyors' map is misleading in that it 
overextends the route's north-south trend. Because of this 
mistake the proposed settlement site was drawn at the 
northern head of one of the Gulf's primary inlets, facing 
directly south. Actually, according to the distances and 
the mention of the Rio Cirama in the surveys, the proposed 
settlement site would have faced eastward much as La Union 
does presently. In fact, La Union appears to occupy a 
location near to that which the surveyors described.
Site location notwithstanding, a recent hike and 
dugout canoe trip demonstrated that this final stretch of 
the transisthmian corridor offered travelers a dramatically 
different ambiance. From Lauterigue south to the Gulf's 
shores, movement was achieved in the tierra caliente of the 
coastal plain rather than the tierra templada that prevailed 
over much of the corridor. Exhilarating cool vistas of pine 
and oak forested slope upon forested slope gave way to 
drudgery in the muggy, flat lands. Both Antonelli and
23?vifrt9)&]
Map 13. Planta del Puerto de Caballos de la Bahia de Fonseca y del camino que 
hay de un puerto a otro, 1590
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Squier described stretches of this land as savanna. 
Presently, portions of the rocky land between the Pan- 
American Highway and the Gulf possess all the meanness of 
the Comayagua Valley's carbon and jicaro without its 
moderate temperatures.
Progress across this hot land eventually brings one to 
water. For much of the Gulf region, this intersection 
between the Pacific Ocean and the mainland occurs in 
mangrove-lined tidal inlets [esteros]. The Gulf of Fonseca 
contains one of Central America's most extensive mangrove 
formations (West 1976). Though neither surveyor mentioned 
it, the morass of stilted roots must have presented an 
imposing coastal barrier. So much so, that it is not 
unreasonable to consider that the mangrove of the inlets 
might have persuaded the surveyors to site the port 
settlement to the west of the corridor's path on the Gulf's 
western margin on higher ground. In a nod to the merits of 
spatial and economic inertia, presently sections of the 
mangrove littoral have been cleared for the construction of 
salt pans. As was mentioned previously, Spanish miners 
exploited the Gulf of Fonseca for salt in the 16th century.
Travelers' ultimate vision of Honduras' transisthmian 
corridor required that they abandon the strictures of 
overland transport and take to the sea. Water-borne 
progress brings the traveler out of the confining mangrove 
galleries and into the open spaces of the Gulf proper.
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Amidst this watery expanse cone-shaped and other less 
symmetrically formed volcanic islands emerge like great sea 
turtles (Photograph 9). A glance back at the collection of 
similar contours to the north possibly suggested to colonial 
travelers that an extension of the mainland's tortuous 
interior had been submerged in the Gulf.
Prospect
With about 25 pages of text and several photographs, I 
have retraced one transisthmian trip along the Honduran 
corridor. Four hundred years ago the trip would have taken 
25 days for a recua loaded with colonial cargo. Presently, 
during verano in a sturdy 4-wheel drive vehicle with plenty 
of clearance, the trip probably could be made in a bone- 
jarring 25 hours. Within two and a half years a paved 
carretera will line Honduras' transisthmian corridor and the 
experience of colonial comportment will vanish from 
Honduras' transisthmian corridor while vestiges remain in 
the landscape.







This study is a historical route geography. Its 
emphases were drawn from an exhaustive review of historical 
route geographies. Themes that loom prominently in this 
body of literature include: the road or route's value as a 
cultural-historical artifact; the question of a road's 
origin, its persistence and influence on pioneer settlement; 
the strong relation between physical geography and the 
routes humans' have created to conquer distance; and finally 
the interdependence between routes and the technology of 
conveyance. This study has combined these themes. In 
addition, I have pursued the notion that it is useful to 
consider the road as a region in and of itself by virtue of 
the distinctive activities that surround it.
This historical route geography has identified and 
evaluated the constellation of human and physical factors 
that influenced the life of Honduras' transisthmian corridor 
between Spanish contact in the 1520s and the discontinuation 
of the Honduran fleet in 1633.
In the process, I have described the historical and 
spatial contexts that focussed Spanish colonists' attentions 
on the problem of overland transisthmian transport 
throughout Central America. Mindful of Meinig's (1962: 413) 
call that historical geographers should understand decision 
makers' "geographical visions," I have presented the 
geographical facts about each of the four primary
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transisthmian crossings. From these facts and the decisions 
made, it is clear that then, as now, the high costs of 
overland transport caused the Spanish to favor Panama, site 
of the narrowest isthmian crossing, over the others despite 
its deficiencies and the others7 potentialities. The choice 
of Panama also reflected the willingness of the Spaniards to 
forfeit advantageous settlement opportunities on the 
isthmus7 interior in favor of a rapid, if arduous and 
pestilential, crossing. Tracking the Tehuantepec and 
Nicaraguan crossings beyond the colonial period demonstrated 
that, despite the failure of each to capture the flow from 
Peru, varying degrees of spatial inertia were established 
with regard to transisthmian transport.
The scope of inquiry sharpened to focus on the Honduran 
corridor, its early history, its primary actors and their 
"geographical visions." Francisco Montejo, the principal 
actor, was shown to be an administrator with a clear vision 
of how he intended to develop his province. For Monte jo the 
transisthmian corridor would be the province7s spine of 
settlement and economic activity. The relocation of Spain7s 
transisthmian transport to this corridor can be thought of 
as the "catalytic action" (Burghardt 1969: 435-436) to focus 
settlement activity along the length of the corridor. This 
notion of Montejo7s finds the adelantado in agreement with 
Vidal de la Blache and Brunhes7 that the road could "sow 
seeds of life." In contrast to the development of the
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Panama crossing, Montejo believed that the flow from Peru 
could stimulate the development of his province's interior.
Montejo desired that those seeds of life germinate in 
the broad upland Comayagua Valley, located at the center of 
this spine. This site would become Central America's 
transport hub and commercial center. Puerto Caballos at the 
corridor's northern terminus would be the region's major 
port. Montejo's pursuit of his plans was interrupted 
abruptly and he never got to press his case for rerouting 
the Spain's transisthmian traffic. Neither the silver 
strikes in the Tegucigalpa area in the 1570s nor indigo or 
cattle production were activities sufficient to catalyze 
settlement.
The review of pre-Columbian transport studies suggested 
that aboriginal travellers and their products might have 
coursed through the Honduran corridor. Historical sources 
demonstrated that some indigenous flows coincided with the 
Spaniards' primary colonial route network. This information 
was insufficient to conclude that Montejo simply 
appropriated an indigenous trace.
The early focus on the Spaniards' attempts to simply 
get across the Central American isthmus revealed traces of 
the problem of colonial route planning and construction. 
With the Interlude and ensuing chapters these concerns were 
further developed. Cognizant of the need to consider 
colonial transport and road-building from the standpoint of
313
"former occupants ... needs and capacities" (Sauer 1941b: 
10), information concerning route and transport factors 
including funding, labor supply, means of conveyance, means 
of sustenance, construction strategies, agricultural 
potential, and settlement potential were collected. The 
result is arguably the most comprehensive collection of 
documents on colonial Latin American transport.
Transport and road-building factors were discussed and 
appraised for the region in general, and the Honduran 
corridor in particular. This survey demonstrated that, in 
addition to Montejo's brief tenure, the development of 
transport along the Honduran corridor suffered from a 
general lack of resources. Specifically, transport and 
road-building in Honduras were undermined by the province's 
lack of labor, mules, agricultural potential and general 
economic activity. The length of the corridor and its 
difficult topography further maligned its promise.
With Chapter Nine I attempted to capture vestiges of 
the experience of colonial travel by combining my field 
notes with travel accounts from early in this century and 
royal surveys from 1590. The resulting travelogue and 
photographs show the reader Honduras' transisthmian 
corridor. Scattered descriptions of current travel along 
the corridor reveal continuities that demonstrate that the 
unique characteristics that distinguished this strip of 
region in the past persist in the present.
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Montejo's Honduran Pipe Dream
I call Montejo's planned route network a "pipe dream" 
for three reasons. Firstly, pipe dreams rarely come true. 
And Montejo's dream of transforming Honduras' transisthmian 
corridor into Central America's primary colonial transport 
artery did not come true. Secondly, pipe dreams are founded 
upon fantastic notions. And Montejo's plan, indeed, 
depended on extremely tenuous circumstances. For it to have 
succeeded, Spain's transisthmian traffic would have had to 
have been shifted from Panama to Honduras. Because Honduras 
possessed neither the population, human or animal, to 
support transisthmian traffic, the corridor would have had 
to have been settled by a large contingent of slaves and 
farmers, not to mention mules or oxen (Antonelli and 
Quintanilla 1590: 16). The final reason for calling
Montejo's plan a pipe dream is that pipe dreams promise a 
finer future. And had the plan succeeded, Honduras' 
colonial development would have followed a dramatically 
superior course. Instead of lagging behind as a forgotten 
and fairly empty colonial backwater, Honduras would have 
emerged as Central America's center of commerce.
Montejo's pipedream was undermined by a host of 
internal and external factors. Among the external factors 
were: 1) the brevity of Montejo's administration; 2) the 
early entrenchment of the Panama crossing; and 3) the 
regional hegemony of Guatemala. The internal factors
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include: 1) the lack of human or animal power; and 2) the 
nature of the canvas on which Montejo sketched his plans. 
For while the corridor's fluvial route occasionally provided 
a relatively gentle grade, it also demanded the construction 
of numerous bridges of seasonally torrential streams, and 
forced travellers to slog through quagmirous stretches of 
low floodplains. The corridor's span also was simply too 
long for economic overland transisthmian transport, given 
the technology available.
Despite the utter failure of Montejo's plan during his 
lifetime, two more maps demonstrate the clarity of his 
vision. Map 14 shows Honduras' current network of paved 
roads. Map 15 results from the superimposition of Map 14 
with Montejo's planned route network (Map 12) and allows a 
comparison of the two. The similarities are readily 
apparent as are several differences. Most of the routes 
that Montejo sought have been paved. Puerto Cortes, Central 
America's largest port, occupies Puerto Caballos' former 
location at the northern end of the transisthmian corridor. 
This port is linked to Comayagua by Honduras' trunkline, La 
Carretera del Norte. Paved roads also connect Puerto Cortes 
to Guatemala City and Trujillo. Olancho, moreover, is 
linked, if indirectly, to the corridor.
Significant differences in the two networks are found 
in the corridor's southern half. Rather than extending the 
entire length of the corridor, La Carretera del Norte veers
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to the southeast at the Comayagua Valley's southern rim. 
This resulted from the contrasting fortunes of two areas.
Since the time of Montejo, the Goascoran basin never 
experienced a lasting economic boom that stimulated 
substantial settlement or investment in transport 
infrastructure. Therefore travel over this stretch of the 
corridor currently is served by a poorly graded cobble and 
gravel road.
Conversely, Tegucigalpa, the trunkline's present 
southernmost destination, enjoyed dramatic growth as a 
result of two silver mining boom period, one in the 1570s 
(MacLeod 1973: 148; West 1958: 769) and another in the
1800s. These and other related developments drew the focus 
of infrastructure investment away from the transisthmian 
corridor and established Tegucigalpa as the route network's 
hub.
In conclusion, Montejo's plan to secure Spain's 
transisthmian trade was a colonial pipe dream. That trade 
never coursed through the corridor to a significant degree. 
The Comayagua Valley remains a fairly empty site waiting to 
be filled while the settlement spills out of the overcrowded 
Tegucigalpa basin. Nevertheless, practicality of Montejo's 
route network is proven by the persistence of his routes in 
the modern Honduran road network. The earliest intense road 
building effort occurred between San Pedro and its port, and 
today that precise route is the only divided, four-lane
expressway in the country. As a complement to the other 
extreme of the early 16th century, the eastern frontier road 




Explanation of Document Collection Abbreviations
AGI = Archivo General de las Indias
ANH = Archivo Nacional de Honduras
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vols. Madrid, 1885-1932.
DHN = Documentos para la Historia de Nicaragua. Madrid: 
Juan Bravo, 1956.
FHT = Zavala, Silvio and Maria Castelo. Fuentes para la
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Panuco, Mexico: Fondo De Cultura Economica, 1939-.
PD = Rubiano, Pablo A. Pedrarias Davila. Madrid: Consejo 
Superior de Investigaciones Cientificas, Instituto 
Gonzalo Fernandez de Oviedo, 1944.
RABN = Revista del Archivo y Biblioteca Nacionales 
(Honduras).
RAH = Real Academia de Historia, Madrid.
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KING PHILIP II'S INSTRUCTIONS FOR ROUTE SURVEY (1588)
Translated and abstracted from:
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Sula, Honduras (1955): 224-227.
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1. Travel to Honduras considering the navigation and ease or 
difficulty of arriving at Puerto Caballos.
2. Punctually and precisely sound the port from its 
entrance, proceeding to its shores. Carefully examine 
possible anchorages. Seek places where ships can be boarded 
from land and not like Nombre de Dios where people must walk 
and carry cargo in chest-deep water to board and disembark 
a ship. This regrettable practice causes the majority of 
sickness and death there.
3. Examine and sound the bay, noting its prospects for 
unloading and unloading. Is it sheltered from wind? Can 
its entrance be fortified? At what price? How many ships 
can it accommodate? Are there heavy downpours? When? Are 
there shipworms or other inconveniences natural to the site? 
Are the environs suitable for healthful settlement?
4. Travel the road from Puerto Caballos to the Bahia de 
Fonseca with Francisco de Valverde, Juan Garcia de 
Hermosilla, Captain Pedro Ochoa de Leguizamo and see if it 
conforms to past reports, if it is used, if it has opened 
anew, if it is rough, if it leads over mountains or through 
thickets or other bad places. Determine whether it is rocky 
or has swamps or other inconveniences. What sort of rivers 
must be crossed? Are they voluminous rivers or small rivers 
that swell greatly with the onset of rain? Are they crossed 
with bridges or boats? Are they passable year-round? If the 
route can be made to accomodate carts, how much will it cost 
and how long will it take?
5. Observe with great care the province's roads that are 
very difficult and flimsy.' Landecho, Villalobos and now 
Valverde have opened roads at great cost. Some have become 
so bad that transport is not possible and beasts perish on 
them. Observe whether work and cost have become unfruitful. 
Keep your findings confidential. And go about your survey 
as inconspicuously as possible.
6. Consider the population of Indians and Spaniards who live 
along the road and the surrounding area. Observe whether 
they are healthfully and well situated. Consider the 
inhabitants' standard of subsistence. See if you can obtain 
the essentials at both ports, and at what price.
7. See if they raise, and if there exist, beasts of burden 
in abundance for transport. What is the current price for 
these beasts? Do they have the corn, pasture ... sufficient 
for their maintenance?
8. In both ports see if there is fresh water for 
provisioning fleets and ships. Are there enough rocks for
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quagmires? Is there hemp, nails, wood and other materials 
necessary for building and repairing ships? Is there lime, 
gypsum, wood and stones for buildings? Where are the most 
convenient locations for populations to be settled near the 
ports? Note the healthfulness of the locations and the 
availability of the resources necessary to provide for the 
people who come with the fleets and overland trade. There 
will be a demand for firewood and pasture and watering holes 
for cattle.
9. It has been reported that the Bahia de Fonseca is a good 
point of departure for ships sailing to Peru. This is 
because the trip is said to be shorter and safer than the 
trip from Panama. The same applies for trips to Nueva 
Espana, the Philippines, India and China. In the course of 
your investigation try to verify these claims.
10. It has also been reported that Honduran residents can 
transport merchandise from Puerto Caballos to Fonseca for 
less than half of what it costs to travel from Nombre de 
Dios to Panama and that they pay two pesos for every load. 
The money collected is used to repair roads. With less than 
this amount the roads could be repaired. If the change 
should take place, conservation of the roads would require 
me to provide some funding. It has also been reported that 
merchants, mariners and passengers would be quite rebellious 
at the increase in price that would accompany trade and the 
royal rent. Because it is necessary to understand clearly 
the situation, learn from the people who presently collect 
the fare approximately what price would be tolerable.
11. I have been informed that in all of the land there are 
many mines that, with work, could produce much profit and 
benefit the poverty of the citizens. If the change of 
routes is made, the land will become populated. This will 
provide the necessary labor and will result in great profit, 
especially if the good, fertile land is cultivated. And if 
for any reason hostilities should arise the citizens could 
be defended and aided by citizens in neighboring regions. 
In the same situation, those threatened could discover 
passages of escape from there (north coast) by the south 
coast to Popayan and Nueva Reino de Granada. This could be 
of great importance. They also could establish treaties 
with people in the lands in between where it is understood 
there is a lot of risk.
12. Learn from people who have knowledge of the north coast 
the nature of the wind. When do they blow? What 
impediments do they cause for navigation from Puerto 
Caballos to Habana? Is it an easy, safe passage? Which 
route is best?
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13. In all that you collect, learn and examine that which 
can be used. Those discoveries that seem useful should be 
pursued and the inherent ease or difficulties involved with 
their execution should be determined. For everything 
compile an extensive report and include designs for 
demonstration to enhance understanding.
APPENDIX B
SUMMARY OF ANTONELLI AND QUINTANILLA'S ROUTE SURVEY (1590)
Translated and abstracted from:
Antonelli, Juan Bautista de and Quintanilla, Diego Lopez 
de. "Relacion del Puerto de Caballos y su 
fortificacion. 7 de octubre de 1590," Academia de 
Geografia e Historia de Guatemala, Publicacion 






Puerto Caballos San Pedro
(Two routes)
c.ami nn por abaio
Puerto Caballos Rancho del Chamalucon 3
Low, bad road; barriers of hills and swamps because road 
runs on low land at the base of mountain; totally closed 
by thickets.
Rancho del Chamalucon Rio Blanco 2+
Wet, thicket-covered Chamalucon stretch; not as bad as 
previous stretch.
Rio Blanco Estancia del Tesorero 3.5
Follows piedmont; better than previous stretch; yet 
covered with big trees; cutting trees and opening a path 
of 70-80 feet breadth to expose road to sun and wind would 
improve present road.
Estancia del Tesorero San Pedro 4
Good level road that passes through grasslands with ample 
pasture for livestock.
r.nminn por arriba
Puerto Caballos San Pedro 10
First 4 leagues very bad road; passes through hills and 
several narrow passes suitable for pack animals; road 
leaves uplands 1 league north of Tesorero; could move 
part of the old road (camino abajo) and improve the 
remainder by clearing the thickets and exposing it to sun 
and wind; this road is better for pack animals and shorter 
than low road; takes one day for mules to travel from
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Puerto Caballos to San Pedro on the high road; by way of 
the low road travellers are forced to camp at Rfo Blanco 
where there is no pasture for pack animals.
San Pedro Rio Chamalucon 1.5
Level, firm road; rio is voluminous and overflows often; 
but locals report that waters subside quickly; requires a 
bridge; there is a good site complete with stones; could 
make pillars of stone; and an arched bridge that could be 
covered with thick trunks of the trees that grow in the 
vicinity; in this manner, much expense could be avoided.
Rio Chamalucon Rio Ulua 3
2.5 leagues through thickets with flat land and good soil; 
one-half league of grassland; Rio Chamalucon is voluminous 
and rapid and floods extensively; waters do not ebb 
readily and can delay fording for two to three days; it 
has a wide bed and presently is crossed with canoes; 
because of its width it would be too costly to construct 
a bridge; instead two or three chatas (flat-bottomed 
boats) each with a capacity of 20-25 mules could readily 
accommodate a mule-team; river is bounded by two steep 
banks that have bypasses.
Rio Ulua Rio Blanco 4
Two equally bad roads; one goes through wet lowlands and 
is used in dry season; the other is a rocky road that 
skirts the foot of a mountain; possible to build a wooden 
bridge across Rio Blanco because it is narrow.
Rio Blanco Estancia de Armento 2
Bad road.
Estancia de Armento Estancia de Medina 3
Good road; good pasture and water supply; only one hill; 
bypasses around both sides of it.
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Estancia de Medina Aramani 1.5
Two hills of good land and two intermittent streams; 
streams flood in wet season; Four to six hours wait before 
fording.
Aramani Miambar 4
Steep hills and deep ravines; good pasture and water; 
mixed oak-pine forest; good soil; possibility to remove 
some passes and ravines from route to make it suitable for 
droves of mules.
Miambar Los Ranchos 3.5
Good, firm road that leads over some foothills; mixed oak 
and pine forests; good pasture for cattle and many arroyos 
that cross the road; two leagues out of Miambar is Cuesta 
Blanca, a steep slope of about one-half league; one arroyo 
swells condiderably because of the many slopes nearby; 
land of bad quality.
Los Ranchos Maneani 4
First 3 leagues steep; land of good quality and dry; good 
pasture, water and open pine groves; crosses the Rio 
Comayagua where a bridge like that prescribed for 
Chamalucon is needed for pack animals; beyond river, road 
is level and runs through grassland with ample pasture for 
both cattle and sheep.
Maneani Comayagua 3*
Two leagues of gentle slopes followed by one league of 
level land with very good soil; lots of pasture and water 
for livestock; possible to reroute road out of Maneani by 
skirting the foothills of a mountain that trends toward 
Comayagua.
Comayagua Alamani 5
Leads across Comayagua Valley; good, firm, level road that 
leads across many streams and through pasture for 
livestock; Rio Comayagyua's ravines are very gentle.
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Alamani Ranchos del Obispo 5
Two roads; one presently used is adequate for mule droves 
... pasture and grass all the way to Fonseca; the other is 
presently only a path but the best possibility for a cart 
road; one league out of Alamani route climbs to the crest 
of a mountain; this stretch would be difficult to open for 
a cart road; route leads over ravine of level land and 
fertile soil then descends to a place called El Palmar; 
cross an arroyo with high banks where a bridge is needed 
for carts; take road to the right on a one-half league 
stretch of level piedmont; a level stretch through ample 
pasture and water leads to Rancho del Obispo; must cross 
a river that requires a bridge because of its volume 
before arriving at Ranchos del Obispo.
Ranchos del Obispo Quequanterique 3+
Some moderate-sized hills and ravines; good road and soil.,
Quequantequerique Estancia de Batres
(Two routes)
Present namino Real
The four leagues south of Quequantequerique are "the worst 
road there is from Comayagua to Fonseca"; it would be 
expensive to open those '4 leagues for carts; would 
require; two bridges over two large gorges, many culverts 
and embankments and ramparts of stone and lime, the 
levelling of a hill with picks and hoes, stone and stone 
and masonry walls to protect road from seasonal torrents 
that drain the abundant watersheds that line the route; 
road would be ruined every year and stymie trade and 
require extensive, expensive repairs annually.
Quequantequerique Loqueterique 3
Hills and ravines; ample pasture for livestock; this 
segment of road is presently used.
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Loqueterique Apazapo 3
Two leagues of hills and ravines; ample pasture and water 
for livestock; land appears to be dry because even with 
much water there is no mud; road is as good as that 
behind.
Apazapo Goascordn 3
Level road; good soil and ample pasture and water for 
livestock.
Goascoran Estancia de Batres 34-
Level road with bypasses around swamps; one-half leagues 
north of Goascoran is best site for a pack animal bridge 
across Rio Goascoran because of boulders in the middle of 
stream; from Alamani to Batres the camino real presently 
used could be upgraded for mule-teams inexpensively.
Proposed Route
Quequanterique los Llanos 4
One-half league north of Quequanterique is a good place to 
bridge the Rio Goascoran and bypass that settlement; the 
west side of the river is best for opening a cart road; 
there is a level stretch from crossing to one league south 
of Loqueterique.
los Llanos Rio de Paralox 4+
Good level road with pasture and water for livestock; 
river is voluminous in flood but locals say it ebbs with 
time; nevertheless, high banked river requires a bridge.
Rio de Paralox Rio de los Sauces 24-
Level terrain with ample pasture and water for livestock; 
high banked river requires bridge.
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Rio de los Sauces Rio de Pasaquina 3.5
Reasonably good road; borders Rio Goascoran; one mountain 
that can be bypassed; river is voluminous because of large 
watershed; requires a bridge.
Rio de Pasaquina Estancia de Batres 2+
Level road, somewhat rocky in some places and swampy in 
others; bypasses possible and in wet places, causeways; 
estancia is located on Rio de Cirama; similar to other 
streams in the vicinity, the river swells considerably but 
ebbs within one day and night; nevertheless, a bridge is 
required.
Estancia de Batres Rio de las Guacamayas 2.5f
Level road with ample pasture and water for livestock; 
climbs some hills in the vicinity of the river; this is 
where the main Fonseca settlement should be established; 
alternate route over this stretch is very swampy and 
contains some bad passes; this completes the road from 
Puerto Caballos to the Gulf of Fonseca.
* = leguas largas 
+ = leguas grandes
The cost of opening these roads and building the bridges:
250,000 ducats. Opening road for carts from Comayagua to 
Fonseca is very expensive. This stretch would be less 
expensive if it was made for pack animals because fewer 
bridges, culverts and other costs would be avoided.
APPENDIX C
SUMMARY OF VALVERDE'S ROUTE SURVEY (1590)
Translated and abstracted from:
Valverde, Francisco de. 11Relacion geografica 
de D. Francisco Valverde, 24 August 1590," 






Puerto Caballos Hato del Fraile
(Three Routes)
Cam-inn por baio
Puerto Caballos Rancho del Chamalucon 4
Total stretch covered by thickets; land of poor quality, 
humid and swampy; would be extremely difficult passage 
even during dry season; this route could be improved by 
opening it but it would still be ruined every wet season 
and difficult in dry season; no pasture because of 
thickets.
Rancho del Chamalucon Rio Blanco 3
Thicket-covered stretch; not as bad as previous stretch 
but still not good; lots of mud during wet season.
Rio Blanco Hato del Fraile 3
Better than previous stretch; covered with thickets; three 
leagues of forest; road leads over some ravines that have 
cut down into the surface and some lagoons associated with 
Rio Chamalucon; this stretch of thickets could be bypassed 
by putting the road on the piedmont of the nearby range 
and opening it as suggested for previous sections; need to 
open road 80 paces wide so wind and sun can dry it; 
presently it is closed year-round.
daminn por arriba
Puerto Caballos Hato del Fraile 10
Because of the poor quality of the low road, muleteers 
prefer another road they call the high road; it is three 
leagues shorter than the low road; this road leads over 
arroyos of stones and water that ordinarily rises to the 
level of a horse7s belly during the wet season; the second 
two-thirds of this road leads over similar arroyos; there 
are also slopes of very poor quality because there are 
hogbacks that with the passage of time and lack of
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maintenance have cut deep alleys that are presently 
hazardous to use; could repair these passes so that 
passage from Puerto Caballos to the savannas of Hato del 
Tesorero could be made in one day; the distance would be
6.5 leagues; passage would be less taxing than the low 
road with its lack of pasture.
Por Rio nhamalucon
Puerto Caballos Hato del Fraile
To avoid the inconviences of the two roads, a river route 
is possible; Rio Chamalucon passes about one league from 
the bay near Puerto Caballos; it would be easy to carry 
merchandise to the river and ship it upstream to Hato del 
Fraile; build warehouses at Hato del Fraile to break bulk; 
ample pasture at Hato to maintain and restore pack 
animals; a crew of negroes and Indians cut a path from 
Puerto Caballos to Chamalucon with machetes then traveled 
up river to Hato; another crew traveled down river 
sounding and examining navigation possibilities; from Hato 
to mouth of river is ten leagues; the channel that Rancho 
Chamalucon is on is the best to follow to arrive at the 
caldera; Rancho is four leagues away from Puerto Caballos 
and 2.5 leagues from the bay; channel is 1.5 fathoms deep 
from Hato del Fraile to its mouth and is 60 paces wide; it 
is not voluminous and is as calm as an estuary; at its 
mouth it is 8 spans deep with good bars such that loaded 
frigates and barks ascend the river with ease to Hato del 
Fraile using their poles; there are several narrow passes 
in the river choked with vegetation; these can be cleared 
easily and inexpensively; from the mouth of the river to 
Puerto Caballos is 3.5 leagues; with the land breezes 
blowing all year it would be best to leave Puerto Caballos 
at midnight arriving at the river by dawn; and if the 
breeze has risen, boats can proceed full speed; if not, 
they can tie up with ease.
Hato del Fraile San Pedro 3
Good, level road.
San Pedro Rio Chamalucon 2
Level road; river can be forded most of the year; in the 
wet seasopn canoes are used to cross; need to build a 
bridge of 120 paces width; a little upstream is a good 
site; bridge will be expensive because the great volume of 
the river requires it; supply of stones and lime on-site.
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Rio Chamalucon Rio Ulua 4
Rio Ulua is very voluminous in concordance with its large 
confluences; it would be difficult and expensive to build 
a bridge the river is more than 200 paces wide and in the 
wet season more than 400 paces; in addition, the banks are 
of unsteady material; could use barks for crossing; the 
road between San Pedro and Rio Ulua crosses more marshy 
areas that should be opened so that passage is possible 
during the wet season; there are scattered thickets.
Rio Ulua Rio Blanco 5
The low road crosses many swamps, one called Cimarron 
that in the height of the wet season is particularly 
difficult for mules; there are some bypasses possible that 
have not been opened by those who use this road because of 
some boulders that cannot be moved because of the erosion 
that would result; this situation occupies one-quarter 
league of the route.
Rio Blanco Estancia de Armenta 2
Rio Blanco is voluminous and requires a bridge because it 
cannot be forded in the wet season; good situation for a 
wooden bridge because river is not wider than 40 feet 
neither is the current rapid nor does it fill its banks; 
on its banks are ample supplies of wood: madre de cacao 
and oaks; a durable wooden bridge will suffice; a stone 
bridge would be expensive because the banks do not possess 
proper building stones; lime would have to be carried from 
two leagues away.
Estancia de Armenta Aramani 4
Land is drier and of good quality; ford two rivers easily; 
however, the river near Aramani is almost big enough to 
cause delay; however, the locals say the confluence is 
nearby.
Aramani Miambar 5
Rugged, folded terrain; ford three rivers easily; it seems 
easy fords result from nearby confluence; road is firm and 
has some good shortcuts to avoid several rugged passes.
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Miambar Los Ranchos 4
Firm road of good quality that traverses a rugged stretch; 
ford three rivers easily because of nearby confluences.
Los Ranchos Maniani 3
Ford 3 rivers; the river near Maniani causes no delay 
because the confluence is within 1.5 leagues.
Maniani Comayagua 3.5
Firm road; for the most part over rough terrain; ford one 
arroyo twice; the good water in Comayagua's river is the 
city's source of drinking water.
From Puerto Caballos to Comayagua is 46 leagues by the low 
road and 43 by the high road; it seems impossible to open 
this stretch for carts because of the ruggedness of some 
areas and the wetness of the level areas that make them 
worse than the rugged areas; between Armenta and Puerto 
Caballos carts would have to swim through the mud; because 
of these qualities it is difficult to plan bypasses, 
especially from Maniani to Estancia de Armenta; upon 
hearing from Comayagua's citizens that a cart road to 
Armenta was impossible, Leguizamo assembled a survey 
party that included Indians from Miambar and Maniani; the 
Indians were included because they were reported to have 
milpas scattered four to six leagues from their homes and 
thus had a good walking knowledge of the area; the party 
searched for 10 or 12 days and Leguizamo reported finding 
a passage for a cart road that could be opened without 
much cost.
Comayagua Amani 5
Crosses a river that, will require a wood bridge 80 paces 
in width; there are stones, lime and good quality chalk 
nearby; valley is seven leagues long and 3.5 wide; it 
presently contains many estancias of cattle and produces 
a variety of crops, especially vheat and corn; the land 
seems capable of growing anything that is planted; could 
irrigate whole valley because of principal river and five 
others; should farmers come, valley is prepared to 
eventually provide plenty; presently area surrounding 
valley proper is principally in wheat and corn; for some 
reason Indians ate plantains instead of corn this year; in
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the valley a hanega, or fanega, of wheat cost 14 reales, 
they felt it necessary to buy some at that price for the 
trip back to Puerto Caballos.
Amani Ranchos del Obispo 4
Firm road over rough terrain; opening this stretch for 
carts would be costly and difficult because of floods.
Ranchos del Obispo Agiienqueterique 3





Firm, if uneven road of good quality for pack animals; 
seems impossible to open for cart route; for floods, can 
make bypasses in some especially difficult places.
Locterique Apazapo 3
Two leagues rough, firm land; impossible to open for 
carts; good quality for pack animals; need to bypass 
several turns in a few places where it is possible.
Apazapo Guascoran 3
Good road that only requires the bypassing of two or three 
passes to make it suitable for carts.
Proposed Route
Because of the difficult nature of the six leagues that 
separate Agiienqueterique and Apazapo they explored another 
road that Leguizamo had already scouted.
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Agiienqueterique San Francisco
Crossed the Rio Guascoran one-half league from 
Agiienqueterique; because of its volume and the fact that 
it sometimes detains people for many days, river needs a 
bridge; apparently possesses a natural foundation for 
bridge; must be 45 paces wide, one arch; limestone and 
quarries on-site; road to San Francisco is good.
San Francisco Cacualpa de Tecla obra 2.5
Most of this distance is impossible for cart road because 
of numerous slopes, and bypasses filled with thousands of 
large holes or cracks; the cost of opening cart road 
would be high and road would not be durable because land 
is easily eroded by water; Antonelli and Quintanilla 
believe it is feasible; respects Antonelli's experience 
and judgement; this stretch woud be better than present 
road for mule-teams; and described bridge would be cheaper 
than the one proposed just outside of Guascoran.
Cacualpa de Tecla Guascoran 3 .5
Firm, flat road through depopulated area; three easily 
crossed rivers; Rio de los Sauces requires a bridge; in 
place of the Locterique, Apazapo, and Guascoran, one 
Francisco P6rez has an estancia with places that 
travellers could use to pass the night; need to establish 
inns; until the pueblos can provide sustenance.
Guascor&n Estancia de Batres 4
Can be made into a road of good quality; need three or 
four bypasses to avoid swamps; road also crosses Rio 
Goascoran and Pazaquina and one by the old settlement of 
Cizama near Batres; bridge over Goascoran should be 
constructed 1000 paces north of pueblo; it will be 
expensive; however, stones and lime are on-site; because 
of the the river's volume one of the arches must be at 
least 50 paces; also need bridges over Rio de los Sauces 
and Pazaquina.
Estancia de Batres Fonseca 2.5
The best place for a settlement near Fonseca is at Asiento 
de Francisco Lopez Quintero; this location is not on a 
current road but there is another that would be good, firm 
and suitable for carts.
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To construct a cart road from Comayagua to Fonseca would 
require alot of culverts in addition to the bridges already 
mentioned. To open the road I have described would cost 
alot.
APPENDIX D
ANTONELLI AND QUINTANILLA'S ROUTE PROJECTIONS (1590)
Translated and abstracted from:
Antonelli, Juan Bautista de and Quintanilla, Diego 
Lopez de. "Relacion del Puerto de Caballos y su 
fortificacion. 7 de octubre de 1590," Academia de 
Geografia e Historia de Guatemala, Publicacion 




1. One fleet, "flota de tierra firme", carries approximately
11,000 tons of cargo to Puerto Caballos.
2. Every one ton of merchandise will be divided into eight 
cargoes for land transport to the Gulf of Fonseca.
Requirements for Recua Transport:
1. 88,000 cargoes will require 14,660 mules to make six
trips per year.
2. Each mule will require approximately five pounds of corn, 
"a medio celemin de maiz", per day for a total of 
approximately 13,900 bushels of corn, 87,916 fanegas.
3. One African to care for and lead five mules: 2,933 
Africans
4. One foreman, "capataz espanol o un negro de razon", per 40 
mules: 366 foremen.
5. Foremen ride horses: 366 horses and corn for them and 
Africans.
6. 2,000 additional tame, harnessed mules to replace deaths 
incidental to transport.
7. Additional mules and sustenance for transport of 
passengers across Honduras.
Requirements for Cart Traffic from Comayagua to Fonseca:
1. Each cart will carry eight cargoes: 1,833 carts making 
six trips per year.
2. One African and other person to service cart: 1833 men.
3. One foreman per 40 carts: 46 foremen.
4. Three pair of oxen per cart: 10,998 oxen.
5. Additional replacement oxen.
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Settlement Requirements:
1. 400-500 married farmers from Castile with their families 
to be distributed throughout the route to raise wheat, corn 
etc.
2. 2,000 Africans to be distributed among these farmers.
3. Require mule-team owners to begin building up their 
individual populations.
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